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-· Introduction 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Terms of Reference 
This  is  the  Final  Report  of  a  study for  DG  XIII  of  the  European Commission on  the 
Regulaton;  and  Legal  Issues  Associated  with  the  Creation  of a  Regulatory  Authorihj  for 
Telecommunications at the Level of  the Union. 
According to the terms of reference, the study consists of the following: 
•  identification  of  what  are  considered  by  market  players  to  be  the  current  or 
emerging core regulatory issues which would best be dealt with at a European rather 
than a national level; 
•  analysis of the potential operational problems which might result from the existence 
of  split  regulatory  responsibilities  and  recommendations  to  overcome  these 
problems; 
•  analysis of the legal issues surrounding the creation of such an authority. 
It is not the within the remit of this study to make policy recommendations on the merits of 
such an authority.  The purpose of the Study is exclusively to focus on the level of support 
within the telecommunications sector for  the resolution of certain regulatory issues at a 
European level, which we have assessed via a survey of organisations active in the sector, 
and to examine the legal and operational issues surrounding the creation of an EU-level 
regulatory  body  for  telecommunications  (henceforth  referred  to  as  the  'European 
Regulatory Authority'). 
The full terms of reference are contained in Appendix 1. 
The  conclusions  drawn in this  report are  those  of  the  authors and do not engage  the 
European Commission. 
1.2  Context of the Study 
The European Community is currently in the final stages of adopting the proposals for the 
regulatory framework  governing the  telecommunications  industry after  1  January  1998 
when all special and exclusive rights of telecommunications networks and services in the 
Community will have been removed  I. 
Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal, Spain and Luxembourg have been given  the  right to  apply to  the Community for 
derogations to the 1 January 1998 deadline for liberalisation.  The Commission is currently examining requests 
received which, with the exception of Greece, do not attempt to delay liberalisation beyond 2000. 
1 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
As part of this process, a common regulatory framework is being developed for a number of 
key  areas,  such as  universal service,  interconnection and licensing,  which draws on the 
current institutions in the telecommunications sector in order to  optimise the  respective 
roles of the national regulatory authorities, the European Commission and the Community 
and of pan-European and international bodies and their off-shoots (such as the International 
Telecommunications  Union  (ITU),  the  Conference  of  European  Post  and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)  or the European Telecommunications Office 
(ETO)). 
Both  the  European  Parliament  and  telecommunications  industry  participants  have 
identified the need to streamline enforcement of the regulatory framework in Europe and 
called for an authority at a European level.  In 1994, the Report on "Europe and the global 
information society"  ("Bangemann Group Report") argued for such an authority, without, 
however, seeking to define its remit. 
A European Regulatory Authority could have varying powers and functions according to 
the wishes of the Community and the common position established with Member States. 
The  range of possibilities for  increased Community-level telecommunications regulation, 
starting with the lowest level of European co-ordination and integration and ending with 
the highest, includes: 
•  a co-ordinating role for the Commission to guide national regulatory authorities and 
encourage best practice among them; 
•  a rationalisation of the work of the various existing telecommunications committees 
and bodies that operate at a Community or wider pan-European level; 
•  creation of a body which: 
receives and carries out specific mandates from the Commission on a broad 
or narrow sphere and advises it and the national regulatory authorities on 
current or future regulatory issues; and 
takes over, in a  more rationalised and comprehensible form,  some of the 
technical functions  of other existing European telecommunications bodies 
and  committees  (both  inside  and/or  outside  the  Community)  but  with 
greater  resources  and a  larger  secretariat enabling it to  take  on a  more 
effective  ex-ante  role  in  developing  policy  recommendations  and/  or 
monitoring the market; 
•  a regulatory body having day-to-day management powers which complement some 
of  the  duties  of  national  regulatory  authorities,  particularly  in  relation  to  pan-
European networks or services, but which work within objectives and policies set 
from time to time by the Community; 
•  an independent regulatory body. 
2 Introduction 
Against  the  background  of  emerging  competition  and  the  offering  of  pan-European 
networks and services, the purpose of the Study is to look beyond 1998 to examine, in the 
light  of  our  Survey  of  telecommunication  market  players,  whether  the  current 
responsibilities of different telecommunications bodies and the balance between them will 
be  sufficient  to  meet  market  needs  or  whether  gaps  exist  in  the  current  regulatory 
framework which call for resolution at a European level or by a new European Regulatory 
Authority. 
1.3  Structure of Report 
The structure of the rest of the Report is as follows: 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter4. 
Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7. 
Oven,iew of Current Regulatory Structure:  In the second chapter of the study, 
we present an overview of the current regulatory structure, and proposals 
already  on  the  table  for  regulating  telecommunications  following 
liberalisation in 1998. 
Survey  Results:  In  this  chapter,  we  identify  the  views  of  market players 
regarding which, if any, current or emerging core regulatory issues would 
best be dealt with at a European rather than a national level. 
Analysis  of  Legal  Powers  of  the  European  Community  as  Applied  to 
Telecommunications: In Chapter 4, we look at the legal powers of the European 
Community as applied to telecommunications in general and, in particular, 
the powers that would need to be invoked by the Community in order to 
create a European Regulatory Authority. 
Lessons from  Other Countries and Sectors and Issues raised by Convergence: In this 
chapter, we draw lessons regarding the function and form of a  European 
Regulatory  Authority  from  the  division  of  regulatory  responsibilities 
between federal and state governments in the  United States, Canada and 
Australia and from the role of pan-European and Community bodies in other 
sectors.  We also examine some of the implications of the convergence for the 
creation of a European Regulatory Authority. 
Legal and Operational Issues: In Chapter 6, we discuss legal issues arising from 
the  creation  of  a  European Regulatory  Authority,  which  includes  issues 
raised by any decisions on the geographic reach of a European Regulatory 
Authority and legal issues relating to the specific functions of a  European 
Regulatory Authority suggested by Survey respondents.  We then discuss 
some of the general operational issues that would need to be considered in 
creating a European Regulatory Authority. 
Conclusions:  In  the  final  chapter  of  the  Report,  we  draw  together  our 
conclusions from the study. 
3 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications  n;e;r;a 
In addition to  the main body of the Report, we have produced a  stand-alone Executive 
Summary  and  a  separate  volume  which  contains  the  appendices  to  the  Report.  The 
appendices contained in this separate volume are as follows: 
Appendix 1.  Terms of  Reference 
Appendix 2.  List of  Interviews 
Appendix 3.  Briefing Note for Interviewers 
Appendix 4.  Questionnaire 
Appendix 5.  Existing Institutions in Telecommunications 
Appendix 6.  Lessons to be Learned from Other Sectors 
Appendix 7.  Covington  &  Burling Report on  Federalism  in  United  States  Telecommunications 
Policy 
Appendix 8.  Subsidiarity under Recent Proposals 
Appendix 9.  The Proposed Community Position on Licensing and Interconnection 
4 Overview of Current Regulatory Structure 
2.  OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
2.1  Introduction 
A decade ago,  the market in Europe was dominated by state-owned telecommunications 
operators and broadcasters  enjoying national monopolies,  and by 'national champions' 
supplying equipment which conformed to locally set standards.  In 1984, the Community 
adopted  a  telecommunications  policy  designed  to  promote  an  advanced  European 
telecommunications infrastructure, stimulate a  Community-wide market for  services and 
equipment and contribute to the competitiveness of European industry and services. 
In 1987,  the Commission published a Green Paper2 setting out a blueprint for a coherent 
programme of Community action based on three broad objectives: 
•  the liberalisation of services; 
•  opening up national borders in the terminal equipment market; 
•  promoting open access to the telecommunications infrastructure. 
In  1993,  following  the  so-called  '1992  Telecoms  Review3'  which  examined  the  partial 
liberalisation of telecommunications services introduced up to that date, the Council called 
for  the liberalisation of all public voice telephony services by 1 January 1998  (subject to 
additional transitional periods of up to five years for Member States with less developed 
networks) in its resolution of 22 July 1993, and followed this with the call for provision of 
telecommunications infrastructure to be liberalised according to the same timetable in its 
resolution of 22 December 1994. 
Between 1990 and 1996, further Green Papers were published on satellite communications 
policy  (1990)4,  on  mobile  communications  (1994)5,  and  on  the  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure and cable  television networks  (1995)6•  In November 
1996, the Commission also produced a Green Paper on numbering policy7• 
To  give effect to  the political decisions  which followed  the Green Papers and the 1992 
Telecoms Review, four Article 90 Directives, culminating in the Full Competition Directive 
(96/19/EC)8  of  13  March  1996,  have  been  adopted  by  the  Commission,  and  five 
COM(87)290. 
See Commission Communication of 21 October 1992, SEC(92) 1048 and Communication on the consultation on the 
review of the situation in the telecommunications services sector, COM(93) 159 final, 28.4.93. 
COM(90)490. 
COM(94)145. 
COM(94)440 and COM(94)628. 
COM(96)590. 
The  other  three  were  Directives  94/46/EC  (satellite  communications),  96/2/EC  (mobile  and  personal 
communications) and 95/51/EC (cable television networks). 
5 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
harmonisation measures have been proposed to the European Parliament and the Council 
and are at varying stages of  agreement9.  The  proposals for  a  Licensing  Directive  and 
Interconnection Directive are discussed in Appendix 9 of the Report. 
As a result of these measures and proposals, Europe now has a well-developed regulatory 
framework for the telecommunications sector which balances: 
•  day to  day management of the sector and policy-making functions  at a  national 
level; 
•  a  policy  function  and  common  set  of  regulatory  principles  established  at  the 
Community Level; 
•  a Commission role in: 
enforcing Community legislation, 
policing internal market and Treaty competition rules, 
funding at a Community level of technical mandates carried out by the Euro-
pean Committee of Telecommunications  Regulatory  Affairs  (ECTRA),  the 
European  Telecommunications  Office  (ETO)  and  the  European 
Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI),  and  conducting  external 
trade negotiations on behalf of the Community; 
•  Europe-wide  activities  under  pre-existing  arrangements  established  by  the 
Conference of European Post and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)  in 
the  area  of  numbering,  radio  frequencies;  one-stop  shopping for  licensing  and 
harmonisation of licensing conditions. 
The  regulatory framework for  the new era post 1 January 1998  is  not yet set in stone, 
although  the  Full  Competition  Directive  (96/19/EC)  has  been  adopted,  and Common 
Positions have been reached on the proposed Interconnection Directive (July 1996), ONP 
Framework  amending  Directive  (September  1996),  and  Licensing  Directive  (December 
1996). 
6 
These are: 
Common Position (EC) No 34/96, OJ C220, 29.7.96 (Interconnection Directive); 
Common Position (EC)  No 58/96, OJ  C315,  24.10.96  (Amendment to  ONP Framework and Leased Lines 
Directives); 
Common Position (EC) No 7/97, OJ C41, 10.2.97 (Licensing Directive); 
Common Position (EC)  No 6/97, OJ C41,  10.2.97 (Decision on Satellite-Personal Communications Services 
(S-PCS)); 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive COM(96)419, OJ C371, 9.12.96 (Amendment to the 
ONP Voice Telephony Directive). 
I _I 
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2.2  Role of the Commission 
The Commission is the guardian of the EC Treaty: its most important function is to ensure 
that the provisions of the Treaty are implemented and it also monitors the observance of 
measures  promulgated  by  all  institutions,  particularly  Regulations,  Directives  and 
Decisions. 
In the context of liberalisation, the Commission may adopt legislation under its competition 
powers.  Article 90 of the Treaty gives the Commission express powers to adopt Directives 
and Decisions to ensure the application of Treaty rules, in particular the competition rules to 
undertakings with special and exclusive  rights.  It may do so  without the  necessity  to 
consult with the Council or European Parliament.  The Commission has, however, tended in 
practice to consult the public, the Council and European Parliament before embarking on 
important legislation,  for  example  the  four  most recent  telecommunications  Article  90 
measures.  In all other areas of importance, legislation is adopted by the Council (or jointly 
by  the  Council  and  European  Parliament).  While  the  measures  liberalising  the 
telecommunications sector have been adopted by the Commission (under Article 90),  the 
measures creating a harmonised regulatory environment for,· in particular, voice telephony, 
licensing and interconnection have been or will be measures which are proposed by the 
Commission but adopted by the European Parliament and Council (predominantly under 
Article lOOa). 
Within the Commission there are 24 Directorate Generals, five of which have at least some 
responsibility in relation to telecommunications.  Those with the greatest involvement are 
DG XIII, which has primary responsibility for telecommunications policy, and DG IV, which 
is responsible for competition policy and, in particular, for measures taken under Article 90 
of the Treaty, as well as for investigating complaints of anti-competitive conduct.  DG IV 
was responsible (inter alia) for promoting the Services Directive (90/388/EEC) and the Full 
Competition Directive (96/19/EC). 
To  assist the Commission in its work, a number of Committees have been established by 
Community legislation: 
•  the ONP Committee has advisory, regulatory and dispute resolution functions in 
relation to its work on Open Network Provision issues (further discussed in Section 
4.3.2b); 
•  the Approval Committee on Tenninal Equipment advises the Commission on draft 
measures taken under the Terminal Equipment Directive; 
•  non-statutory Committees: 
the proposed Licensing Directive now envisages the creation of a Licensing 
Committee to assist in monitoring the application of the Licensing Proposal 
(see Appendix 9); 
7 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications  n;e;r;a 
the Senior Officials  Group on Telecommunications has not met since July 
1993  and its  functions  have  largely  been  taken  over  by  the  High  Level 
Committee  of  National  Regulatory  Authorities,  which  was  created  by 
Council at the time of the 1992 Telecommunications Review. 
2.3  National Regulatory Authorities 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) have been established in most (but not all) Member 
States.  These NRAs have various degrees of authority and various degrees of independence 
from the relevant Ministry.  In keeping with the terms of reference of this study, the Report 
assumes  that,  in the  near future,  there  will  be  independent and effective  NRAs  in all 
Member States and hence that some of the current problems of enforcement of European 
Community (EC)  measures will no longer exist.  The Council of Ministers recently affirmed 
its  commitment  to  NRAs  when  reaching  a  Common  Position  on  Satellite-Personal 
Communications Systems (S-PCS). 
Directives  are  transposed into national legislation  and implemented locally,  and prime 
responsibility for  the implementation and enforcement of  Directives  therefore  lies  with 
Member State governments and NRAs.  This would, of course, continue to be so were a 
European Regulatory Authority to be established.  The regulatory structure and power of 
NRAs in the European Union (EU) is set out in Table 2.1. 
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1
 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
We set out below, in Table 2.2, details of the number of staff in NRAs in Member States and 
a number of non-Member States and in ERO and ETO. 
2.4  Pan-European Non Community Bodies: CEPT, ECTRA/ETO and 
ERCfERO 
The Conference of European Post and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)  is  a 
long-standing organisation of national bodies.  It has no formal link with the EU  and its 
membership of 43  includes 28  non-EU countries.  The CEPT has two committees dealing 
with telecommunications matters.  These are: 
•  the European Committee of Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs (ECTRA); and 
•  the European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC). 
Representatives of the EC are councillors within both ECTRA and the ERC. 
Two bodies, one of which is an organ of ECTRA and the other an organ of the ERC, are of 
particular relevance for the present study.  These bodies are respectively: 
•  the European Telecommunications Office (ETO); and 
•  the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO). 
2.4.1  ECTRA and ETO 
a.  ECTRA 
The European Committee of Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs (ECTRA) is one of the 
working committees of the CEPT.  Of interest in the context of the present study are the 
ECTRA  working  groups  and  project  teams  which  are  developing  harmonised  licence 
conditions for specific services. 
b.  ETO 
The  European Telecommunications Office  (ETO)  was formed in September 1994  and is 
based in Copenhagen.  The ETO Memorandum was signed by 24 of the 43 countries of the 
CEPT.  It participates  in the areas  of licensing and numbering and its  main tasks  are 
undertaken for the European Commission.  ETO currently has 9 members of staff. 
In the area of numbering ETO plays a role in: 
• 
• 
12 
the establishment of a European telecommunications numbering scheme; 
providing assistance to national administrations on numbering issues such as carrier 
selection, number portability and the harmonisation of short codes.  I Overview of Current Regulatory Structure 
Table 2.2 
Personnel in Telecommunications Regulatory Bodies ( 1> 
Member States 
Country  Total Personnel  Personnel in 
Frequency Management 
Austria  ~300 
Belgium  ~175 
Denmark  ~150 
Finland  ~130 
France  ~200 
Germany  ::::400 
Greece  ~60 
Ireland  ~40 
Italy  ~300 
Luxembourg  ~12 
Netherlands  ~450 
Portugal  ~300 
Spain  ~350 
Sweden  ~165 
United Kingdom  ~215 
Non-Member States 
Country  Total 
Personnel 
Australia  n.a. 
Hong Kong  ~250 
Singapore  ~150 
United States (FCC) (2>  ~2,000 
United States (state regulators)  (3)  ~9,600 
Pan-European Bodies 
Body 
European Radiocommunications Office (ERO) 
European Telecommunications Office (ETO) 
Personnel in 
Frequency 
Management 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Source:  National Regulatory Authorities, ERO,  ETO, NARUC. 
n.a. 
~95 
10-15 
~70 
~30 
~so 
n.a. 
~25 
n.a. 
~4 
~40 
~120 
~100 
~115 
~55 
Personnel in 
Telecommunications 
~150 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Total Personnel 
14 
9 
Notes:  (1)  Figures in this table are provided to give an indication of staff levels, but are based on national 
figures which are not directly comparable. 
(2)  Figure includes broadcasting and spectrum management. 
(3)  Figure includes total number of staff and Commissioners in all state regulators covering all sectors, 
as these agencies regulate both energy and telecommunications and, in many instances, also 
transportation, water and sewerage. 
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In the area of licensing, ETO has two specific but rather different roles.  First, it provides a 
one-stop  shopping  procedure  for  15  of  the  ETO  Memorandum  Signatories,  whereby 
companies can fill in an application form and ETO takes the necessary steps to ensure that 
the applicant obtains a licence for liberalised services in the countries which are parties to 
this  process1o.  Second,  ETO  provides  logistical  support  in  co-operation  with  ECTRA 
working groups and project teams and is  developing harmonised licence  conditions for 
specific telecommunications services. 
2.4.2  ERC and ERO 
a.  European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC) 
The  European  Radiocommunications  Committee  (ERC)  is  a  body  made  up  of 
representatives of NRAs.  The ERC meets three times a year. 
b.  European Radiocommunications Office (ERO) 
The European Radiocommunications Office  (ERO)  was opened in 1991  as  the executive 
body of the ERC.  ERO provides technical expertise to the ERC.  Like ETO, ERO is based in 
Copenhagen.  ERO currently has 14 members of staff. 
The role of ERO includes the following activities which cover all43 CEPT countries: 
•  undertaking detailed spectrum investigations and making proposals to the ERC for a 
European Frequency Table; 
•  carrying out specific studies for the European Commission11; 
•  providing a centre of expertise on radio regulatory matters, including frequencies, 
licensing (excluding public networks), type-approval, etc. 
A summary of the various telecommunication bodies mentioned above, which are discussed 
more fully in Appendix 5, is set out in Table 2.3 below. 
2.5  Purpose of Study 
Against this backdrop, this study is  intended to  identify whether there are gaps in the 
existing structure, or whether there are areas where the creation of a European Regulatory 
Authority could make the structure function more efficiently. 
10 
11 
14 
It can be noted that membership of the ETO  one-stop shop for  licences  includes some non-EU countries and 
excludes some EU countries. 
It can be noted that, even in this area, the studies cover all member countries and not just those of the EU. -
-
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Survey Results 
3.  SURVEY RESULTS 
3.1  Background 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the views of market players regarding which, if 
any, current or emerging core regulatory issues would best be dealt with at a European 
rather than a national level. 
The interviews took place in the first half of 1996  encompassing nine Member States 
along with a variety of pan-European bodies and market participants. Our sample of nine 
countries was selected to gauge views from both the north and the south of Europe and 
from smaller and larger Member States: 
•  Austria; 
•  France; 
•  Germany; 
•  Greece; 
•  Italy; 
•  Netherlands; 
•  Spain; 
•  Sweden; 
•  United Kingdom  . 
In all, a total of fifty two interviews were carried out as part of this study, fifty of which 
form part of the Survey (along with a further two fact-finding interviews with the European 
Telecommunications Office (ETO)  and the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO)). 
The  Survey  covers  dominant  telecommunications  operators,  regulators  and  policy 
makers, competitors and users.  For the purposes of this Survey, the term "competitors" 
covers  both  service  and infrastructure  providers,  operating  either  nationally  or  across 
borders.  To  get  a  broad  coverage  of  users'  views  and  expertise  we  spoke  to 
telecommunications managers at multinational enterprises and to national and international 
users associations.  A full list of interviewees is contained in Appendix 2. 
The purpose of the Survey was to identify technical arguments put forward by market 
players as to whether, and, if so, in which areas, a European Regulatory Authority would 
add value to the current institutional set-up, assuming that NRAs will become both 
independent and fully effective.  It was not our purpose to survey existing regulatory 
inadequacies  that stem from  the lack  of independence or effectiveness  of  NRAs.  The 
Survey  presents  a  detailed  picture  of  views  relating  to  the  need  for  a  European 
Regulatory Authority and, more generally, it identifies those areas which, because of 
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their pan-European dimension, industry feels may not be adequately safeguarded under 
the existing regulatory framework. 
To  assist in the interview programme, NERA  prepared a  briefing note for  interviewers 
designed to ensure maximum coverage and the correct focus.  The briefing note is contained 
in Appendix 3. 
Interviews were structured by use of a general questionnaire sent to all respondents prior to 
the interview.  The questionnaire provided a focus for discussions.  However, interviewees 
were able to concentrate on those areas considered most pertinent to their interests and their 
expertise.  Respondents were also able to raise issues considered relevant but not covered by 
the questionnaire.  The full questionnaire is contained in Appendix 4. 
We note here that there was substantial variation in the awareness shown by interviewees 
of issues relevant to the possible creation of a European Regulatory Authority.  We believe 
that this demonstrates that the technical debate surrounding the creation of a European 
Regulatory Authority is still very much in its infancy, and consciousness of its possible 
relevance varies widely.  For example, we found that smaller competitors, operating only in 
national markets, had not formalised a view on European regulation and found it difficult 
to  see its direct relevance to their operations.  In these cases, a few interviewees stressed 
that, given the absence of any formal company position on this issue, the views expressed 
would necessarily be of a  personal nature.  Other respondents stated that they found it 
difficult to discuss the possible added value of European regulation for different regulatory 
activities  without first  having details  of the institutional framework  and structure  that 
would exist given a new European Regulatory Authority. 
In the rest of this chapter, we present the results of our Survey, looking at each regulatory 
area contained in our questionnaire and examining respondents'  views of the potential 
added value of regulation at a European level.  We have also included a section relating to 
general support for a European Regulatory Authority, as expressed by interviewees, which 
did not relate  to  any particular regulatory  activity.  In  the final  section,  we present a 
summary of the Survey results. 
At the start of each section we have included a  table which provides a summary of the 
current regulatory framework in the relevant area.  We also provide, in each section, tables 
summarising the views of respondents, one table divided according to interviewee country 
and a second showing views according to interviewee category (i.e. principal TO, regulator, 
etc.).  The tables show respondents answers to the question: "would there be added value to 
the participation of a European Regulatory Authority in this activity?".  Answers are shown 
as"./" (yes)," x" (no), and"-" (no comment, no preference). 
20 I 
Survey Results 
Caution is required in interpreting these summary tables, as: 
•  the sample of organisations interviewed is limited to fifty; 
•  interviewees' answers were not always in the form of ~~yes/no/don't know" and in 
some cases we have interpreted interviewees' responses to produce the summary 
tables; 
•  interviewees showed different strengths of feeling in different areas and this will not 
be reflected in the tables. 
Despite the qualifications  listed above, we consider that the summary tables  provide a 
useful snapshot of respondents'  views in each area and allow comparisons to  be made 
between responses relating to different areas of regulation. 
3.2  Support for a European Regulatory Authority 
The  tables below show the general views of interviewees regarding the potential value 
added by a European Regulatory Authority.  We note that regulators and policy makers 
were mostly against the creation of a  new European regulatory body, arguing that it 
would create a new layer of regulatory bureaucracy and that, if this body were given any 
Would a European Regulatory Authority add value to the current regulatory framework 
within the EU? 
Interviewee Type  ~  X  Interviewee Country  ~  X 
Principal TOs  4  2  2  Austria  2 
Regulators and Policy Makers  3  6  1  France  3 
Competitors  18  3  2  Germany  3  1 
Users  6  1  Greece  4  1 
Others13  2  Italy  3  2 
TOTAL  33  12  5  Netherlands  5  1 
Spain  4  2 
Sweden  3  1 
United Kingdom  3  2 
Other14  5 
TOTAL  33  12 
2 
2 
1 
5 
real  powers  at  the  expense  of  the  NRAs,  it  would  also  contravene  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.  Principal TOs were split in their responses, while the vast majority of 
competitors, users and other interviewees considered that there might be at least some 
13  In addition to principal TOs, regulators and policy makers, competitors and users, we interviewed one Member of 
the European Parliament and one equipment manufacturer. 
14  Five of the interviewees were not representing organisations based in one of the nine Member States that formed 
our core sample for the Survey. 
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advantages  in  the  creation  of  a  new  body  dealing  with  some  aspects  of 
telecommunications regulation at the level of the European Union.  We  did not find a 
significant national split in interviewees' views on Community-level regulation. 
Some  interviewees  wished  to  present arguments concerning the  possible  creation  of  a 
European  Regulatory  Authority  which  cut  across  the  analysis  of  the  advantages  of 
European regulation on an area by area approach. 
Amongst other things,  it was put to  us that there  was a  clear  and urgent need for  a 
European Regulatory Authority for the following reasons: 
•  Transition from  a  situation,  where it was  said  that  telecommunications  was  a 
natural monopoly to the current environment in which it has been agreed that there 
should be liberalisation throughout Europe.  It was argued that this transition needs 
a watchdog operating at a European level. 
•  The term "Pan-European" represents the concept of the single market and the pan-
European aspect of the telecommunications market needs a pan-European body. 
•  Reassurance: Investors bidding for licences, TOs and consumers need reassurance 
that someone is guaranteeing the stability of the operating environment throughout 
Europe. 
•  Consistency: At present, a lot of authority is being handed to NRAs as a result of the 
subsidiarity requirement, an example being the proposed Interconnection Directive 
that some interviewees believed may result in a common principle interpreted in 15 
different ways. 
•  Forum is a concept which is closely related to transition.  At present, some countries 
have independent NRAs, some do not.  It is considered that there is an enormous 
need to establish best practice.  A possible role for a European Regulatory Authority 
would be to assist the NRAs in doing this.  It was also argued that there is a need for 
a body to ensure that ideas about best practice were disseminated throughout the 
Community. 
Those  that  opposed  the  creation  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  for 
telecommunications tended to argue that there would be no value added from a new body 
as: 
•  the current institutional set-up, reformed to make existing bodies more responsive to 
the needs of regulation (e.g. by securing NRA independence) would be sufficient to 
meet  the  need  for  regulatory  harmonisation  in  the  single  market  for 
telecommunications; 
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•  the creation of the body would lead to over-regulation of the sector, when we should 
be  moving to  a  situation under  which competition and market development is 
primarily left to market forces; 
•  a  European Regulatory Authority could cause damage to  the  telecommunications 
sector through its inability, relative to the NRAs, to take sufficient account of specific 
local circumstances; 
•  the creation of such a  body would constitute an over-centralisation of regulation 
contravening the subsidiarity principle which gives Member States some scope for 
determining the direction of their own telecommunications regulation. 
We also note here that some interviewees, who saw clear technical advantages to shifting 
some aspects of telecommunications regulation to a new European body, argued that they 
considered such an option to be unrealistic under the present political climate. 
3.3  Interconnection 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for interconnection 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Interconnection agreements are seen initially as a matter for commercial negotiation -
although procedures vary between Member States (in a few Member States, they are 
determined by the regulator without any negotiations taking place).  NRAs or the 
relevant Ministry may approve the agreement ex-post or intervene in the event of a 
dispute between parties - procedures vary between Member States 
Availability of interconnection, and related technical and commercial arrangements 
are covered by the ONP Voice Telephony Directive.  The proposed Interconnection 
Directive establishes rights and obligations to interconnection, lays down harmonised 
principles for interconnection terms and costings and establishes an ex-ante dispute 
resolution mechanism.  Member States are to comply with this Directive by 
31.12.1997. 
Interconnection issues may be discussed within ECfRA. 
b.  Survey results 
Nearly all those who see some overall added value from the creation of a  European 
Regulatory  Authority  consider  that  this  body  should  have  a  role  in  the  area  of 
interconnection.  This  makes interconnection one of the best supported candidates for 
involvement  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority.  The  view  was  expressed  that 
harmonisation of interconnection terms was crucial to the evolution of a single European 
market  and  the  development  of  trans-European  (seamless)  networks.  It  was  further 
considered that the current institutional set-up, however reformed, would prove unable to 
deliver the required harmonisation. This was because the mechanism available at present to 
harmonise interconnection terms - the use of Directives - would allow national diversity in 
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transposition  and  enforcement  which,  in  the  case  of  interconnection,  may  provide 
insufficient harmonisation for the needs of the single market.  The proposed Interconnection 
Directive  was generally held to  be a  positive  step, but many thought that it would be 
insufficient in preventing market distortions post-liberalisation. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in interconnection? 
Interviewee Type  ~  X  Interviewee Country  ~  X 
Principal TOs  4  3  1  Austria  1  3 
Regulators and Policy Makers  2  5  3  France  4  1 
Competitors  19  3  1  Germany  3  1  1 
Users  5  2  Greece  3  2 
Others  2  Italy  3  2 
TOTAL  32  11  7  Netherlands  5  1 
Spain  4  1  1 
Sweden  2  1  1 
United Kingdom  3  2 
Other  5 
TOTAL  32  11  7 
Relative to other possible areas for the involvement of a European Regulatory Authority, 
such as licensing, interconnection is a regulatory activity in which NRA involvement so far 
has been less substantial, mainly due to the limited amount of interconnection that has so 
far occurred in most Member States.  The principal difficulty identified by interviewees 
was the existence of different national accounting systems.  If a  European Regulatory 
Authority were involved in the determination of the cost basis for interconnection, it would 
have to take account of national differences in the accounting systems and would probably 
be unable to impose a uniform cost accounting system throughout Europe, at least until 
accounting systems could be harmonised. 
Supporters  of  the  involvement  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  in  the  area  of 
interconnection varied greatly in what they saw as the possible role of such a body.  Options 
included: 
•  a fully empowered body, determining the cost basis for interconnection and either 
determining, ex-ante, price and interconnection terms, or acting as the body to which 
negotiating parties can appeal if they fail to agree interconnection terms; 
•  a body which would intervene in disputes which NRAs could not resolve to the 
satisfaction of the negotiating parties, or to which NRAs could pass on disputes for 
resolution; 
•  a body which has a  stronger harmonisation role than existing pan-European and 
Community institutions and may also act as a forum for NRA discussions and cross-
fertilisation of experience, but leaves actual enforcement and policing to the NRAs. 
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Another distinction which was advanced by a large number of respondents was that: 
•  NRAs could continue to regulate interconnection within borders; while 
•  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  be  responsible  for  regulating 
interconnection across borders. 
However, it was held by some that this distinction was not relevant.  The fact that cross-
border traffic involves interconnection does not mean that you need a regulator that has 
cross-border jurisdictions.  This is because, even for cross-border traffic, the overwhelming 
majority of points of interconnection will be on the territory of a Member State and, as such, 
interconnection will fall under the jurisdiction of that Member State. 
Some of those opposing a European Regulatory Authority's involvement in interconnection 
argued that the real motivation behind support for such a role, despite statements to the 
contrary, was a lack of faith in the objectivity of the NRAs.  Such a lack of faith was held to 
be  premature,  as  the  latest  package  of  Directives  is  designed  to  ensure  the  true 
independence of the NRAs. 
In addition,  it was argued that the  proposed Interconnection  Directive  also  states  that 
decisions of the NRA must be open to appeal in the national courts, and that this will create 
a relatively speedy legal mechanism for those that are not happy with NRA decisions. 
Some support was voiced for the involvement of a European regulator in the negotiation 
of international accounting rates.  The 1998 liberalisation in Europe will bring an effective 
end to the system of accounting rates for international telephone traffic within Europe.  This 
is because new infrastructure providers will be able to bypass any TO networks governed 
by non-cost based accounting rates.  However, it was perceived by some that there would 
be a need for a European body to negotiate accounting rates with the rest of the world, on 
behalf of the EU as a whole.  If  this does not happen, it was argued, there will be a very real 
danger of whipsawing- that is countries with monopoly operators playing off EU operators 
against  each  other  in  order  to  reduce  outgoing  international  accounting  rates,  while 
maintaining high rates for incoming traffic. 
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3.4  Standards 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for standards 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Member States have historically adopted standards for apparatus, including terminal 
equipment. 
ONP Framework Directive may require the implementation of specified European 
standards for technical interfaces and or service features.  Standards list is published 
by the Commission. 
ETSI has the responsibility for designing technical standardisation. The European 
Standards Committee (CEN) and the European Electrotechnical Standards 
Committee (CENELEC) prepare harmonised standards to achieve a free market for 
goods and services not covered by ETSI.  In respect of terminal equipment, Directive 
91/263 requires mutual recognition of apparatus which is tested, approved and 
marked in accordance with certain minimum criteria in other Member States.  The 
ITU-T (standardisation sector) recommends standards. 
b.  Survey results 
As shown by our summary tables, support for the involvement of a European Regulatory 
Authority  in  the  area  of  standards  was  relatively  weak.  The  line  taken  by  many 
respondents was that standardisation at the European level was already undertaken by 
ETSI.  Some respondents were happy with the work carried out by ETSI up to now, while 
some of those that had reservations concerning the work of ETSI argued that reform of 
this body was the direction in which we should move, rather than the creation of a new 
body which would result in confusion.  A  user representative argued that standards 
should be international and that European regulation of standards, by ETSI or by another 
body, was a distraction from this aim and only served to create wasteful standards 'blocs'. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in standards? 
Interviewee Type  ~  .)(  Interviewee Country  ~  .)( 
Principal TOs  1  6  1  Austria  1  3 
Regulators and Policy Makers  8  2  France  1  3  1 
Competitors  7  11  5  Germany  3  2 
Users  4  2  1  Greece  2  3 
Others  1  1  Italy  2  3 
TOTAL  12  28  10  Netherlands  4  2 
Spain  2  4 
Sweden  1  3 
United Kingdom  3  2 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  12  28  10 
Those  that  did  support  the  involvement  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  in  the 
development of standards either considered ETSI  to  be beyond reform or,  more  often, 
26 n;e;r;a  Survey Results 
considered that a new body could have a role that is complementary to ETSI.  For example, 
it could: 
•  ensure the independence of testing laboratories; 
•  help in the industrial phase of standards implementation, financing manufacturers 
to help them develop and implement European standards for their equipment; 
•  ensure  the  speedy  implementation  of  European  standards  to  allow  markets  to 
develop; 
•  operate in a similar way to the FCC, by mandating standards when interested parties 
fail within a fixed time to come up with their own, agreed standards; 
•  leave ETSI to continue with its scientific and technical work agenda and to produce 
standards, and focus  instead on the legal aspects of standard-setting and on the 
enforcement of standards produced by ETSI; 
•  indicate to ETSI the areas in which there is a need for standards. 
Nevertheless, support for any involvement of a new EU-level regulator in standard setting 
was strictly limited. 
3.5  Allocation and Management of Radio Frequencies 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for radio frequencies 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Responsibility of the relevant Ministry - the relevant ministry varies by Member 
State. 
Community has reserved certain frequency bands for new services (e.g. GSM).  The 
Council recently authorised the Commission to give CEPT a brief to harmonise the 
use of frequencies. 
ERO undertakes detailed spectrum investigations, and radio licensing covering 
frequencies and spectrum approval. The ERC is responsible for frequency co-
ordination at the regional level.  CEPT undertakes co-ordination activities on a pan-
European basis. 
b.  Survey results 
The tables below show that, although a majority of respondents with a definite view were 
against any form of involvement of a European Regulatory Authority in the allocation 
and management of radio frequencies, there was, nevertheless, a significant proportion 
of  positive  replies.  It was  argued  by  some  of  those  opposing  European  Regulatory 
27 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications  n;e;r;a 
Authority  involvement  in  this  area  that,  in  general  terms,  NRAs  and  the  existing 
international institutions, ITU,  ECTRA and the ERC,  are doing what is required on radio 
frequencies  and  many questioned  the  value  that could  be  added  by  a  new  European 
Regulatory Authority. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in frequencies? 
Interviewee Type  ./  X  Interviewee Country  ./  X 
Principal TOs  1  5  2  Austria  1  1  2 
Regulators and Policy Makers  2  8  France  3  1  1 
Competitors  9  5  9  Germany  2  1  2 
Users  4  2  1  Greece  3  2 
Others  1  1  Italy  1  3  1 
TOTAL  17  20  13  Nether  lands  3  3 
Spain  4  2 
Sweden  1  1  2 
United Kingdom  1  3  1 
Other  2  1  2 
TOTAL  17  20  13 
Some  held  that even European regulation would be  insufficient and that international 
negotiations ·would be required to  secure successful treatment of satellites.  Nevertheless, 
support for  Community-level  regulation  of  frequencies  was  greatest  in the  area  of 
satellites services, which were held to be too much of a cross-border issue to be regulated 
effectively by the co-ordinated efforts of the NRAs. 
3.6  Numberingts 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for numbering 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
NRA or relevant Ministry controls the national numbering allocation and plans. 
ONP Voice Telephony Directive provides guidance to NRAs on number allocation, 
number plans and the appropriate use of possible European numbering schemes. 
The Full Competition Directive requires Member States to ensure that numbers are 
made adequately available by 1 July 1997.  The proposed Interconnection Directive 
requires that numbering plans be independently administered and attributed in a 
non-discriminatory and proportional manner. 
ETO is responsible for co-ordination activities in the context of a European 
telecommunications numbering scheme and the harmonisation of short codes.  ENO 
allows the opinions of interested parties to be taken into account and for the 
Commission to be involved where necessary. 
15  The issue of number portability is dealt with separately in this chapter under Section 3.10.4. 
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b.  Survey results 
As  can be  seen from  the  summary tables,  there was relatively strong support for  the 
involvement of a  European Regulatory Authority in numbering issues.  Much of this 
support was limited to greater co-ordination of numbering for the long term creation of a 
European  numbering  space,  and  in  defining  general  rules  on  the  management  of 
numbers by the NRAs, rather than in the direct allocation of numbers between operators. 
A  few  respondents  thought  that  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  be  given  a 
supervisory role over numbering issues. 
In addition, a few respondents felt that, given the importance of uniform access of operators 
to  numbers  to  secure  a  single  European  market  for  telecommunications,  a  European 
Regulatory Authority could have a role in resolving number allocation disputes between 
operators  and  NRAs.  Additionally,  some  respondents  argued  that  if  some  services 
become available with truly pan-European numbers (such as freephone services), then 
the European numbering scheme of such a service should be managed by a European-
wide regulatory body. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in numbering? 
Interviewee Type  ../  X  Interviewee Country  ../  X 
Principal TOs  3  2  3  Austria  1  3 
Regulators and Policy Makers  2  6  2  France  3  2 
Competitors  12  5  6  Germany  1  2  2 
Users  4  1  2  Greece  4  1 
Others  1  1  Italy  1  4 
TOTAL  22  14  14  Netherlands  4  2 
Spain  2  3  1 
Sweden  3  1 
United Kingdom  1  2  2 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  22  14  14 
Although a relatively large number of interviewees saw a case for creating a full European 
numbering space "from scratch" equivalent to that of the United States, most respondents 
thought that this would be extremely costly and that, consequently, harmonisation should 
be limited to global non-geographic numbers (such as freephone, premium rate, personal 
numbering etc.) and for the introduction of new services.  Retrospective harmonisation was 
mostly seen as being too costly. 
A  small  number  of  respondents  argued  that  given  only  a  limited  requirement  for 
harmonisation and given that there was not a great need for rapid resolution of problems, 
current institutions such as the Commission, ITU, ECTRA, ETO and the NRAs are sufficient 
for securing well thought out and negotiated plans for numbering harmonisation. 
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3.7  Licences 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for licensing 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Licences awarded at a national level by NRA or Ministry- procedures vary between 
Member States and service type within EC framework. 
Procedures, time limits, reasons for limiting numbers, and conditions which may be 
attached are determined at a European level by the Full Competition Directive and 
proposed Licensing Directive - Licence conditions to be notified to the Commission 
by 31.12.96 and published by 1.7.1997. 
ETO is co-ordinating the development of a "one-stop shopping procedure" for licence 
applications in participating countries for certain services- ECTRA, on the basis of 
Community-funded mandates, is developing harmonised licence conditions for 
specific categories. 
b.  Survey results 
Respondents  were asked  to  consider the  possibility  of  the involvement of  a  European 
Regulatory Authority in a number of licensing related issues, in particular: 
•  allocation and issuing of licences; 
•  the setting of licence conditions; 
•  the monitoring of compliance with licence conditions. 
In some senses, these are separate issues as the allocation and issuing of licences is largely a 
procedural matter, while the setting of licence conditions and the monitoring of compliance 
with licence conditions go to the very heart of regulation and thereby encompass a number 
of other areas, including interconnection and access to radio frequencies. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in licensing? 
Interviewee Type  ,/  X  Interviewee Country  ,/  X 
Principal TOs  2  2  4  Austria  2  2 
Regulators and Policy Makers  1  8  1  France  3  1  1 
Competitors  12  5  6  Germany  2  1  2 
Users  5  1  1  Greece  3  2 
Others  1  1  Italy  3  2 
TOTAL  21  16  13  Netherlands  4  2 
Spain  1  2  3 
Sweden  2  2 
United Kingdom  1  2  2 
Other  4  1 
TOTAL  21  16  13 
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On balance, there was support for the involvement of a European Regulatory Authority 
in licensing.  The strongest supporters were companies wishing to operate across Europe. 
These considered the case for  a single licence to  operate across Europe, and issued by a 
single European body, to be very strong.  For example, one interviewee asked "how can you 
envisage  a  single  market for  telecommunications  when there  is  no  one  to  give  you  a 
European licence?" 
Some interviewees identified substantial differences in the licensing regimes of the various 
Member States. 
•  Procedures differ widely from country to country.  Two extreme cases are the United 
Kingdom and Germany.  Under the United Kingdom system, which uses licence 
conditions  as  the  principal  instrument of  regulation,  very  detailed  licences  are 
issued.  In Germany, by contrast,  licences  are much shorter than in the  United 
Kingdom.  Here  an  operator  just  agrees  to  have  the  status  of  a  Public 
Telecommunications  Operator  in  very  broad  terms.  Rights,  restrictions  and 
obligations are established for  that category of organisation in the legislative and 
regulatory measures accompanying liberalisation in Germany. 
•  There  are  differences  between  Member  States  in  the  levels  of  compliance  and 
enforcement.  This was seen as being very important, as, even if formal rules are 
harmonised, different levels  of enforcement will mean that harmonisation is  not 
achieved in practice. 
•  In a  number of countries it is  not always clear what information is  required for 
licence applications and the application process can be very cumbersome.  In others, 
the  process  is  seen as  more  easy  going.  The  time  taken  to  prepare  a  licence 
application thus varies greatly, and this can be an important practical problem when 
an operator has to apply for licences. 
A number of operators argued that obtaining 15 separate licences imposes an additional 
cost on operators.  The cost of having a multiple licence regime is seen as particularly high 
if some of the licence applications run into difficulties and local experts need to be hired to 
handle the negotiating process and to iron out difficulties.  In addition, differences in licence 
conditions  between Member States  can impose  extra  costs  on those  that are  trying  to 
establish a seamless network across Europe, rather than a patchwork of national networks. 
Those arguing against the involvement of a European Regulatory Authority in the issuing of 
European Community licences,  the setting of licence  conditions and the  monitoring of 
compliance believe that the costs of multiple licence applications and of compliance with 
different  sets  of  licence  conditions  have  been  greatly  exaggerated  and  that  European 
measures are currently on the table that will deal with a number of the problems raised. 
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For example, some respondents pointed to the one-stop-shop available through ETO  as a 
way of minimising the costs of multiple licence applications.  However, it was pointed out 
by others that ETO only deals with the licensing of services and has no authority to impose 
binding licence  conditions or to  oblige  licences  to  be  granted by  the  NRAs  concerned. 
Indeed, a  small number of respondents referred  to  ETO's  role  as  that of a  mailbox.  In 
response, those that view the ETO one-stop-shop role more positively pointed out that it is 
very new and, at present, only applies in the case of services liberalised in 1990 and then 
only to those countries that have signed up.  However, being a CEPT organisation, ETO also 
offers the possibility of a one-stop-shop beyond EU borders.  The ETO one-stop-shop is thus 
seen by  supporters  as  a  framework  which can be  extended  as  more  services  become 
liberalised. 
Some of those opposed to the establishment of a  single European Community licenc~ 
have argued that the proposed Licensing Directive addresses a number of the problems 
raised by multiple licence applications.  The emphasis in the Licensing Directive is  on 
general  authorisations  (e.g.  class  licences  or  declaration  procedures).  When allocating 
licences which cover the provision of public voice telephony or involve the use of scarce 
resources such as radio spectrum, the granting of rights of way (the right to dig up roads 
etc.),  the imposition of universal obligations or the imposition of particular competitive 
safeguards, Member States will be allowed to require that the operators hold individual 
licences.  In general, for other telecommunications activities, particularly resale activities, 
companies will operate through general authorisations or class licences, which will reduce 
the need to apply for licences and, where declarations are required, the maximum waiting 
period that can be required will be four weeks. 
Class licences are seen as preferable to both a mutual recognition regime and to a single 
European licence  because  the  existence  of  class  licences  will  lessen  the  administrative 
burden on new operators.  Under mutual recognition or single European licensing, service 
providers will need to apply for one licence instead of fifteen.  Under class licensing, service 
providers will not need to make any licence applications. 
It is  further argued that, for  the minority of companies that will still need to  apply for 
individual licences,  once the Licensing Directive is  in force,  the Directive anticipates an 
extension of the one-stop-shop procedures - probably through an enhancement of ETO. 
This will reduce the administrative burden as operators will be able to fill in a single form to 
send to ETO for distribution.  In addition, it was argued that ECTRA and ETO are doing a 
lot of work on harmonisation of licences, usually funded through European Commission 
work orders.  This will make one-stop-shopping for licences easier and reduce the burden of 
meeting different licence requirements in each Member State. 
By  contrast, supporters of a  single European licence  argue that the  proposed Licensing 
Directive  is  insufficient  to  meet the  needs  of  those  wishing to  establish  pan-European 
operations.  In addition, it was argued that, unlike the proposed Interconnection Directive 
which was issued four months earlier, the proposed Licensing Directive arrived too late to 
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be incorporated into national telecommunications laws which are currently being prepared. 
It was thus concluded by some interviewees that the impact of the  Licensing  Directive 
would be relatively limited. 
3.8  Ownership and Competition Regulation 
a.  Summary of  current framework for ownership and competition regulation 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
NRA/relevant Ministry or relevant Competition Authority (if any). 
The Commission's competition rules are contained in Articles 85 to 94 of the EC 
Treaty and EC Merger Regulation (responsibility of DG IV)- the principal provisions 
being Article 85,86 and 90 concerning anti-competitive agreements, abuses of a 
dominant position and bringing within the competition rules public undertakings 
entrusted with services of general economic interest and enjoying special or exclusive 
rights.  Article 222 stresses the neutrality of the Community towards national choices 
of property ownership (i.e. public or private).  Full Competition Directive adopted by 
the Commission under Article 90. 
Other Regulatory  Community's involvement in GATT talks on ownership issues and in on-going WTO 
Involvement  talks on basic telecommunications liberalisation (including the issue of removal of 
ownership restrictions existing in signatory countries). 
b.  Survey results 
Our  Survey  showed  relatively  limited  support  for  the  involvement  of  a  European 
Regulatory Authority in ownership and competition regulation. 
Under the heading of ownership and competition regulation, interviewees were asked to 
comment on a number of aspects of regulation: 
•  merger control; 
•  prevention of anti-competitive practices; 
•  state/ private ownership of the incumbent TO; 
•  regulation  of  cross-ownership  of  information  technology  activities  (e.g. 
telecommunications and broadcasting); 
•  regulation  of  common  position  on  foreign  ownership  of  telecommunications 
companies. 
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Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in ownership and competition 
regulation? 
Interviewee Type  ../  X  Interviewee Country  ../  X 
Principal TOs  1  4  3  Austria  4 
Regulators and Policy Makers  3  6  1  France  1  1  3 
Competitors  5  10  8  Germany  3  2 
Users  5  1  1  Greece  3  2 
Others  1  1  Italy  1  4 
TOTAL  15  21  14  Nether  lands  4  2 
Spain  1  3  2 
Sweden  1  3 
United Kingdom  1  3  1 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  15  21  14 
Many  respondents  thought  that,  although  certain  telecommunications  regulatory 
activities  relevant  to  competition  (e.g.  interconnection,  licensing)  should  rightly  be 
handled by a telecommunications specific regulator, competition regulation should be 
dealt with by a cross-sector competition authority.  Respondents tended to think that the 
present system, with the Commission, acting through DG IV, as the European competition 
authority,  was  effective  in  relation  to  merger  control  and  general  competition  issues, 
although some respondents thought that DG  IV  should be afforded greater resources for 
dealing with telecommunications competition matters.  Some interviewees also  felt  that 
there was a need for a European competition authority that was more independent of the 
political process than the Commission is at present. 
3.9  Implementation and Enforcement of EC Directives 
a.  Summary of  current framework for the implementation and enforcement of 
Directives 
National 
Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
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Directives (the most commonly used instrument in telecommunications) are binding as to 
their objectives but allow for national implementation according to national legal 
procedures within the time limits defined.  Regulations (not used in the telecommunications 
sector) are automatically part of national law.  Decisions are addressed either to Member 
States or to undertakings (e.g. competition Decisions).  They bind the addressee and do not 
require implementation.  Recommendations, Opinions and Resolutions of the institutions 
are non-binding measures.  The issue of enforcement of Directives as well as challenges to 
the compatibility of national implementing measures with Community law may be brought 
before national courts. 
Article 189 sets out the rules concerning the need to implement Community legislation or its 
direct application without implementation. The Commission has the responsibility of 
overseeing implementation and may bring Member States before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) under Articles 169 and 171 (the latter for failure to comply with judgement). 
Actions can also be brought under Article 170 by Member States against other Member 
States but this is extremely rare. 
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b.  Survey results 
There was relatively widespread support for a  European Regulatory Authority having 
some  role  in  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Community  framework. 
However, there was a variation in the nature of the actual proposals for  what that role 
should be.  These include: 
•  resolution of disputes arising from implementation of the Community framework; 
•  supervision  of  national  implementation  of  Directives  and  detection  of  non-
compliance; 
•  direct enforcement of Directives throughout Europe by a new European Regulatory 
Authority. 
Reasons for support of European Regulatory Authority involvement in the enforcement 
of Directives varied. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in the implementation and 
enforcement of  EC Directives? 
Interviewee Type  ./  X  Interviewee Country  ./  X 
Principal TOs  4  1  3  Austria  1  3 
Regulators and Policy Makers  7  3  France  1  3  1 
Competitors  15  5  3  Germany  3  1  1 
Users  4  2  1  Greece  3  1  1 
Others  1  1  Italy  2  3 
TOTAL  24  15  11  Nether  lands  4  1  1 
Spain  4  2 
Sweden  1  1  2 
United Kingdom  2  2  1 
Other  4  1 
TOTAL  24  15  11 
Some responses to this question reflected a refusal, on the part of the interviewee, to 
accept that NRAs could ever be fully independent and neutral.  Some interviewees argued 
that  NRAs  would  necessarily  be  more  easily  influenced  by  the  incumbent 
telecommunications  operator  than a  European  Regulatory  Authority  would  be.  They 
further argued that a regulator which existed outside the jurisdiction of individual Member 
States would be better able to maintain its stance on particular issues in the face of political 
opposition. 
For some interviewees, the crucial issue on Directives is whether a sufficient level of detail 
can be harmonised in every Member State (e.g. costing approaches to interconnection) given 
the current institutional set-up.  It was argued that, under current Treaty powers, the 
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Commission is obliged to ensure balance and is restrained in the degree to which it can 
produce a single common approach to key problems in different Member States by the 
need to respect subsidiarity. 
It was  further  argued  that  the  current  mechanism  for  the  Commission  to  ensure 
implementation  of  Directives  is  very  weak  and  that  a  Directive  is  limited  in  the 
harmonisation it can achieve.  This is because each Member State has the power to interpret 
and implement the Directive in the way it sees fit.  It was held that there is  a  case for 
diversity  on  some  issues.  However,  in  those  areas  in  which  harmonisation  is  most 
important, current European institutions and enforcement mechanisms are  regarded  as 
inadequate, because  the  power of  Member States  to  interpret (in  transposition)  and to 
implement Directives  necessarily  breeds  diversity,  even where  NRAs  are  independent. 
Such diversity is regarded as limiting the impact of EC harmonisation Directives and thus 
hindering the development of the single market for telecommunications.  As a result it is 
argued  that,  to  ensure  the  harmonised  implementation and  consistent  enforcement  of 
Directives,  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  needs  itself  to  have  direct  power  of 
enforcement or, failing that, the power to oversee the activities of the NRAs. 
Those that questioned the merits of having a European Regulatory Authority involved in 
the enforcement of Directives advanced a number of arguments: 
•  There was no reason whv telecommunications should be treated differently from 
J  J 
other  aspects  of  the  single  market.  It was  argued  that  the  mechanisms  used 
elsewhere  for  implementing  and  enforcing  Directives  should  also  work  for 
telecommunications. 
•  Remedies for non-implementation and non-enforcement already exist.  For example, 
while an appeal to the European Court of Justice could involve a protracted process, 
complainants could also appeal to national courts and this was likely to be faster and 
easier.  As such it was considered untrue that the only way to ensure Member State 
enforcement of Directives is through an Article 169 complaint. 
•  New mechanisms, currently being put into  place,  would help ensure successful 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  Directives.  In  future,  the  creation  of 
independent  NRAs  and  the  right  to  appeal  will  be  beneficial  to  Directive 
implementation. 
•  Creating  a  new  European  body  to  act  as  a  "regulator  of  regulators"  would 
contravene the principle of subsidiarity. 
•  The direct enforcement of Directives by a European Regulatory Authority was held 
to be infeasible by some of those interviewed. 
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3.10  Other Regulatory Functions 
Interviewees also had the opportunity to comment on other regulatory functions that could 
be assigned to a European Regulatory Authority.  On our questionnaire, we included four 
examples of other such functions: 
•  consumer protection, i.e. dealing with complaints by users and service providers; 
•  regulation of price levels and price structures; 
•  funding and enforcement of universal service obligations (USO); 
•  issues relating to number portability. 
Responses to this section were fairly limited, with a large number of respondents choosing 
not to comment. 
3.10.1  Consumer Protection 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for consumer protection 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
NRA and/  or relevant national "fair trading" authority and the courts. 
In addition to across-the-board consumer protection legislation in a number of areas, 
Community law provides certain consumer guarantees, such as procedures for 
resolution of consumer disputes under the Voice Telephony Directive, minimum 
levels of service and the right to have a written contract.  Pricing principles in relation 
to universal service are contained in the proposed Voice Telephony Amending 
Directive. 
None in particular. 
b.  Survey results 
Few  respondents  considered  consumer  protection  to  be  a  worthwhile  area  for  the 
involvement of a European Regulatory Authority.  Interviewees considered it illogical and 
impractical that user complaints, which tend to be of a very localised nature, be dealt with at 
the European level. 
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Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in consumer protection? 
Interviewee Type  ~  X  Interviewee Country  ~  X 
Principal TOs  1  3  4  Austria  4 
Regulators and Policy Makers  5  5  France  5 
Competitors  4  7  12  Germany  5 
Users  2  1  4  Greece  2  1  2 
Others  2  Italy  5 
TOTAL  7  16  27  Netherlands  1  3  2 
Spain  1  2  3 
Sweden  2  2 
United Kingdom  3  2 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  7  16  27 
Those that supported the activity of a European Regulatory Authority in this area, tended to 
argue that the new body should be involved following a first appeal to the NRAs or that the 
European body would be responsible for establishing a general framework for consumer 
protection issues.  These respondents were worried about the effects on the single market of 
having cumbersome rules for consumer protection in some countries and lax rules in others. 
3.10.2  Regulation of Price Levels and Price Structures 
a.  Summary of  current framework for price regulation 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Responsibility of NRA or Ministry - application of price regulation varies widely 
between Member States. 
Pricing principles defined in ONP Framework Directive, ONP Voice Telephony 
Directive and the Leased Lines Directive (such as cost-orientation of certain offerings 
and services and the affordability of universal service). 
Actions by DG IV relating to anti-competitive pricing. 
b.  Survey results 
Of the minority of interviewees that chose to give an answer, a majority were opposed to 
European Regulatory Authority involvement in pricing.  Many respondents questioned 
the need for regulatory involvement in pricing structures at all, arguing that competition 
would very quickly force  rebalancing.  Most considered that regulation of price  levels 
should be left to the NRAs.  Nevertheless, some interviewees did see possible problems for 
the single market of having different pricing regulations in each Member State and argued 
that there should thus be at least limited involvement of a European Regulatory Authority. 
38 n;e;r;a  Survey Results 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in pricing? 
Interviewee Type  ../  X  Interviewee Country  ../  X 
Principal TOs  2  2  4  Austria  4 
Regulators and Policy Makers  4  6  France  1  4 
Competitors  5  7  11  Germany  1  4 
Users  2  2  3  Greece  2  1  2 
Others  2  Italy  5 
TOTAL  9  15  26  Nether  lands  4  2 
Spain  1  2  3 
Sweden  1  3 
United Kingdom  1  2  2 
Other  2  1  2 
TOTAL  9  15  26 
3.10.3  Funding and Enforcement of Universal Service Obligations (USO) 
a.  Summary of  current framework for regulating the universal service 
obligation 
National Regulation 
EC Regulation 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
Responsibility of NRA or Ministry - existence of USO charges varies widely between 
Member States. 
The Full Competition Directive sets out certain criteria for universal service schemes. 
The proposed Interconnection Directive sets out the method of calculating the costs of 
universal service obligations and possible mechanisms for sharing usa costs. 
None yet. 
b.  Survey results 
Half of those responding to the question of whether a European Regulatory Authority 
should be involved in the issue of universal service obligations responded positively. 
Many of the respondents favouring Community-level regulatory involvement in USO 
funding and charging expressed a fear that USO arrangements could lead to the playing 
field being tilted in favour of the incumbent.  Alternatively, some respondents were 
worried that, if USO arrangements varied between Member States, this would result in 
higher entry costs in some Member States than in others, which would in turn act as a 
barrier to the development of a single market. Differences in arrangements could include: 
•  some Member States setting a significantly higher requirement for universal service 
provision than others; 
•  Member States using different funding arrangements (e.g.  USO fund, access deficit 
charges for interconnection, etc.); 
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•  Member States  distributing the cost differently between incumbents, competitors 
and users; 
•  variations  between  Member  States  in  the  USO  requirements  imposed  on  new 
entrants. 
Advocates  of  involvement  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  in  universal  service 
arrangements  offered  a  varied  selection  of  proposals,  some  suggesting  that  direct 
determination and enforcement was required, with others arguing for a more limited role. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in regulating the universal service 
obligation? 
Interviewee Type  v"  X  Interviewee Country  v"  X 
Principal TOs  2  2  4  Austria  4 
Regulators and Policy Makers  5  5  France  1  2  2 
Competitors  6  5  12  Germany  1  4 
Users  5  1  1  Greece  2  1  2 
Others  2  Italy  2  3 
TOTAL  13  13  24  Nether  lands  1  3  2 
Spain  2  2  2 
Sweden  4 
United Kingdom  1  2  2 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  13  13  24 
Concern was expressed, by a  small number of respondents, that European involvement 
might  lead  to  the  requirement  for  subsidies  from  Member  States  to  fund  network 
development in other Member States.  Some of those arguing against the involvement of a 
European  Regulatory  Authority  in universal  service  arrangements  also  stated  that  the 
principle of subsidiarity required that Member States be allowed to determine the level of 
universal service and the method for provision.  They also tended to argue that current 
institutional arrangements were sufficient to  secure  the  harmonisation required  by the 
single market. 
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3.10.4  Issues relating to Number Portability 
a.  Summary of  current regulatory framework for number portability 
National Regulation  NRA or relevant ministry is responsible for number portability - procedures vary 
between Member States. 
EC Regulation  Proposed Interconnection Directive requires NRA'  s to introduce number portability 
by 2003. 
Other Regulatory 
Involvement 
ETO has provided technical assistance and studies to national administrations and 
the Commission on number portability. 
b.  Survey results 
Almost half of those responding to  the  question of whether a  European Regulatory 
Authority should be involved in the issue of number portability responded positively. 
Supporters of the involvement of a European Regulatory Authority in matters relating to 
number portability argued that this was an important regulatory area, which should be 
dealt with at a European level.  Some held that the introduction of number portability was 
vital to the reduction of entry barriers and, consequently, if implementation occurred at 
different times in each Member State then entry barriers would differ across Europe, to the 
detriment  of  the  development  of  a  single  market  for  telecommunications.  Equally, 
differences in the methodology used to allocate the costs of introducing number portability 
between incumbents, new entrants and users would have an effect on the extent of entry 
barriers in each Member State. 
Should a European Regulatory Authority have a role in number portability? 
Interviewee Type  v"  X  Interviewee Country  ../  X 
Principal TOs  1  3  4  Austria  4 
Regulators and Policy Makers  4  6  France  5 
Competitors  8  4  11  Germany  5 
Users  3  2  2  Greece  2  1  2 
Others  2  Italy  1  4 
TOTAL  12  13  25  Netherlands  3  2  1 
Spain  3  3 
Sweden  2  1  1 
United Kingdom  1  2  2 
Other  3  2 
TOTAL  12  13  25 
Some of those opposing the involvement of a European Community-level body recognised 
that  number  portability  was  important  to  the  development  to  competition  and  were 
disappointed  that  its  introduction  was  being  delayed  in  many  parts  of  Europe. 
Nevertheless, they argued that this was a matter to be determined by the Member States 
themselves  and  that  current  institutions  would  eventually  secure  the  introduction  of 
number portability throughout Europe. 
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3.11  Other Issues Raised 
3.11.1  External Functions of a European Regulatory Authority 
a.  Summary of  cu"ent situation with regard to external trade 
Current position under 
Treaty 
Position in international 
fora 
Article 113 states that the Council may authorise the Commission to open the 
necessary negotiations on agreements with one or more states or international 
organisations where this is necessary to implement the common commercial policy. 
The Commission represents the Community in negotiations (such as the WTO 
negotiations).  In other fora, such as the ITU and the World Radiocommunications 
Conference (WRC), European Common Positions are generally agreed between the 
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b.  Survey results 
In our questionnaire, sent to survey respondents prior to interview, we chose to focus on 
seven principal areas where European Regulatory Authority activity might be considered 
beneficial.  We also gave examples of a few other areas which might be seen as relevant.  To 
ensure that respondents had an opportunity to raise issues considered to be important by 
them, but not specifically mentioned in the questionnaire, the following questions were 
included: 
"8.1  In what other activities do you think the involvement of a European-wide regulatory 
body might be beneficial?" 
"9.2  Are there any other issues, not covered by the above list of questions, which you 
wish to discuss?" 
A number of respondents considered that a European Regulatory Authority might have an 
important role to play in representing the Community externally in connection with matters 
relating to telecommunications trade and other issues.  A number of examples were raised 
of how a European Regulatory Authority might exercise this role.  These include: 
•  negotiating accounting rates with non-EU countries on behalf of all Member States 
(as mentioned in Section 3.3); and 
•  representing the EU in WTO trade negotiations. 
In any such negotiations, and especially those on international trade, it was argued that 
advantage was to be gained if Europe was able to speak with a single voice. 
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3.11.2  Convergence 
A number of respondents mentioned the convergence of telecommunications, computing, 
information and entertainment technologies in connection with the possible creation of a 
European Regulatory Authority.  Although interviewees in our Survey did not have strong 
views  concerning  how  Community  and  national  regulatory  institutions  should  be 
structured to deal with convergence, a small number expressed the view that some reform 
of regulation would be necessary. 
3.12  Summary 
Two summary tables are provided below.  The first shows the number of participants, in 
percentage terms, in favour (" v"""), against("  x") and with no comment/no preference ("-") 
on the involvement of a  European Regulatory Authority in each of the areas discussed 
above.  The  second  table  shows  the  same  information but with  the  "no comment/  no 
preference" responses excluded. 
Area of Regulatory Activity  ~  X 
Interconnection  64%  22%  14% 
Implementation and enforcement of EC Directives  48%  30%  22% 
Numbering  44%  28%  28% 
Licences  42%  32%  26% 
Allocation and management of radio frequencies  34%  40%  26% 
Ownership and competition regulation  30%  42%  28% 
Universal service obligations  26%  26%  48% 
Standards  24%  56%  20% 
Number portability  24%  26%  50% 
Price regulation  18%  30%  52% 
Consumer protection  14%  32%  54% 
Area of Regulatory Activity16  ../  X 
Interconnection  74%  26% 
Implementation and enforcement of EC Directives  62%  38% 
Numbering  61%  39% 
Licences  57%  43% 
Universal service obligations  50%  50% 
Number portability  48%  52% 
Allocation and management of radio frequencies  46%  54% 
Ownership and competition regulation  42%  58% 
Price regulation  38%  63% 
Standards  30%  70% 
Consumer protection  30%  70% 
16  Figures do not necessarily add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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We would again stress that, as with the tables presented in previous sections of this chapter, 
these summary tables can only provide a broad indication of the views of respondents as, 
crucially,  they  sometimes  rely  on  our  interpretation  of  complex  views  expressed  by 
interviewees and, in a few cases, some of those advocating the involvement of a European 
Regulatory Authority only did so in support of a body with a fairly limited set of functions. 
Advocates of the creation of a new regulatory body at the level of the European Union 
tended to  argue  that,  as  a  result  of  the  creation  of  a  single  liberalised market  for 
telecommunications, some regulatory activities would require substantial harmonisation 
and fast  action.  At the same time, they believed that, in those areas where speedy 
harmonisation is less important for the successful development of a single market, or 
where existing structures work well (e.g. the applications of the competition rules), the 
case for a new body is weaker.  In these circumstances, it was felt that much more can be 
left to be determined by Member States. 
Opponents of a new European Regulatory Authority tended to feel that the creation of 
such a body would conflict with the principle of subsidiarity and that current institutions 
and procedures, which could continue on a  path of development and improvement, 
would suffice  in providing the  measures required for  the  development  of a  single 
market. 
In our Survey, the following were considered by a majority of market players with a definite 
view to be areas which required a regulatory role at a Community level as well as at the 
national level: 
•  interconnection; 
•  numbering; and 
•  licensing, i.e.: 
licence issuing 
the setting of licence conditions 
the monitoring of compliance with licence conditions. 
It is important to note that many of those supporting a  role for  a  European Regulatory 
Authority in numbering saw the activities of such a body as best focused on securing a 
greater degree of harmonisation rather than being the body primarily responsible for the 
allocation of numbers to operators. 
It is also worth noting that some respondents who support the idea of having a  single 
European licence issued by a European Regulatory Authority, emphasised that there may be 
substantial difficulties in the transition to such a licence. 
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A majority of respondents giving a definite view with respect to the implementation and 
enforcement of the Community regulatory framework also indicated support for European 
Regulatory Authority involvement.  Whether, from a legal perspective, this would be an 
appropriate role for such an authority is a matter for debate.  This is firstly because, under 
the  Treaty  (and  in  particular  Articles  169  to  171),  there  already  are  well  established 
processes for addressing breaches of Treaty rules and secondly because Member States are 
already required to provide for a right of appeal to national courts against the decisions of a 
national  regulatory  authority.  Moreover,  the  arrogation  to  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority of a judicial role would appear to run counter to the doctrine of separation of 
powers or 'trias politica'17.  Nevertheless, the Survey results in this area do reflect a strong 
concern  that  more  needs  to  be  done  to  secure  implementation  and  enforcement  of 
Community  regulations  and,  in  particular,  that  these  tasks  should  Je  adequately  co-
ordinated and resourced within the Commission. 
In addition to those areas identified as being supported by a majority of survey respondents 
with  a  definite  view,  we  list  the  following  areas  where  opinion  was  evenly  divided 
regarding the involvement of a  European Regulatory Authority and where a  variety of 
cogent arguments were put forward, namely: 
•  spectrum management; 
•  number portability; and 
•  universal service. 
Although the topic was not explicitly included as  part of our Survey Questionnaire (as 
contained in Appendix 4), a number of respondents considered that a European Regulatory 
Authority could have a role to play in external trade negotiations. 
Market players considered various other areas to be less important for the involvement of a 
European Regulatory Authority.  These are: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
17 
standards; 
ownership and competition regulation; 
consumer protection; and 
price regulation  . 
This fundamental doctrine means that,  in a  system of democratic  government based on law,  the  legislative, 
executive and judicial functions  ought to  be carried out by  distinctly  separate institutions.  This 'balance of 
powers' is safeguarded by the EC  Treaty.  Delegation of these functions to  Community bodies other than the 
institutions established by the Treaty would render that safeguard ineffective. 
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The European dimension of ownership and competition regulation in telecommunications 
was  held  to  be  very  important  by  most  respondents,  but  a  large  number  of  these 
interviewees advocated the continued role of the Commission (through DG IV) in this area. 
Some also stated that DG  IV  should be granted more resources and perhaps afforded a 
greater degree of independence. 
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4.  ANALYSIS OF LEGAL POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
4.1  Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to look at the legal powers of the European Community as 
applied to telecommunications in general and, in particular, the powers that would need to 
be invoked by the Community in order to create a European Regulatory Authority. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: 
•  In Section 4.2, we provide background to the analysis by summarising the extent of 
the Community's powers and the general constraints on Community action.  We 
also  look  briefly  at the  powers  behind  Community  telecommunications-related 
action to-date. 
•  In Section  4.3,  we  ask  the  extent to  which it is  possible  to  create  a  European 
Regulatory Authority without amending the EC Treaty.  As part of our discussion, 
we  draw  a  distinction  between  policy  functions,  which  could  not  legally  be 
devolved to a European Regulatory Authority without an amendment to the Treaty, 
and executive function, which could.  We also look at functions relating to dispute 
resolution and appeals, most of which could also not be devolved to a  European 
Regulatory Authority without an amendment to the EC Treaty. 
•  In Section 4.4  we discuss the legal procedure for  creating a European Regulatory 
Authority within the current EC  Treaty and explore which Treaty Articles would 
form the most appropriate basis for the creation of such a body. 
•  Finally, in Section 4.5, we draw some conclusions concerning the legal powers of the 
European  Community  as  regards  telecommunications  and  the  creation  of  a 
European Regulatory Authority. 
4.2  Background 
4.2.1  Extent of Community Powers 
Clearly, the Community may not create a European Regulatory Authority unless it has the 
necessary legal authority to do so.  We consider below the extent of that legal authority. 
The principal legal sources are the Treaty establishing the European Community ("the EC 
Treaty"), signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, as amended by the Treaty on European Union 
("the Maastricht Treaty"), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and case law of the 
European Court of Justice ("the ECJ"). 
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Paragraph 1 of Article 3b of the EC Treaty (inserted by the Maastricht Treaty) states that: 
The  Community shall act within  the limits of the  powers conferred upon  it by this 
Treaty and of  the objectives assigned to it therein. 
This Article establishes what is known as the principle of "conferred powers", under which 
the  Community  only  enjoys  the  powers  expressly  conferred  on it by  the  EC  Treaty. 
However, the position is complicated because, by referring also to objectives, the definition 
admits the possibility of additional, less certain, "implied powers". 
Implied powers, in their widest formulation, were invoked by the ECJ  in Gennany -v-
Commission18, in which the ECJ  held that, whenever a provision of the Treaty confers a 
specific task on the Commission, that provision must also be regarded, by implication, as 
conferring on the Commission, within some limits, "the  powers  which  are  indispensable  in 
order to carry out the task". 
Given  that  there  are  many  widely  drawn  prov1s1ons  in  the  Treaty19,  this  judgement 
significantly empowers the Commission (and, by extension, the Community) and has been 
deployed to approximate the laws of the Member States on a wide variety of subjects. 
4.2.2  Constraints on Community Action 
The Community is, therefore, empowered (and mandated) to act in certain areas by the EC 
Treaty as interpreted in ECJ case law.  The Community's power to take action is constrained 
by a number of general concepts: 
•  subsidiarity; 
•  proportionality; 
•  non-discrimination. 
In taking action in the telecommunications field, and in seeking to establish a European 
Regulatory Authority for telecommunications, the Community will be obliged to operate 
within these constraints.  Below, we briefly discuss each of these concepts. 
18 
19 
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Case 281/85, [1987] ECR 3203. 
For example, Article 155 requires the Commission to ensure that the provisions of the EC Treaty are applied, and 
Article 100 empowers the Council to issue Directives for the "approximation" of such laws or other provisions of 
the Member States as "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market". 
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a.  Subsidiarity 
The Community may only create a European Regulatory Authority if the necessary powers 
for the intended action have been transferred by Member States to the Community.  If the 
Community does have the necessary powers, it may either have: 
•  exclusive competence; or 
•  concurrent  (shared)  competence  to  act  with  Member  States  (i.e.  regulatory 
responsibilities are shared between the Community level and Member States). 
In the latter case, the Community can only exercise its powers if the "subsidiarity" test is 
satisfied. 
It is clear that the whole field of telecommunications regulation cannot be claimed by the 
Community  as  being  wholly  within  its  exclusive  competence2°  and  therefore  that 
telecommunications regulation is a matter for concurrent competence. 
The meaning of subsidiarity is provided in Article 3b of the EC Treaty: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action,  in  accordance  with  the  principal of subsidiarity,  only if and insofar as  the 
objectives  of the  proposed  action  cannot  be  sufficiently achieved  by  the  Member 
States and can  therefore,  by reason of  the scale or effects of  the proposed actions,  be 
better achieved by the Community. 
This is a statement that positively directs Community action where, by reason of the scale 
or effects, the objectives of that action are better achieved by the Community21.  In the 
context of achieving the internal market or trans-European networks, Community action 
can clearly be, and indeed has been, justified in appropriate cases (See Appendix 8). 
Applying these general principles to the telecommunications sector, the Community's view 
so  far  appears to  have been that it is  appropriate  to  issue  Directives  liberalising  and 
harmonising the sector in Member States, based on the Treaty Articles identified in Section 
4.2.4, but that Member States should be left to determine how to give effect to the detail of 
the measures under national law. 
The subsidiarity hurdle should not be difficult to overcome legally within the Community, 
since it is  principally a  political concept and the ECJ  has never decided that an act was 
20 
21 
The preamble in recent telecommunications Directives expressly eschews any such notion. 
The Commission has stated that "far from having the effect offreezing Community action,  the dynamic of the subsidiarihj 
principle should make it possible to expand it if required,  or limit or even abandon  it when action at Community level is  no 
longer warranted" (COM(93) 545).  This illustrates the flexible nature of the concept of subsidiarity and, conversely, 
the difficulty of legal analysis and accurate prediction of its application to specific Community initiatives. 
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illegal  for  lack  of  Community competence  (as  opposed  to  institutional competence  or 
wrong legal basis).  Moreover, if all Member States agree in Council to a measure under 
Article 235 (see Section 4.4.2d), adherence to the subsidiarity principle is self-proven22. 
b.  Proportionality 
The concept of  ~proportionality' is contained in the last part of Article 3b of the EC Treaty23, 
which states: 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of  this Treaty. 
Proportionality also features in two pre-conditions for the application of Article 235, which 
states that: 
•  action by the Community must be "necessary to attain" the particular objective; and 
•  the measure must be "appropriate" for the attainment of the objective. 
The  concepts  of proportionality and subsidiarity are closely  related,  but not identical. 
Subsidiarity constitutes a limitation of Community powers with respect to Member States, 
while  proportionality is  applicable to  the relationship between the Community and its 
citizens. 
Pertinent  questions  for  the  Commission  to  ask  before  framing  its  proposals  for  the 
establishment of a European Regulatory Authority therefore, are: 
•  is  it  necessary  to  establish  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  to  achieve  the 
objectives of the EC Treaty in the telecommunications area? 
•  could the objectives be achieved by other means? 
22 
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But see  the Brunner case [1994  CMLR 57]  which arose Under Article 23(1)  of the German Constitution.  Where the 
Federation transfers sovereign powers to the Community, the German Courts may rule on whether the subsidiarity 
pnnciple has been properly applied.  In Brunner, the German Court held that the Federal Government should be vigilant 
to ensure that the second paragraph of Article 3b of the EC Treaty (which states the subsidiarity requirement) is strictly 
interpreted and stated that it will:  review  legal  instruments of European  institutions and agencies  to  see  whether they  remam 
witlzm the lzmzts of tlze sovereign rights conferred on  tlzem or transgress tlzem (see also Footnote 51). 
Article 3b was added to the EC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty (1992).  The concept of proportionality actually began 
life as a  general principle of law developed by the ECJ,  and has been expressed, in the Fromancais case (Case 
66/82[1983]ECR395) as follows: 
In  order to establish whether a provision of  Community law is consonant with the principle of  proportionality it is 
necessary  to  establish,  in  the first  place,  whether  the  means  it  employs  to  achieve  the  aim  correspond  to  the 
zmportance of  the aim and, in the second place, whether they are necessary for its achievement. 
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•  will the detriment to those adversely affected be disproportionate to the benefit to 
the public? 
In practice, the ECJ will not interfere unless it is a very clear and obvious infringement of 
the  principle  of  proportionality, but it is  difficult  to  define  when this  point has been 
reached.  Provisions struck down for breaching the principle of proportionality tend to be 
ones that impose taxes, levies, charges or duties on a particular category of business. 
In the case of a European Regulatory Authority, if a balanced approach is adopted and if 
the arguments in favour are sufficient to rise above the subsidiarity threshold, they are also 
likely to satisfy the proportionality test. 
c.  Non-discrimination 
A further principle governing the Community institutions, often discussed together with 
proportionality and which can equally be seen as a constraint imposed under the Treaty, is 
that of non-discrimination or equality.  Article 6 states that: " ...  any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality shall be prohibited". 
The ECJ has ruled that disguised discrimination is also covered by the Treaty24•  In another 
case the ECJ  ruled that, not only overt discrimination would be prohibited, but also all 
forms of covert discrimination which, although based on criteria which appear neutral, in 
practice, lead to the same result25. 
In practice the establishment of a European Regulatory Authority should not offend against 
the principle of non-discrimination, but rather promote it.  Care will, however, be needed 
when formulating its procedures. 
4.2.3  Instruments available to the Community in Exercising its Powers 
As explained above, the Community exercises its powers as defined by the EC Treaty and 
case law of the ECJ.  In doing so, it has a number of legal instruments available to it: 
•  Directives are binding as to their objectives but allow for national implementation 
according to national legal procedures within the time limits defined; 
•  Regulations are automatically part of national law; 
•  Decisions,  which are addressed either to  Member States or to  undertakings (e.g. 
competition Decisions), bind the addressee and do not require transposition into 
national law; 
24 
25 
Case 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de l'Ordre des avocats ala Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765. 
Cases 62-63/81 Seco v Evi [1982] ECR 223. 
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•  Recommendations and Resolutions of the institutions are non-binding measures. 
4.2.4  Community Action in Telecommunications to Date 
Several of the objectives set out in the EC Treaty impact the telecommunications sector and 
are clearly wide enough to empower the Community to regulate telecommunications.  To 
date, Directives have been the most commonly used instrument in telecommunications. 
Regulations have not been used.  The Community may only issue a Directive (or any other 
instrument) if it is permitted to do so by a Treaty Article.  That article is then known as the 
"legal basis" of that measure (see Section 4.4.1a). 
Recent telecommunications Directives have taken a number of Articles of the Treaty as their 
legal basis, the most significant being Articles 90 (which brings within the competition rules 
certain  public  undertakings)  and  100a  (which  requires  the  harmonisation  of  national 
legislation or regulation). 
Article 90 has been used by the Community to issue Directives requiring Member States to 
liberalise elements of the telecommunications sector, such as terminal equipment in 1988 
and many non-voice services in 1990.  The Full Competition Directive, issued under Article 
90,  now  requires  Member  States  to  liberalise  all  telecommunications  services  not  yet 
liberalised and all telecommunications infrastructure by 1 January 199826• 
Article 100a has formed the basis of Community telecommunications harmonisation, with 
several  harmonisation  measures  having  been  issued  following  from  the  1990  ONP 
Framework Directive, including Directives on leased lines and voice telephony.  Directives 
under  Article  100a  on  the  harmonisation  of  interconnection  arrangements  and 
telecommunications licences are also due to be issued in 1997. 
Articles 90  and 100a are discussed further in Section 4.4.2 but one important distinction 
should already be noted.  Under Article 90,  Directives or Decisions are adopted by the 
Commission, whilst under Article 100a it is  the European Parliament and Council who 
finally agree the measure. 
Some recent telecommunications measures have also taken other Treaty Articles as their 
legal basis, including: 
• 
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Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal, Spain and Luxembourg have been given  the right to  apply to  the Community for 
derogations to the 1 January 1998 deadline for liberalisation.  The Commission is currently examining requests 
received which, with the exception of Greece, do not attempt to delay liberalisation beyond 2000. 
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•  Articles  57(2),  59  and  66  which  are  concerned  with  the  freedom  of 
telecommunications companies to provide services into other Member States or to 
establish companies in those Member States; 
•  Article 129b-d, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, which states as an objective the 
co-ordination  of  Member  States'  transport,  energy  and  telecommunications 
infrastructure and the development of trans-European networks (TENs); 
•  Article  235  which is  employed where action is  necessary by the Community to 
attain a Treaty objective but the Treaty has not provided express powers for  this 
purpose. 
4.3  The Extent to which the Creation of a European Regulatory Authority 
Requires a Treaty Amendment 
In this section we examine the extent to which the creation of a  European Regulatory 
Authority for telecommunications would require an amendment to the EC Treaty.  Drawing 
on EC  case law, the degree of power given to new Community Agencies to date and the 
degree of power held by Oftel in the United Kingdom and the FCC in the United States, we 
provide suggestions for the kinds of tasks that could be delegated to such a body, with and 
without Treaty amendment.  We then move on to discuss the nature of a possible role in the 
appeals process for a  European Regulatory Authority created in the absence of a  Treaty 
amendment. 
4.3.1  Degree of Power Allocated to a European Regulatory Authority 
EC  case law dictates that the creation a European Regulatory Authority would require a 
Treaty amendment if this body is given very wide power and discretion in its activities.  If, 
however,  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  is  created  with  a  more  specific,  narrowly 
defined set of tasks, then it is indeed possible to create such a body without the need to 
amend the Treaty.  As such, although it is not possible to give a new European Regulatory 
Authority any policy functions without Treaty amendments, there are clear precedents for 
the creation of Community agencies, within the Treaty, which carry out tightly defined 
executive functions. 
Within this context, we discuss the following: 
•  case law which dictates that without Treaty amendment, executive functions, and 
only executive functions, can be given to a new Community agency; 
•  the degree of power that has been given to new Community agencies to-date; 
•  the division of labour between the national telecommunications policy maker and 
the regulator in the United States and the United Kingdom; 
53 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
•  specific  executive  tasks  which  it  may  be  possible  to  delegate  to  a  European 
Regulatory Authority without the need for a Treaty amendment, and those policy 
tasks which could only be delegated to a European Regulatory Authority through an 
amendment of the EC Treaty. 
a.  Case Law on the degree of  power that may be allocated to a new Community 
body with and without amendment of  the Treaty 
"Delegation of power" to "Community agencies",  defined in this Study as Community 
bodies other than the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors, is now an accepted part of the workings of the 
EC. 
In  Meroni  v  High  Authority,27  the  ECJ  concluded  that  delegation  of  powers  to  a 
Community agency (in that case, to two scrap iron subsidisation bodies) was permissible, 
but only when "it involves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of  which can,  therefore,  be 
subject  to  strict review  in  the  light of objective  criteria  determined by  the  delegating  authority''. 
The Court justified this by referring to "the  balance  of powers  which  is  characteristic  of the 
institutional structure of the  Community''.  According to Meroni, the legal basis will dictate 
which powers may be delegated. 
Additionally, the ECJ  proceeded to state that a  delegation of authority "implying a wide 
margin  of discretion  which  may,  according  to  the  use  which  is  made  of it,  make  possible  the 
execution of  actual economic policy'' is unconstitutional as "it replaces the choices of  the delegator 
by the choices of  the delegate, bring[ing] about an actual transfer of  responsibility." 
The several Treaty provisions which confer legislative powers on the Community may form 
a sufficient legal basis for establishing a Community agency to which defined tasks may be 
delegated, but only within the limitations set by Meroni and only if the establishment of the 
body contributes to the pursuit of the objectives for which the legislative power in question 
has been granted. 
Two  further  constraints  are  relevant in determining the  degree  of power that may be 
delegated to a new Community body without the need to amend the Treaty: 
• 
27 
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Case 9 I 56 [1959] CR133. Analysis of Legal Powers of the European Community 
•  the delegate will be subject to all the conditions to which the delegating authority 
would  have  been  subject  had  it  exercised  them  directly,  two  of  which  were 
mentioned specifically in Meroni: 
the duty to state the reasons on which the decisions are based (Art 190); and 
the availability of review by the ECJ of all decisions. 
Applying the principles of Meroni to a European Regulatory Authority, it appears that its 
enabling legislation would need to  dictate  specific  executive  functions  for  a  European 
Regulatory Authority to perform, while leaving high-level decisions affecting economic 
policy in the hands of the Commission.  For example, legislation could permit a European 
Regulatory  Authority  to  administer  spectrum  auctioning  rules,  but  legislation  that 
conferred  to  a  European Regulatory  Authority  the  power to  allocate  spectrum in the 
"public interest" would exceed European delegation principles.  In addition, a European 
Regulatory Authority would not necessarily be limited to executive functions.  It could also 
carry out activities, such as carrying out studies or gathering information, which fall short 
of executive functions. 
If, however, it is considered that a  European Regulatory Authority should have more 
than  an  executive  function  and  undertake  policy  decisions  with  certainty  and  in 
complete, unfettered independence, that would require an amendment to the EC Treaty. 
The distinction between constrained discretion and policy making powers is sometimes 
difficult to draw, particularly in the absence of more or clearer guidance from the ECJ.  For 
this  reason,  we now look for  guidance by examining the degree  of power granted to 
existing Community agencies and the degree of power granted to  the existing national 
telecommunications regulators in the United Kingdom and the United States.  We go on to 
suggest some ways in which the distinction could be applied to a  European Regulatory 
Authority. 
b.  Degree of  power given to new Community Agencies to date 
It is helpful to look at the extent of the delegated powers enjoyed by other agencies.  A brief 
review of some of these agencies, their powers of decision-making and the nature of their 
decisions demonstrates the varying levels of authority that the Commission has conferred, 
and is  instructive when considering how much power may be delegated to a  European 
Regulatory Authority.  A fuller discussion of some of these bodies is set out in Appendix 6. 
Examples of bodies created through amendment of the EC  Treaty include the European 
Investment Bank and the European Central Bank.  Both the European Investment Bank and 
the  European  Central  Bank  are  autonomous  legal  bodies  which  have  policy-making 
functions within the EU institutional framework.  The European Investment Bank furthers 
the development of the EU by borrowing funds on capital markets to finance projects that 
promote EU  policy while one of the European Central Bank's objectives is  to define and 
implement the monetary policy  of  the Community.  Each  body has an advisory board 
which sets the policies to be implemented by its executive board.  The European Central 
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Bank can make regulations on monetary policy that are binding and directly applicable to 
all Member States. 
Despite  the  ability  to  formulate  and execute  policy,  these  bodies  are  subject  to  some 
restraints.  Both the European Central Banks and the European Investment Bank must 
comply with their founding agreements as well as the EC Treaty and are subject to review 
by the European Court of Justice.  Member States and the Commission also have some 
input into decisions made by the policy and executive arms of these bodies as they may 
designate who serves on the representative boards. 
No Treaty amendment was considered necessary prior to the establishment of the other 
bodies discussed in this section, which are: 
•  the Office of Harmonisation; 
•  the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA); 
•  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). 
The Office of Harmonisation 
Created  under  Article  235,  the  Office  of  Harmonisation  has  a  significant  role  in 
administering  the  Community's  trademark  policy  and  procedures  as  set forth  by the 
Community in Council Regulation No.  40/94.  The Office  of  Harmonisation functions 
independently of the Commission subject to periodic review by the Commission to assess if 
amendments to Regulation 40/94 are necessary. 
The Office of Harmonisation has the greatest amount of executive authority of the three 
agencies discussed as it independently implements procedures defined by the Commission. 
In  doing so,  the  Office  of  Harmonisation evaluates if trademark  applicants  have  met 
minimal  filing  conditions,  invites  observations  by  third  parties  and  opposition  to  the 
application and determines if  the trademark can be registered. 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) 
The EMEA, has a limited amount of executive power within the centralised mechanism for 
the approval of biotechnology products and veterinary medicines used as  performance 
enhancers. 
The EMEA co-ordinates and supervises the two authorisation procedures established by 
the  Commission  but,  unlike  the  Office  of  Harmonisation,  the  EMEA  does  not  make 
decisions independently of the Commission.  The EMEA  presents draft decisions to the 
Commission about the  possible  approval of  biotechnological  medicines  and veterinary 
drugs used as performance enhancers, and the Commission retains the right to veto the 
EMEA' s recommendations, though only "in exceptional circumstances". 
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The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
The EMCDDA has the least amount of executive authority and has a minimal role in the 
Community legislative  process.  The  EMCDDA  functions  as  a  research  body  for  the 
Commission, its purpose being to collect and provide information on drugs, drug addiction 
and its social ramifications to the Commission and the Community's Member States. 
While an important source of the information the Commission may use to develop policy, 
the EMCDDA has neither executive nor decision-making powers.  Policy and executive 
decisions about drugs rest solely with the Commission.  In fact,  the EMCDDA "may not 
take  any  measure  which in any way goes  beyond the  sphere of  information and the 
processing thereof." (EEC 302/93) 
Conclusions on the degree of power given to new Community Agencies to date 
As can be seen, the Community has delegated a varying amount of policy and executive 
powers to its agencies.  In most cases, the Commission has tended to retain final decision-
making authority while the agencies provide technical expertise or engage in fact-finding 
that provide a basis for the Commission's policy and executive decisions.  The Office of 
Harmonisation is an exception to this rule as it can make decisions and has a quasi-judicial 
function independent of both the Commission and Member States. 
A central difference between an agency such as the Office of Harmonisation, created under 
the current Treaty and the European Central Bank, created through a Treaty amendment, is 
that the former merely applies guidelines to  the facts  of each case, implementing rules 
drawn up by the Community institutions, while the latter creates policy and draws up 
guidelines which are  directly applicable to  the  Member States and implemented by its 
executive board.  The Office of Harmonisation is an executive rather than a legislative or 
policy-making body, and the fact that it may make decisions within the limited areas in 
respect of which it has been delegated a degree of discretion does not affect this status.  If 
that discretion were to be too wide, the body would fall foul of Meroni.  Another distinction 
lies  in  the  preparatory  nature  of  tasks  carried  out  by  bodies  such  as  the  Office  of 
Harmonisation and European Medicines Evaluation Agency, making recommendations to 
the Commission rather than carrying out the recommendation themselves. 
Although Meroni is concerned with the limits of delegable power, underlying the decision 
is  the fundamental requirement of Community law that policy-making power must stay 
with the primary Community institutions established under the Treaty in order to maintain 
the balance of power.  This case may be a helpful guide to the policy  I execution dichotomy. 
We  might however extrapolate from the judgement that an agency with an executive, as 
opposed to policy-making, function will have clearly defined powers to implement policy 
within a  pre-determinated framework while remaining subject to a  strict review by (for 
example)  the  Commission  in  the  light  of  objective  criteria.  The  European  Medical 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA) is an example of this.  However, the Office of Harmonisation 
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suggests that the Commission need not have the right to overturn or alter all individual 
agency decisions to remain true to the principles of Meroni.  In the Office of Harmonisation 
framework,  appeals are made to an internal agency review board and if necessary,  the 
Court of Justice.  Review of the agency is limited to periodic evaluation and amendments to 
the  enabling  legislation.  By  contrast,  the  creation  of  agencies  such  as  the  European 
Investment  Bank  and  the  European  Central  Bank,  which  set  policy,  determine  the 
framework by which to implement that policy and whose decisions  are not subject to 
Commission approval, require amendments to the EC Treaty. 
If we were to define an 'executive role' as the implementation of policy, we note that this is 
given a wide interpretation in the context of delegation by the Council to the Commission, 
allowing for  the adoption of regulations, the "drawing-up of implementing rules"  and 
"wide powers of discretion and action".  The lesson from experience to date is that the 
distinction  between  executive  and  policy  making  powers  depends  upon  the  context. 
Although this does not provide definitive conclusions, it does at least indicate the flexibility 
which the Community institutions have in applying these concepts. 
These points should be borne in mind in the following discussion.  We have been unable to 
locate any detailed guidance on the policy/  executive dichotomy in European Community 
case law. 
c.  Degree of  power held by OFTEL and the FCC 
Below we provide a brief discussion of OFTEL and the FCC to examine how much power 
the legislature and executive have devolved to these telecommunications regulators.  The 
aim of this discussion is to draw light, given the absence of any guidance in EC case law, on 
what may consist of the legitimate non-policy executive functions of a European Regulatory 
Authority.  However, the conclusions that can be drawn are limited as both OFTEL and the 
FCC carry out tasks that would intuitively be deemed to be part of the policy-making level, 
albeit within certain legal constraints. 
The powers of OFTEL in the United Kingdom 
The Director-General of OFTEL is given his powers by the Telecommunications Act 1984 
("the Act").  He is empowered to modify and enforce licence conditions and to investigate 
complaints.  The  Director-General's  functions  do  not  include  the  formulation  and 
development of policy; in particular, the issuing of licences is a function reserved for the 
Government,  but  the  powers  vested  in  the  Director-General  afford  him  considerable 
autonomy under the heads of making recommendations, exercise of discretion and issuance 
of guidance and licence condition amendment. 
•  Recommendations: the Director-General makes recommendations to the Secretary of 
State  on  policy  matters,  and  in  practice  much  of  the  UK  1991  White  Paper 
reproduced the Director-General's proposals. 
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•  Discretion:  the  Director-General's  official  functions  under  the  Act  necessarily 
involve exercise of considerable discretion, but within constraints as to the policies 
and aims to which he must adhere in making decisions which are set out in some 
detail in the  Act.  For example, Section 3(2)(a)  instructs the Director-General to 
exercise  his  functions  in  the  manner  which  he  considers  is  best calculated  to 
promote  the  interests  of  users.  His  decisions  are  also  subject  to  UK  rules  of 
administrative  law  and  if,  for  example,  the  Director-General  fails  to  take  into 
account relevant considerations (or takes into account irrelevant considerations), a 
Court might overturn the decision. 
•  Guidance:  the Director-General has the power to  issue guidance which, while it 
must fall  within  the  policy  guidelines  to  which  he  is  subject,  in fact  involves 
significant decision-making power. 
•  Amendments  to  Licence  Conditions:  the  Director-General  may  modify  the 
conditions of a  licence under Section 12, although within stated limitations.  For 
example, he may not, generally, amend individual licences without the consent of 
the licensee,  nor may he amend class  licences  where any member of that class 
objects.  Recently,  the Director-General has, in fulfilment of his duty to  promote 
effective  competition,  incorporated  a  new  licence  condition  mirroring  EU 
competition laws  into  the  licence  of  BT  (the  dominant  operator  in  the  United 
Kingdom).  BT unsuccessfully challenged the Director-Generals power to amend its 
licence in this manner.  This provision, which will have a dramatic impact on the 
industry,  demonstrates  the  considerable  autonomy  which  the  Director-General 
enjoys. 
The powers of the FCC in the United States 
Under the United States Constitution, Congress can delegate some, but not all, legislative 
functions to administrative agencies.  Enabling legislation which creates an agency defines 
congressional policy objectives and can confer rulemaking authority to the agency, subject 
to  judicial review.  Congress  can control or restrict  an agency  by  amending enabling 
legislation to reflect policy changes and can also directly control an agency through funding 
appropriation and legislative vetoes. 
However, under US v. Chada, Congress must follow proper legislative procedures to do so 
(i.e. the legislation must be voted on by both the Senate and the House and presented to the 
President).  In addition, the Senate has some indirect control as it must approve Presidential 
appointments of commissioners. 
In  the case  of  the  FCC,  the Communications Act  of 1934  gave  the agency  the  task of 
executing and enforcing interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communications 
to  make "available so far  as  possible to all the people of the United States ... a  rapid, 
efficient, nationwide and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
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facilities at reasonable charges."  [47  U.S.C.  151]  The Courts, Congress and the FCC have 
interpreted this as a "universal service at a reasonable price" policy objective. 
The 1934 Act gave broad powers to the Commission to meet this objective in interstate and 
foreign commerce, subject only to the requirement that any action taken is "consistent with 
the public interest, convenience, and necessity"  [Sees.  303/  307].  Congress did not define 
these broad terms and the FCC, in practice if not in right, has enjoyed considerable policy 
discretion as a result. 
The Commission supported, until the late 1960s, AT&T's monopoly as it viewed this as the 
best  way  to  achieve  universal  service.  However,  the  Commission  later  changed  its 
approach  and  now  views  competition  as  the  best  method  to  achieve  the  Congress's 
objectives: Congress forbore from intervening for 62 years either to endorse or condone the 
FCC's approach.  Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 formally adopts vigorous 
competition as the means to achieve the goals of the 1934 Act, it can be argued that the 1996 
Act is a codification of policy developed by the FCC and the Courts years earlier. 
The FCC's ability to develop policy has resulted from use of the "informal rulemaking" 
process.  Rules promulgated under this process are prospective in application, and informal 
rulemaking procedures are simplified and less costly than order procedures.  In addition, 
rulemaking proceedings allow for  extensive  public  participation, and decisions  are not 
limited to the record as is the case in order hearings28• 
The advantages of these procedures can be seen given the low standard of judicial review 
by which courts evaluate FCC rulemakings.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, FCC 
action must not be "arbitrary, capricious, or not otherwise in accordance with law" and 
Courts  have  often  deferred  to  agency  expertise  in  technical  areas  such  as 
telecommunications29. 
Conclusions from OFTEL and FCC 
It is apparent that, although the legal constraints in the two administrations dictate that the 
regulators have an executive function rather than a policy-making one, this is a somewhat 
theoretical situation.  In practice, the FCC, and OFTEL to a lesser extent, do make policy 
decisions, although within a wider policy framework governed by legislation.  This point 
illustrates just how difficult it is to provide a cast-iron formula for defining tasks that may 
be  viewed  as  purely executive  (and  thus  fit  for  delegation  to  a  European Regulatory 
Authority).  Nevertheless,  in Section  d  below  we  suggest  some  functions  that  might 
constitute the legitimate executive functions of a European Regulatory Authority. 
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d.  Suggestions for the demarcation of  the policy and executive functions of  a 
European Regulatory Authority 
The  Office  of  Harmonisation  discussed  in Section  4.3.lb  has  the  greatest  amount  of 
executive authority of the agencies created without Treaty amendment that are reviewed in 
this Study, although its powers do not approach those of OFTEL or the FCC discussed in 
Section 4.3.1c  or,  we would contend, the upper limit on delegation set by Meroni.  In 
practice, we conclude that the FCC and OFTEL do make policy decisions, albeit in a wider 
policy framework governed by legislation.  It follows that, although a European Regulatory 
Authority's  powers  could,  without Treaty  amendment,  exceed  those  of  the  Office  of 
Harmonisation, they would still need to stop short of policy-making functions held by the 
FCC and OFTEL. 
Based on the Survey, and for each of the areas identified by Survey respondents as good 
candidates for enhanced European regulation, we suggest in this section those tasks that 
might constitute the legitimate executive functions of a  European Regulatory Authority. 
However, as stated earlier, we have been unable to locate any detailed guidance on the 
policy/  executive dichotomy in European Community case law.  As such, our suggestions 
should be considered as indicative only. 
Licensing 
Chapter 3 shows that there is a support from some market players for the availability of a 
single European licence for networks which extend across national borders, and that this 
perceived need will not be fully  met by harmonisation, mutual recognition or one-stop 
shopping procedures (although, for services, class licences might provide a solution). 
In the context of licensing, we suggest that policy issues which may not be delegated in the 
absence of a Treaty amendment include: 
•  whether or  not to  maintain special  or exclusive  rights  (already  determined  by 
Community law); 
•  whether otherwise to limit the number of licensees, and on what objective basis 
(again, in the process of determination under the Full Competition Directive and the 
Proposed Licensing Directive); 
•  the broad principles for the application process (transparency, non-discrimination 
etc.). 
Once the broad policy has been set in place, the assessment of bids for and the grant of a 
Community  Licence  can  be  seen  to  be  an  executive  action  and  could  therefore  be 
undertaken by a European Regulatory Authority at a European level, at least for certain 
types  of  network  (or  perhaps  services)  which  may  be  said  to  enjoy  a  Community 
dimension,  for  example  Trans-European  networks  or,  perhaps,  Satellite-Personal 
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Communications  Systems.  In  the  latter  case,  however,  Member  States  would  be 
particularly concerned about handing over the administration of valuable radio frequency 
spectrum to the Community. 
Interconnection 
Nearly all respondents who favoured a European Regulatory Authority felt it should have 
some role in interconnection, and many also thought that, while it was a positive step, the 
Proposed  Interconnection  Directive  would  in  itself  be  insufficient  to  prevent  market 
distortions post-liberalisation. 
In the context of interconnection, policy matters clearly included the issue (already decided 
in the Community) of whether operators should be required to allow interconnection and 
the  broad  framework  for  interconnection  (transparency,  cost-orientation  and  non-
discrimination).  Accounting separation of interconnection costs and setting common cost 
principles might also be considered policy issues: there is scope for debate here. 
Other actions in relation to interconnection would appear to be merely executive in nature, 
although undoubtedly complex and capable of resulting in diverse results  (in  itself an 
argument for further action at Community level in the quest for a true Single Market). 
For networks which, when connected, will extend beyond national borders, a potential role 
for  a  European Regulatory  Authority with executive  powers would be to  step in and 
determine interconnection terms in cases where the operators cannot agree terms.  Viewed 
another way, we can see  scope for  a  European Regulatory Authority to formulate and 
propose detailed trans-border interconnection conditions which could then be adopted by 
the Commission and recommended to, or imposed on, NRAs. 
Numbering 
While a few respondents saw a Community role in the creation of an overall European 
numbering space  (e.g.  00  3-XX  for  Europe  or equal  length  strings  of numbers for  all 
locations in Europe - as in the USA), more saw a more limited, but still important role in 
identifying and prescribing common numbering ranges for  important business services 
such as non-geographic numbers (e.g. premium rate or nation-wide local rate numbers and 
numbers for future advanced business services). 
In the context of numbering, policy issues are perhaps limited to the decision to transfer (or 
otherwise) the administration of control of the numbering space to an independent body 
and the principle of non-discrimination in allocation. 
Other actions appear executive in nature and, not only to promote the Single Market, but in 
the context of promoting European businesses generally, one can see an important role for a 
European Regulatory Authority in harmonising number allocation procedures and the use 
of present and future non-geographic numbers on a Community-wide basis or, taken one 
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step further, in taking over blocks of such numbers from NRAs and making allocations 
directly.  Other roles may also develop, particularly in relation to numbering and for future 
Trans-European networks. 
Number portability 
Number portability can be seen as a partial sub-set of Interconnection.  Number portability 
is seen by most as an essential ingredient for infrastructure liberalisation.  Experience in the 
United Kingdom has shown, not only, that lack of number portability acts as a barrier to 
entry, but also  that complex  issues  arise  when determining what additional costs  are 
incurred by an incumbent operator who is required to allow number portability.  Whether 
or not to  require  number portability  at all  is  perhaps a  policy  issue  but, below  that, 
determining the terms on which it is  brought in is  clearly an executive act which falls 
within the same ambit as a determination of interconnect terms so that, in some cases, it 
may become an area for  regulation by a  European Regulatory Authority with executive 
powers only.  In the medium term, the requirement for number portability across national 
borders may also be expected to grow. 
Universal service 
Support for a role for  a  European Regulatory Authority in relation to Universal Service 
funding stemmed primarily from a fear that a level playing field across the Community 
might otherwise not be achieved. 
In the  context of  Universal Service,  policy  issues  may be  limited  to  the concept and, 
perhaps, the determination of a framework (for example establishing a fund) from which 
costs are to be met.  The basic principles for costing must be determined at Community 
level (for example, the recent debate about whether mobile telephony should be part of the 
equation), as should the assessment of whether national approaches are compatible with 
Community  law  on  a  case-by-case  basis  as  national  schemes  are  notified  to  the 
Commission.  Other  high  level  principles,  for  example  transparency  and  non-
discrimination, are also in the policy realm. 
Below  that,  there is  a  clear possible role for  a  European Regulatory  Authority without 
policy making powers in formulating and proposing more detailed harmonised rules for 
the determination of the costs of Universal Service,  the categories of licensees who will 
contribute to  those  costs  and the  methodology to  be used in allocating costs  between 
operators.  By reason of subsidiarity, it is clear that NRAs must retain a material role, but 
there is a strong case for further intervention at a Community level to avoid distortion. 
Spectrum management 
Chapter 3  shows  that a  number  of  respondents  to  the  Survey  felt  that regulation  of 
spectrum at Community-level could add value, particularly where satellite communication 
was involved. 
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Spectrum continues to be regarded by most Member States as a national resource and this 
belief may be expected to intensify as, in the wake of the recent FCC auctions, the value of 
spectrum is better understood.  So, in the case of spectrum management, subsidiarity, or 
political views, may speak against a significant role for a European Regulatory Authority in 
this area. 
The Community's role so far as been limited to co-ordination of allocation and reservation 
of  particular bands for  new uses  (notably GSM  and DECT).  Co-ordination remains  a 
necessary executive action and a European Regulatory Authority could perhaps take over 
this  task,  and some further  role  in harmonising licence  conditions, and bring forward 
recommendations to the Community, particularly in the context of new services with a 
Community dimension, such as S-PCS and beyond. 
We  also  foresee  that,  if  Member  States  begin,  or  in  some  cases  continue,  to  auction 
spectrum, while others do not, there could perhaps be an impact on the single market.  A 
European Regulatory Authority without policy making powers could carry out certain non-
policy aspects of the work in that area and report to the Commission. 
If  current attitudes of Member States change, there may perhaps be scope in future for some 
bands of frequency  to  be released to an executive European Regulatory  Authority, for 
allocation to providers of Trans-European services. 
Monitoring and assisting in enforcement 
There was widespread support for a European Regulatory Authority to take some role in 
the implementation and enforcement of EC Directives, but divergent views on what that 
role should be.  Some respondents called for a European Regulatory Authority to take a 
direct role in enforcement, but that is unlikely to be appropriate for the reasons discussed in 
Section 3.12. 
Nonetheless a European Regulatory Authority might usefully: 
•  take on the role of monitoring the effectiveness of the new legal and regulatory 
framework across the Community from a Single Market perspective; 
•  identify where problems continue; 
•  stimulate discussion on best practice and; 
•  where necessary, report back to the Commission on further actions that might be 
appropriate. 
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In cases where the Commission or the ECJ decide to take enforcement action, a European 
Regulatory Authority could also perhaps assist in gathering evidence. 
4.3.2  Dispute Resolution and Appeals 
Some respondents to the Survey suggested that a European Regulatory Authority should be 
given a  specific role in dispute resolution between (i)  market players and NRAs or (ii) 
between NRAs or (iii) between market players, where a Community dimension is involved. 
We  take  a  cautious line  both on legal  principle and in light of  other existing  dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
It is not possible, without an amendment to the EC Treaty, to use a European Regulatory 
Authority  as  a  formal  appellate  tribunal  with  the  power  to  make  binding  decisions. 
However,  a  more  limited  European  Regulatory  Authority  role  in  dispute  resolution, 
through conciliation or an arbitration procedure where complainants renounce their rights 
to further action, is possible under the terms of the current Treaty. 
Within this context, we examine: 
•  the general Community position on appeals; 
•  specific  dispute resolution mechanisms and conciliation rules in the Community 
telecommunications framework; 
•  the  role  of  existing  non-telecommunications  Community  bodies  in  relation  to 
appeals. 
Finally, we draw on this discussion to examine the possible role of a European Regulatory 
Authority in relation to appeals. 
a.  General position on appeals 
At present, disputes as  regards telecommunications regulation will fall,  in the ordinary 
course, to be resolved under general national law, the Treaty rules (if applicable) and/  or 
special  conciliation  procedures  established  under  specific  EC  telecommunications 
measures. 
Under civil law jurisdictions, if there is a dispute between a telecommunications operator 
and the NRA (or equivalent body, if an NRA has not yet been established) the aggrieved 
party is likely to be able to request the NRA to reconsider its decision.  If the request for 
reconsideration fails,  the aggrieved party is  likely to be able to bring the case before a 
national court or tribunal under national administrative law.  By  contrast, in the case of 
OFTEL in the UK, no appeal ordinarily lies against its decisions except on the quite limited 
basis of judicial review. 
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However, the European legal framework may open at least two channels through which a 
dispute raising an issue of Community telecommunications regulation may be challenged 
(e.g. whether an NRA's approach to interconnection is consistent with Community rules): 
•  Following Article 177, a national court may refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of the Treaty or the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
Community (and also now of the European Central Bank) if it considers that a 
decision on the point is necessary to enable it to give judgement3°.  Moreover, if a 
case is brought before a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is 
no judicial remedy under national law, it must refer the case to the ECJ  on these 
issues. 
•  If the NRA or similar body can be considered to be a  public body, there is  the 
possibility for the Commission to consider an action against the Member State in 
question under Article 169 for failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty.  As an 
NRA would be established by national law (statute or licence), even if it is quasi-
autonomous, an NRA might well remain within the reach of Article 169. 
The procedure under Article 169 comprises both an administrative/  political and a judicial 
stage.  First the Commission delivers a 'reasoned opinion', after sending a letter ('mise en 
demeure') to the Member State concerned.  The judicial stage cannot be commenced until a 
reasoned opinion has been delivered.  The judicial stage gives rise to a case before the ECJ, 
brought by the Commission. 
b.  Specific dispute resolution mechanisms/conciliation rules in the Community 
Framework 
There already exist a number of dispute resolution procedures under existing Community 
measures.  These are briefly summarised below. 
The ONP Committee 
The ONP Committee was established under the ONP Framework Directive.  One of the 
tasks of the Committee is assisting in settling disputes between users and NRAs under, for 
example,  Article  12  of  Directive  92/44,  using  a  conciliation  mechanism  involving  a 
Working  Group  which  includes  the  Commission,  two  ONP  Committee  members  (i.e. 
representatives of the Member States telecommunications ministries or NRAs) and other 
interested  parties.  This  procedure  may  be  used  for  any  question  concerning  the 
30 
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The recent case involving BT Regina v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications PLC (Case C-392/93), 
[1996]  2 C.M.L.R.  217 is  an example of a  national court's decision to exercise its right to obtain a  preliminary 
ruling from the ECJ.  BT sued the United Kingdom government alleging that national legislation exempting some 
telecommunications operators from  the  provisions of Council Directive 90/531, exceeded the UK's discretion 
under Article 189,  and the United Kingdom national court referred to  the ECJ  for a  preliminary ruling under 
Article 177 four questions involving interpretation of the disputed provision of Directive 90/531. n;e;r;a  Analysis of Legal Powers of the European Community 
infringement of the provisions of the relevant Directive, though in the case of the procedure 
under the proposed Interconnection Directive this is limited to interconnection disputes. 
I  Procedures under the ONP Voice Telephony and Leased Line Directives 
I 
I 
Article 12 of Directive 92/44 ("the Leased Line Directive") firstly states that invoking the 
conciliation procedure is without prejudice to any action the Commission or any Member 
State might take pursuant to the Treaty (particularly Articles 169 and 170), illustrating the 
point that disputes may have a number of alternative manners of resolution.  The aggrieved 
party must,  under  this  procedure,  first  attempt resolution at national level,  either  by 
appealing  to  the  NRA  or  to  the  authorities.  Written  notification  is  given  to  the 
Commission, but here it is also given to the NRA, and either the NRA or the Commission 
may, where it finds there is a case for further examination, refer the case to the Chairman of 
the ONP Committee31.  The procedure is  the same as that under the Voice  Telephony 
Directive, but with some differences as to when the procedure can be invoked. 
The Leased Line Conciliation procedure has been used successfully on two occasions32. 
Most recently, it was used by the Dutch user association to challenge the price differentials 
for leased lines between national and international routes covering the same distance.  This 
was argued to show that international tariffs were not cost-orientated.  The outcome of the 
discussions between PTT  Nederland and the association was agreement that differentials 
would be reduced by 2000 to no more than 20%. 
Article 27 of Directive 95/  62/EC ("The ONP Voice Telephony Directive") contains similar 
provisions,  with  the  main  difference  being  that  this  Article  contains  the  specific 
requirement that the dispute must involve telecommunications organisations in more than 
one Member State for the conciliation procedure to be invoked. 
Procedure under the Proposed Interconnection Directive 
Article 15 of the Proposed Interconnection Directive refers to the advisory role of the ONP 
Committee, but goes on to imbue the Committee, by Article 16, with a dispute resolution 
function.  This is similar to the conciliation procedure laid down in Article 12 of Directive 
92/44 and in the Voice Telephony Directive.  Article 16 applies to interconnection disputes 
between organisations operating under authorisations provided by different Member States 
where the dispute is not within the responsibility of a single NRA.  Any party may refer the 
dispute to the relevant NRAs, and they must co-ordinate their efforts to resolve the dispute. 
If they cannot do so  within 2  months,  either party may by written notification  to  the 
Commission (copied to all parties involved) invoke the dispute resolution procedure.  The 
final role of the Committee under this Directive will depend on the outcome of conciliation 
between the Council and the European Parliament on the proposal. 
31 
32 
The ONP Committee is chaired by a senior official of DG XIII. 
A dispute still exists as to whether the procedure was invoked on the first occasion, as the NRA  in question 
disputes the fact that national procedures had been launched and that an unsatisfactory result had been obtained. 
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Where the Commission finds that there is a case for further examination, it may set up a 
Working  Group  made  up  of  at  least  two  members  of  the  ONP  committee,  one 
representative of each of the NRAs concerned and the chairman of the ONP committee or 
another official of the Commission appointed by him.  If the Group has not defined its 
position within three months, or the position has not been implemented within, generally, 2 
months, the advisory procedure of the ONP Committee will take over.  This seems to go 
further, in terms of ensuring resolution of the issue at national level, than the procedure 
under the Leased Line Directive.  Of significance to this Study, the complainants invoking 
the dispute resolution procedure must renounce their rights to further action at national 
law. 
Proposed right of appeal under Licensing Directive 
Under the present Article 5 of the Proposed Directive on Licensing, certain NRA decisions 
and refusals would be made subject to a right of appeal to an institution in the Member 
State concerned which is independent of the NRA.  The nature of the appeal process is not 
specified.  The final position, however, is yet to be determined. 
c.  Role of  existing Community bodies in relation to appeals 
The  EMCDDA  does  not  make  any  administrative  or  executive  type  decisions  and 
consequently no right of appeal exists. 
In contrast, the EMEA can and does make decisions (in the form of proposals), but they are 
subject to review by the Commission.  Should approval of a medicine be denied under the 
centralised procedure, a manufacturer can appeal to the EMEA within 15 days of notice. 
The Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products must then re-evaluate its initial decision 
within 60 days. 
A right of appeal also exists within the decentralised decision mechanism of the EMEA. 
This mechanism allows a manufacturer to seek licensing approval directly from a Member 
State.  If the Member State authorises the medicine, it must then produce a detailed report 
to be circulated among the other Member States.  If Member States refuse to recognise the 
authorisation, manufacturers can appeal to  the  EMEA  to  arbitrate.  Again,  any EMEA 
recommendation is subject to Commission review. 
As  an independent agency,  the Office  of Harmonisation renders decisions  that are not 
subject to Commission review.  Applicants or parties affected by the denial or grant of a 
trademark can appeal within two months of the decision to the Office of Harmonisation's 
Board of Appeal.  The Board of Appeal reviews the initial decision and can exercise any 
power conferred to the Office of Harmonisation.  The Board can also remand cases back to 
the  initial  Office  of  Harmonisation  decision-making  body.  Appeals  from  the  Board's 
decisions are made to the Court of Justice.  The Commission has no control over Office of 
Harmonisation's final  decisions,  and is  limited to  amending the enabling legislation to 
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expand  or  revoke  Office  of  Harmonisation's  executive  powers if dissatisfied  with  the 
agency and its decisions. 
d.  Role of  a European Regulatory Authority in relation to appeals 
With reference particularly to interconnection disputes, some respondents emphasised a 
role  for  a  European Regulatory Authority in hearing appeals from decisions  of NRAs. 
However, in the context of the discussion above on existing legal mechanisms under the 
Treaty and existing conciliation procedures, we consider that, without an amendment to 
the EC Treaty, the role of a European Regulatory Authority in the area of appeals would 
need to be limited. 
A  European Regulatory  Authority might offer conciliation and/  or guidance services  to 
NRAs but if it were to act as a forum for appeals, this would, in our view, be inconsistent 
with the rules enshrined under the Treaty of Rome under which challenges to decisions of 
Member States or NRAs, arising from a breach of Treaty rules or Community measures, are 
to be referred to the ECJ.  In the absence of an amendment to the Treaty, we do not consider 
a European Regulatory Authority could take on this role. 
This  view  is  supported by the  ECJ's  opinion on the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA) 
(Opinion  1/9133)  which  held  that  a  proposed  court created  within  the  EEA  member 
countries, with the power to issue binding decisions, could impact the balance of powers 
between Member States and the Community institutions.  It therefore risked infringing the 
ECJ' s exclusive jurisdiction, as this would adversely affect the allocation of responsibilities 
and  powers defined  in the EC  Treaty.  As  a  result,  any jurisdiction that a  European 
Regulatory Authority might have could not extend to issues of the respective competences 
of the Community and the Member States34. 
To  date,  the  Community  legal  framework  has  not  prescribed  a  definitive  appeals 
mechanism  relating  to  NRA  decisions  but  instead  has  provided  for  conciliation 
mechanisms  to  bring  the  parties  in  dispute  and  NRAs  together.  All  the  current 
arrangements  would  need  to  be  reviewed  if a  European  Regulatory  Authority  were 
established.  For example, it may be appropriate for a European Regulatory Authority: 
• 
33 
34 
only to assume a conciliation/  arbitral role; 
Opinion delivered pursuant to the subparagraph of Article 228(1)  of the Treaty,  Draft agreement between the 
Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to 
the creation of the European Economic Area. 
The  ECJ  held  that an  international  agreement  that created  a  system  of  courts  to  interpret  the  agreement's 
provisions was not per se incompatible with the Treaty.  However, in this case, the EEA Court impinged on the 
exclusive jurisdiction conferred to the ECJ under Article 219 of the EC Treaty as the EEA court could also interpret 
the allocation of Community and Member State responsibilities.  Moreover, under the agreement, the EEA Court 
was not subject to  subsequent decisions  of the  ECJ.  Thus,  the ECJ  concluded that the EEA  Court violated 
Community law. 
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•  to be limited to that role only in the case of disputes between NRAs which have a 
Community dimension. 
Using a  European Regulatory Authority as  a  more formal  appellate tribunal would be 
difficult without an amendment to the EC Treaty. 
4.4  Creation of a European Regulatory Authority without Treaty 
Amendment 
In Section 4.2.4 we described how the Community has adopted legislation covering various 
aspects of telecommunications, and indicated the legal basis or bases upon which it has 
done so. 
In the first part of Section 4.4, we explain in more detail: 
•  how the legal basis for a measure is decided; 
•  how different Articles require different procedures for adoption of measures; and 
•  the circumstances under which a number of Articles may be combined. 
In the second part of this section, we consider the appropriate legal and procedural basis 
for the establishment of a European Regulatory Authority. 
4.4.1  Procedure for Creating a New Body under the Treaty 
a.  Legal and procedural basis 
The phrase "legal basis" is used in Community law to indicate the Article of the Treaty (or 
other source of legal authority) under which a Community institution adopts a measure. 
For  example the correct legal basis  of Council  Decision 94/  445/EC3S  is  Article  129b-d. 
More specifically, it is the second indent of Article 129c(1), since it is that part of the Article 
which refers to implementing measures to ensure interoperability of networks. 
The legal basis of a measure should be distinguished from its procedural basis (which we 
use in this Study to mean the Article (or part of an Article) which sets out the procedure to 
be followed by a Community institution in adopting a measure.).  The procedural basis is 
determined by the legal basis.  That is to say, once it has been decided which Article is to 
form the legal basis, this Article will dictate which procedure is to be followed.  It will do so 
either by reference to another Article, such as one of the sections of Article 189, which sets 
out various procedures, or by defining the procedure to be followed within the Article 
itself.  For example, in the case of Article 129b-d, the procedural basis is stated in Article 
35 
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129d,  where measures are  to be adopted to  ensure interoperability of networks, to  be 
Article 189c (the "co-operation procedure").  Article 235, by contrast, describes within the 
Article itself the procedure to be used in passing a measure under it, rather than referring to 
another Article of the Treaty. 
The procedural basis is an important factor in the establishment of a European Regulatory 
Authority.  Depending on the legal basis chosen, the procedure may involve Parliament in 
a  purely consultative role,  at one extreme, or in a  "co-decision"  role,  in which it may 
ultimately prevent legislation being finally adopted, at the other. 
b.  What happens where there is a choice of  legal basis? 
As will be seen in Section c below, Article 235  may only be used as the legal basis if no 
other legal basis can be found in the Treaty, so the choice between legal bases will not arise 
in that case.  However,  where either of  two Treaty  provisions  other than Article  235 
potentially serve as the legal basis for a new measure the situation is quite different. 
On  numerous  occasions,  the  ECJ  has  confirmed  that  the  choice  of  a  legal  basis  for 
Community measures is a matter of law rather than a matter of discretion.  In the context of 
the organisation of the powers of the Community, the choice must be based on objective 
factors which are amenable to judicial review.  Those factors include, in particular, the aim 
and content of the measure concemed.36 
Where an institution's power to adopt a measure arises under two separate provisions of 
the EC  Treaty, both of which have the same procedural basis, the institution is bound to 
adopt that measure on the basis of both of the provisions.37 
However, where an institution wants to adopt a  measure which is  justified under two 
separate provisions of the EC Treaty, each of which has a different procedural basis, the 
institution is  only able  to  use one of the provisions as the relevant legal basis for  the 
measure.  The ECJ has held that, in this case, the institution must choose the legal basis that 
does not undermine, or is least undermining of, the role of the Parliament.  In the Titanium 
Dioxide Waste case38, for example, the ECJ  decided that although the Directive concerned 
had two objectives, Article 100a was the appropriate legal basis rather than Article 130s, 
because the latter caused a detrimental impact on the procedural role of the Parliament. 
In  addition,  and  in  potential  conflict  to  this,  the  ECJ  has  separately  held  that if  the 
objectives of one Treaty provision are more specifically relevant than another to a  given 
measure, the more specific legal basis should be chosen.39  For instance, the mere fact that a 
38 
39 
Case C-300/89 Commission v.  Council ('Titanium Dioxide Waste') [1991] ECR 1-2867, 10; Case C-426/93 Gennany v. 
Council [1995] ECR 1-3723, 29. 
Case 165/87 Commission v.  Council. 
Case C-300/89 Commission v.  Council. 
Case C-155/91 Commission v. Council and Case C-187 /93 Parliament v.  Council. 
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measure affects the establishment or functioning of the internal market is not sufficient for 
Article lOOa to apply (see Section 4.4.2b). 
c.  Exclusivity of  use of  Article 235 as legal basis 
Article  235  fully  embraces the concept of implied powers  (see  Section 4.2.1  above)  by 
providing that: 
If action  by  the  Community should prove  necessary  to  attain,  in  the  course of the 
operation  of the  common  market,  one of the objectives of the  Community and  this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from  the  Commission and after consulting the  European  Parliament, 
take the appropriate measures. 
It  follows from the very wording of Article 235 that its use as the legal basis for a measure is 
justified only where other potentially applicable Articles  have been considered and no 
other Treaty provision gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt that 
measure.  It is thus not possible to use Article 235  in conjunction with any other Treaty 
Article as the legal basis for a Community measure. 
This  point was clearly  made in the  Edicom  Case40,  which concerned  the  adoption  of 
Decision 94/  445/EC by the Council on the basis of Article 235.  The ECJ  annulled the 
Decision because it found that it was a measure covered by the second indent of Article 
129c(l)41, and therefore this should have formed the legal basis, not Article 235.  Practically, 
this was important because the two Articles have different procedural bases. 
4.4.2  Which Article(s) should form the Legal Basis of the European Regulatory 
Authority? 
The  principal  candidates  for  forming  the  legal  basis  for  the  creation  of  a  European 
Regulatory Authority are as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
40 
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Article 90; 
Article 1  OOa; 
Article 129b-d; 
Article 235 . 
Case C-271/94 European Parliament v Council of the European Union. 
Council Decision 94/  445/EC on inter-administration telematic networks for statistics relating to  the trading of 
goods between Member States. Analysis of Legal Powers of the European Community 
Below we consider each of these Articles in turn, discussing their appropriateness to the 
formation of a European Regulatory Authority. 
a.  Article 90 
Article 90, which is also discussed in Chapter 2, states that: 
•  certain public undertakings (including telecommunications undertakings) shall be 
subject to the Treaty rules  (especially competition)  insofar as these rules  do not 
obstruct them in the performance of their tasks; and 
•  the Commission shall ensure compliance with this Article, if necessary by adopting 
Decisions or Directives42. 
The  Commission's  approach  has  been  confirmed  by  the  ECJ  in  French  Republic  v 
Commission43, in which it stated that Article 90(3) permitted the Commission to impose, by 
the  adoption  of  Directives,  general  obligations  with which  public  undertakings  must 
comply under the EC Treaty.  This ruling was a cornerstone to the further development of 
telecommunications policy in the Community. 
In theory, therefore, Article 90(3) may be a legal basis for further Community action in this 
area.  However, there are reasons why Article 90(3)  may not be a sufficient base for  the 
establishment of an ERA: 
• 
• 
42 
43 
to  justify  intervention  under  Article  90,  action  must  be  necessary  to  ensure 
compliance of Member States (essentially, in their regulation and control of public 
undertakings) with other basic Articles of the EC Treaty (for example, Articles 6, 30, 
52, 59, 85 and 86)- the establishment of an ERA would need therefore to be clearly 
linked  to,  and  its  tasks  restricted  to,  issues  such  as  maintaining  freedom  of 
competition and fair competition and access to markets, which may not mesh easily 
with its intended role; 
Article  90  is  designed to deal with actions of Member States and not actions of 
undertakings, the proper legal base for which would be Article 85/86 (as stated in 
Case C-202/88).  While, therefore, Article 90 could be an appropriate legal base for 
regulating  the  relationship  between  a  Member  State  and  a  publicly  owned 
telecommunications operator, it would not appear to allow regulation by the ERA of 
public  or privately owned telecommunications operators; 
The Commission may thus issue legislation without formal European Parliament or Council approval, although 
in practice it engages in a wide consultative process before adopting important legislation. 
Case C-202/88. 
73 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
•  Article 90 may be used to remedy breaches of the Treaty rules, flowing, inter alia, 
from the  existence  of special and exclusive  rights.  The  creation of a  European 
Regulatory Authority would be creating an administrative framework rather than 
remedying breaches of the Treaty or effects inherent in monopoly situations. 
b.  Article 100a 
Article 100a, which uses as its procedural basis the co-decision procedure as set out in 
Article  189(b)  of  the  Treaty44,  has  been  the  legal  basis  of  a  number  of  recent 
telecommunications harmonisation Directives (see Chapter 2 and Section 4.2.4).  The first 
paragraph states: 
"By way of  derogation from  Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in  this 
TreahJ,  the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of  the objectives set 
out  in  Article  7a.  The  Council  shall,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  procedure 
referred  to  in  Article  189b  [co-decision  procedure]  and  after  consulting  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee,  adopt  the  measures for  the  approximation  of the 
provisions laid down  by law,  regulation or administrative action  in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of  the internal market." 
44  Under the co-decision procedure (subject to  certain exceptions)  action by the Community's legislative bodies 
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occurs as follows: 
the Commission submits a proposal to the Parliament and the Council; 
the Parliament adopts its opinion; 
the Council adopts a common position by qualified majority; 
the Parliament may then either: 
approve the Council's common position within 3 months or reserve judgement on the common position. 
In both cases the Council adopts the proposal in accordance with the common position; or 
indicate by absolute majority that it intends to reject the common position; or 
propose amendments agreed to by an absolute majority to the common position. 
If amendments are proposed, the Parliament's suggested amendments are then forwarded to the Council and 
the Commission, and the Commission delivers an opinion on them. 
The Council, on the other hand, may either adopt or reject the Parliament's amendments within 3 months. 
If the amendments are adopted, the council  may act by qualified majority.  However, if the Commission 
has given a negative opinion of the amendments, the Council must act by absolute majority to adopt the 
amendments. 
If the amendments are rejected, then the Conciliation Committee, which consists of an equal number of 
members from the Council and Parliament, is convened and a qualified majority of the Council and 
Parliament representatives are required to reach a decision. 
Once assembled, the Conciliation Committee may either: 
formulate and approve a joint text within 6 weeks, in which case the Parliament and Council both must 
adopt it or the proposal lapses; or 
fail  to  agree in which case the proposal also lapses unless the Council confirms its original common 
position and the Parliament fails to veto the proposal by absolute majority of its members within six 
weeks of the Council's confirmation. I 
Analysis of Legal Powers of the European Community 
Case law indicates that this  Article  will only be the appropriate legal basis where the 
measure intended to be adopted under it is primarily a harmonisation measure.  In Case C-
155 j 9145, for example, the ECJ stated: 
"The fact that some provisions of  the  Directive affect the functioning of  the internal 
market  is  not  sufficient for  Article  100a of the  Treaty  to  apply.  Recourse  to  that 
provision is not justified where,  as in  this case,  the measure  to  be adopted has only 
the incidental effect of  harmonising the market conditions within the Community." 
While the establishment of a  European Regulatory Authority will doubtless further the 
single market and harmonisation of national measures, it is far from clear that the Article is 
a sufficient legal basis in itself. 
c.  Article 129b-d 
Article 129b-d, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, states as an objective the co-ordination 
of  Member  States'  transport,  energy  and  telecommunications  infrastructure  and  the 
development of trans-European networks (TENs).  Article 129c(1)  (second indent), which 
concerns the implementation of measures to ensure the interoperability of networks, uses 
the co-operation procedure, as set out in Article 189(b)  of the Treaty,  as its  procedural 
basis46. 
It would not, in itself, provide an adequate legal basis for the establishment of an ERA were 
the ERA granted powers and entrusted with tasks which go beyond the specific objective of 
establishing TENs.  If, on the other hand, the role and powers of the ERA are so limited as 
to  relate  only  to  the  establishing  TENs,  Article  129b-d  could  then  perhaps  form  the 
appropriate basis. 
d.  Article 235 
Under Article 235,  the Council may act on a  Commission proposal provided it does so 
unanimously and it has consulted the European Parliament. 
Article  235  is  of  special  interest in the  context of  establishing  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority because it has been used to establish other Community bodies.  For example, 
both the Community Trade Mark Regulation (40/94)47  and the Regulation establishing the 
45 
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Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities Case C-155/91. 
The co-operation procedure is substantially similar to the co-decision procedure (see footnote 44).  However, the 
procedures differ if the Council intends to reject the Parliament's suggested amendments to  the Commission's 
proposal.  Under the co-operation procedure, there is  no conciliation mechanism where the Council does not 
accept the Parliament's amendments.  Council can therefore adopt the legislation in accordance with its common 
position,  albeit that unanimity is  required  (instead  of a  qualified  majority)  if  (i)  Parliament has rejected  the 
Common Position or (ii) it wishes to adopt amendments which the Commission does not support. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trademark. 
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European Medicines Evaluation Agency48  take Article 235 as their legal basis, reciting, for 
example, in their preambles that the EC Treaty "does not provide, for  the adoption of  a uniform 
system at Communi h) Level, as provided for by this Regulation, powers other than  those of  Article 
235". 
Indeed, the only Community agency we have looked at during the course of this Study 
(other than those created through Treaty amendment) which has not had Article 235 as its 
basis is the European Environment Agency, which was established under Article 130s.  In 
our opinion, the establishment of this body, which has a purely information-gathering role, 
is  clearly within the ambit of the wording of Article 130s,  whereas there is no specific 
Article for which this could be said in relation to an ERA,  unless its role was defined in 
terms of TENs (see above). 
Administrative  measures  implementing  certain  "supporting  policies"  have  also  been 
promulgated under Article 235.  For example, the European Monetary Co-operation Fund 
("the Fund") and the European Monetary System were established on the basis of this 
Article.  Within the framework of its tasks, the Fund (or its administrative council) was 
given an autonomous administrative power which, in particular, included the authority 
independently to adopt administrative rules to be applied within a specific framework. 
Article 235 may be used only to attain one of the objectives of the Community.  The primary 
objectives of the Community are set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty and they include, 
as well as more specific goals, broad objectives such as the promotion of economic growth 
and the raising of living standards. 
Of particular relevance to the present Study are the objectives described in a number of sub-
paragraphs of Article 3, namely: 
(c)  an internal market characterised by the abolition, as behveen Member States, 
of  obstacles to the free movement of  goods, persons, services, and capital. .. 
(d)  a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted ... 
(h)  the approximation of the laws of  the Member States to  the extent required for 
the functioning of  the common market ... 
(n)  encouragement  for  the  establishment  and  development  of trans-European 
networks ("TENs"). 
Moreover, as Article 235  does not specifically  refer  to  Articles 2 and 3,  it may also  be 
legitimate to deploy Article 235  to attain objectives gleaned from other Treaty provisions, 
48 
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Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation 
and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European agency for the 
evaluation of medicinal products. 
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and here we point to those included in Articles 7a, 57(2), 59, 100a and 129b-d (see Section 
4.2.4). 
Another argument in favour of using Article 235  as the legal basis can be found in the 
Massey-Ferguson  case49,  which  concerned  a  regulation  on the  valuation  of  goods  for 
customs  purposes enacted  under  Article  235,  which had as  its  purpose ensuring that 
uniform rules were applied throughout the Community.  It was argued by counsel that the 
necessary power to  adopt the Regulation was granted already by other Articles of the 
Treaty,  provided that these were given a  sufficiently broad interpretation.  It was thus 
maintained that Article 235 could not be used as the appropriate legal basis.  However, the 
ECJ  ruled  that  even  if,  given  a  broad  interpretation,  other  Articles  did  grant  the 
necessary powers, this interpretation was subject to doubt and, therefore, recourse to 
Article 235 was legitimate. 
Prima facie, therefore, Article 235 would appear to be the most appropriate and logical legal 
basis for establishing an ERA, and it has been used as such a basis in analogous cases in the 
past.  so 
As  a cautionary note, there may be some limits to the extent to which judicial authorities 
will accept use of Community's implied powerss1 but, provided broad political agreement 
is  reached,  challenge is  unlikely.  Challenge could be made by a  third party before  a 
national court which could in tum (under Article 177)  refer this question of Community 
Law to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, which the national court would then apply to the 
facts. 
e.  Conclusion on legal basis 
A  prime Community objective  is  to  increase the involvement of the Parliament in the 
Community's legislative process.  The Parliament's participation in that process is essential 
to the institutional balance and should reflect the fundamental principle that the people 
take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly.s2 
However, as already stated, the choice of legal basis precedes choice of procedural basis 
and governs this decision.  The choice of legal basis must be made with a clear view of the 
49 
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Case 8(73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson 
E.g. in case of the Office of Harmonisation and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency. 
Case 2 BVR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others -v- The Treaty on European Union, [1994] 1 CMLR 
57.  The German Federal Constitutional Court held that any measure based  on a  wide interpretation of the 
Community's implied powers would not have binding effect in Germany.  It referred to the potential of Article 
235 as a "dynamic extension" of the Treaties over time and stated that this could not produce any binding effects 
in Germany.  The interpretation of the Treaty "may not have effects that are equivalent to  an  extension of the  T  reatlj". 
Obviously, this is the view of a national court rather than the ECJ, and so is inconclusive, but it does illustrate that 
the Supreme Court in Germany believes it has the power to overturn any purported extension of Community 
power under Article 235 so providing a potentially serious conflict over the supremacy of Community Law. 
Case 138/79 Raquette Freres v.  Council [1980] ECR 3333 and Case 139/79 Maizena v.  Council [1980] ECR 3393, §34. 
77 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications  n;e;r;a 
aim and content of measure to be adopted, based on an objective assessment.  This will 
determine the procedure for adoption of the measure, and only if there is a valid choice of 
two or more legal bases having different procedural bases does the issue arise of which has 
the most 
1 democratic' procedural basis. 
So,  for  example, if it was considered that Articles  lOOa  and 129b-d could both serve as 
justification for a particular measure, these could not jointly act as the legal basis of the 
measure, as each has a different procedural basis.  A decision would have to be made to use 
one or the other of these Treaty Articles as the legal basis.  In this case, ECJ case law appears 
to dictate that Article lOOa would be the appropriate legal basis, as it is this Article which 
uses the more 
1 democratic' legal basis (i.e. co-decision). 
Equally,  Article 235,  which is used where no other Treaty Article  specifically provides 
sufficient power to  attain one of  the objectives  of  the Community, cannot be used in 
conjunction with any other Article as the legal basis for a measure. 
While it is true that a European Regulatory Authority would further the single market and 
harmonisation of national measures, and assist in establishing trans-European networks, 
Article lOOa and 129b-d appear to be insufficient legal bases for establishing a such a body, 
if the intention were for it to carry out a variety of functions.  We thus argue that Article 235 
is  the better legal basis for  the creation of a  European Regulatory Authority.  Measures 
introduced under Article 235 require Council unanimity and consultation of Parliament. 
4.5  Conclusions 
In  this  chapter,  we have  looked  at the  legal  powers  of  the  European Community in 
regulating telecommunications and the powers available for  the creation of a  European 
Regulatory Authority.  Our main conclusions are as follows: 
•  The creation of a European Regulatory Authority to exercise policy making powers 
or act as a formal appellate tribunal would, in both cases, require an amendment of 
the EC Treaty. 
• 
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However,  a  Community institution could,  without Treaty  amendment,  create  a 
European Regulatory Authority with executive or decision-making power, so long 
as: 
the body is set up to operate only within a limited margin of discretion; 
delegated powers are clearly defined and subject to strict review; 
the new body is subject to the same procedural safeguards as the delegating 
body; 
the delegating body only delegates powers which it has received under the 
EC Treaty; 
the  delegation of  powers to  the  new body is  clearly  justified  under  the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
I 
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the creation of the new body is  proportional in relation to  the objective 
sought; and 
the body is created in a non-discriminatory way. 
•  Unless a European Regulatory Authority were to be created with a very narrowly 
specified role, our analysis suggests that it would stretch case law to rely on Articles 
90, 100a or 129b-d as the legal basis for establishment.  A final view on this point can 
only  be  taken  after  the  precise  role  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  is 
determined, but we consider at this time Article 235 to be the most likely legal basis. 
In Chapter 6 we go on to examine some additional legal issues relevant to the creation of a 
European Regulatory  Authority,  including those  issues  raised by any decisions  on the 
geographic reach of a  European Regulatory Authority and issues relating to the specific 
functions of a European Regulatory Authority suggested by Survey respondents. 
79 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications  n;e;r;a 
80 I 
Lessons from Other Countries and Sectors and Issues raised by Convergence 
5.  LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND SECTORS AND 
ISSUES RAISED BY CONVERGENCE 
5.1  Introduction 
In. this chapter, we draw lessons about the possible functions  and form of a  European 
Regulatory Authority from: 
•  the division of telecommunications regulatory responsibilities between federal and 
state governments in the United States, Canada and Australia, the way in which this 
division has changed in recent years and the forces behind these changes; 
•  the role of pan-European and Community bodies in other sectors and the reasons 
why these were created. 
We  also  examine some of the implications for  a  European Regulatory Authority of the 
convergence  of  telecommunications,  computing,  information  and  entertainment 
technologies. 
The result is a frame of reference for the discussion of a European Regulatory Authority, 
which is further developed in Chapter 6,  that looks at the legal and operational issues 
surrounding different forms of enhanced Community-level activity in those areas identified 
by the survey respondents. 
5.2  Lessons from Other Countries' Experience in Telecommunications 
5.2.1  United States 
The experience of the United States is of considerable significance in the current context 
given the important regulatory role played by the federal government and the fact that the 
federal role has increased in recent years.  In this section we consider that experience (a 
fuller description is provided in Appendix 7)  and examine whether the forces which have 
given rise to a powerful and growing federal role in the United States are also relevant in a 
European context. 
a.  Regulatory bodies 
Federal Communications Commission 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)  was established, as a quasi-independent 
institution,  by the  Communications  Act  of  1934.  The  FCC's  responsibilities  are  wide 
ranging  and  include  the  regulation  of  telecommunications,  radio  and  television 
broadcasting and radio spectrum. 
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In the area of fixed telephony, responsibility is split between the FCC and the state level 
Public Utility Commissions (PUCs).  In principle the FCC has responsibility for regulating 
interstate and international traffic, while the PUCs deal with intrastate telecommunications 
traffic.  In practice, the division between interstate and intrastate issues cannot be defined in 
a  precise  manner  and  the  respective  roles  of  the  FCC  and  the  PUCs  have  changed 
significantly over time. 
There are two major reasons for such changes.  Firstly, the FCC has attempted, particularly 
since the late 1960s, to take over certain responsibilities which were previously undertaken 
by the PUCs.  It has done so by the invocation of the principle of federal pre-emption which 
enables it to supersede state regulation where such regulation has a significant impact on 
interstate communications.  As noted in Appendix 7 the FCC has been successful in using 
this principle on many, although by no means all, occasions. 
Secondly,  legislative  changes and judicial rulings have shifted the balance of power in 
favour of the FCC.  This is clearly evidenced by the 1996 Telecommunications Act which 
takes away the power of states to limit entry and gives the FCC sole power over universal 
service obligations (USOs). 
In the area of mobile communications, responsibilities are likewise split between the FCC 
and the PUCs, although here again the FCC has pre-empted powers from the states in order 
to remove regulation which reduced competition and to enhance the possibility of nation-
wide mobile services. 
The FCC also has exclusive control of radio and television station licensing, whereas cable 
TV is licensed by federal, state and local regulators. 
Each  state has a  PUC,  as does the District of Columbia.  These bodies, which regulate 
telecommunications  and  other  utilities,  differ  significantly  both  in  structure,  size  and 
policies.  In  general  the  PUCs  have  adopted  a  more  conservative  approach  towards 
competition and other aspects  of regulation than the FCC  and indeed one of the main 
arguments of the FCC, for federal pre-emption, has been a desire to increase the intensity of 
competition.  However, some PUCs have been very much more innovative than others; for 
example Illinois, New York and Connecticut were active in encouraging competition at the 
intra-state level.  On the other hand, other PUCs, particularly in states with relatively few 
telecommunications intensive businesses and large USOs,  have been much less  keen to 
foster local competition.  It can be noted from Vogelsang's recent studyS3 that the FCC has 
tried to use federal regulation as a means of diffusing the regulatory innovations introduced 
in the more progressive states. 
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Bad Honnef, October 1994. 
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~  National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) 
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) is an organisation 
of federal  and state regulators although, in practice,  it represents the interests of state 
regulators.  It discusses and sponsors studies of regulatory subjects, organises federal-state 
meetings  on regulatory  issues,  participates  in regulatory  proceedings  and  attempts  to 
achieve co-ordination between the PUCs.  However, it only becomes publicly involved in a 
particular issue where there is a near consensus between the PUCs. 
Competition Authorities 
Enforcement  of  antitrust  laws  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Antitrust  Division  of  the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission and the states.  The DOJ was 
responsible  for  initiating  the  complaint  against  AT&T  which  eventually  led  to  the 
divestiture of AT&T in 1984 under the terms of the Modification of Final Judgement (MFJ). 
It has responsibilities for  telecommunications antitrust issues excepting those relating to 
certain types of mergers and in cases where issues are state specific. 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
Since 1934, the responsibility for radio spectrum management has been a federal matter. 
This assignment of responsibilities reflected the view that, due to interference problems, 
radio spectrum should be managed as a national resource.  Radio spectrum management 
responsibilities are split between the FCC, which manages non-government spectrum, and 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), which manages 
government spectrum.  It can be noted that, while the FCC's procedures are open to public 
scrutiny, those of the NTIA are not.  On the other hand it would appear that the NTIA's 
procedures are considered to be relatively quick in comparison with those of the FCC. 
b.  The changing balance of  federal and state responsibilities in 
telecommunications 
FCC pre-emption in fixed telephony 
While  the  states  continue  to  have  responsibility  for  regulating  certain  aspects  of 
telecommunications, their role has diminished in recent years and will further diminish as a 
result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  The FCC has interpreted its responsibility for 
interstate  regulation  broadly and has  used  the  principle  of  pre-emption  to  take  away 
powers from the states. 
Pre-emption has generally been justified on the grounds that the federal government: 
•  has the power to regulate interstate commerce and is required to ensure an efficient 
telecommunications network; and 
•  is responsible for managing certain scarce resources such as spectrum. 
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However,  the  primary motivation behind pre-emption has been the desire  to  promote 
competition.  This  reflects  the fact that the FCC  has,  since at least the late 1960s,  been 
interested in establishing a competitive telecommunications market whereas the PUCs have 
been more interested in ensuring that long distance charges should subsidise local and 
rental charges in order to satisfy universal service and related goals.  Having said this, it can 
be noted that a limited number of PUCs, including those in Illinois and New York, have 
actually been in advance of the FCC in promoting competition and indeed the FCC  has 
often developed its policies in the light of developments in these states. 
Pre-emption was initially invoked by the FCC in order to liberalise the customer-premises 
equipment  (CPE)  market.  Thus,  in 1968  the  FCC  invalidated  a  CPE  tariff54  which  it 
considered to be uncompetitive and in 1974 pre-empted all state regulations which were 
anti-competitive in nature.  The FCC's pre-emption was upheld by the Fourth Court of 
Appeals.  In 1980 the FCC pre-empted all state regulation of CPE, with the implication that 
CPE charges would be unbundled and separated from transmission service charges.  This 
decision was upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit. 
In 1982 the FCC pre-empted state regulation which interfered with the public's reception of 
Multipoint Distribution Service55.  This was also upheld by the Court, as was a further use 
of the FCC's pre-emption powers in relation to cable TV two years later. 
More recently the FCC has successfully exercised its powers of pre-emption in a number of 
areas including: 
•  centre marketing; 
•  enforcement of local exchange carrier (LEC) franchise boundaries; 
•  disconnection tariffs charged by a local phone company to interstate carriers; 
•  stopping  imposition  of  structural  separation  requirements  on  the  regional  Bell 
operating companies (RBOCs) for enhanced services; 
•  forbidding the introduction of a caller-identification blocking service; 
•  taking away state entry requirements for paging. 
However, the FCC has not always been successful in attempting to pre-empt state powers. 
For example, in 1986, the Louisiana Public Service Commission was granted the right to use 
different depreciation rates to those proposed by the FCC in monitoring LEC performance. 
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As noted in Appendix 7, there has been a recent tendency for the courts to take more care to 
preserve state jurisdiction. 
Federal pre-emption in mobile telephony 
Since the 1980s, when mobile communication services became of significance, the FCC has 
attempted to pre-empt state regulation of the cellular telecommunications market structure. 
Initially,  these  attempts  were  not  entirely  successful.  However,  in  1993  Congress 
established, in the Budget Act,  a  federal  regulatory framework for  Commercial Mobile 
Radio Services  (CMRS)  and Private Mobile operators.  According to this  Act,  while the 
states may seek authority from the FCC to regulate CMRS rates, such authority would only 
be granted in a limited range of circumstances.  In addition, the Act freed some federal 
government spectrum for  PCS and other mobile uses and specified that the FCC should 
auction this spectrum. 
The FCC would also like to pre-empt state CMRS interconnection rules.  However, this may 
prove difficult, in part because, on some interpretations, the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 places interconnection arrangements for CMRS in the hands of the states. 
Federal pre-emption in cable 
The FCC has also made moves to pre-empt state authority in the area of cable television. 
However, such moves have at times had unfortunate consequences.  Thus, the 1984 Cable 
Act allowed the pre-emption of state and local authorities' rate regulation for those systems 
where the FCC judged there was II effective competition".  However, as noted in Appendix 
7,  the  Cable  Act  effectively  freed  the  industry  from  state  regulation  but  prevented 
competition developing.  As a result cable TV rates increased significantly in real terms.  In 
recognition of this problem, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992 redefined II effective competition" thereby imposing federal rate regulation on most 
systems. 
Conclusions on pre-emption 
Experience in the United States suggests that the respective merits of federal and state 
regulatory responsibility will depend, in large measure, on the issue under consideration. 
Thus, in areas where externalities56  are important, such as radio spectrum management or 
numbering, there may be a case for a significant degree of federal responsibility.  On the 
other hand, where the best mode of regulation is uncertain there is a strong case for state 
regulation, perhaps in combination with federal regulation, since this will result in a variety 
of different approaches being adopted which will, in turn, show which ones are likely to 
work and which are not. 
5o  An externality exists if the actions of one agent impose costs or benefits on another agent and these impacts are 
not taken into account through market mechanisms. 
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It would appear that the primary motivation for FCC pre-emption has been less a belief that 
the issue is one which would automatically be handled best at the federal level than the 
desire to promote competition in the telecommunications market and, in pursuit of that 
objective, get rid of state powers which restrict the degree of competitions7.  In fact many, 
although not all, of the cases of pre-emption fall into this category.  Thus, the pre-emption 
of state powers in the case of both CPE and cable TV were designed to increase competition, 
while the attempt to remove the powers of the state body to set its own depreciation rates 
was also designed with this aim in mindss. 
Other factors increasing the role of the Federal Government 
While the principle of federal pre-emption has had a significant bearing on the division of 
federal and state responsibilities, other factors have also played an important role.  In 1984, 
following the MFJ,  AT&T was required to relinquish its interest in all of the RBOCs.  The 
resulting regulatory structure was based on the principle that, in potentially competitive 
markets  such  as  the  long  distance  and  equipment  market,  competition  should  be 
encouraged whereas in other markets (e.g. local loop), regulation should try to replicate the 
effects of competition. 
Regulatory responsibilities were divided as follows: 
•  AT&T interstate business- FCC; 
•  AT&T intrastate business- PUCs; 
•  RBOC local and intraLAT  A long distance services - PUCs; 
•  RBOC access and Open Network Architecture (ONA) -FCC. 
As noted in the discussion of pre-emption, the dividing line between intra and interstate 
issues is by no means a clear cut one and the division of powers following the MFJ proved 
to be a contentious one in a number of respects.  This division has now been modified by 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act which: 
•  opens up the local services market to any potential entrant; 
•  allows local exchange carriers (LECs) into the interexchange market; 
•  introduces mechanisms for limiting the interconnection charges imposed by LECs 
on interexchange carriers; and 
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type of regulation and thereby serve as a check on the powers of the federal regulator. 
The FCC  argued that Louisiana's depreciation rates would not allow the recovery of capital costs and would 
frustrate the creation of a competitive environment. I  ; 
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•  allows the states to retain authority over interconnection rates, including universal 
service  rates,  subject  to  broad  federal  rules,  such  as  cost  based  charges. 
Interconnection charges are submitted to the states for approval but the FCC can 
review such approvals. 
The Telecommunications Act 1996 thus marks a significant move towards competition and 
away from regulation.  In addition the Act increases the role of the federal government and 
the FCC and reduces the role of the state government. 
c.  Implications for a European Regulatory Authority 
The increasing role of federal regulation in the United States has not, in general, been 
motivated by a  belief that a  particular function can be exercised more effectively at the 
federal level but rather by a desire to increase competition.  In the European context the 
Commission  has  been  instrumental  in  developing  a  range  of  measures  to  increase 
competition and has been in advance of the majority of Member States in its desire to create 
a competitive marketplace.  However, if as is assumed in the remit of this study, NRAs will 
in future be efficient, independent bodies, the need for a  European federal body to take 
additional actions to foster competition will be much reduced, although not necessarily 
entirely eliminated. 
Other  possible  economic  justifications  for  federal  regulation  include  the  existence  of 
externalities, the potential reductions in transaction costs that result from only having to 
deal with one federal agency rather than a multiplicity of state ones (of particular relevance 
to licensing in the EU), and the existence of differences between states that act as barriers to 
the creation of a  true single market.  On the other hand, there are a variety of economic 
justifications for  state level  regulation, namely the importance of  having detailed local 
information and taking local conditions into account (e.g. universal service obligations), the 
fact that the cost of conducting certain regulatory activities (e.g. granting rights of way or 
dealing with consumer complaints) at a federal level would be prohibitively high, and the 
possible benefits that might be derived from the existence of a discovery process whereby 
the activities and effectiveness of different regulators could be compared. 
In practice, the division of regulatory responsibilities in the United States appears logical 
from an economic viewpoint.  Thus, for example: 
•  issues  such  as  spectrum  management,  numbering  and  standards,  where 
externalities are likely to be important, are primarily decided at the national level; 
•  issues such as rights of way, where regulatory accessibility is important, are decided 
at the state level. 
In contrast, spectrum management and numbering in Europe are primarily regulated at the 
state  level,  although  ETO  and  ERO  are  both  working  to  try  to  facilitate  greater 
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harmonisation.  While it is difficult to compare the effectiveness of regulation in different 
circumstances, it would appear to be the case that the United States has benefited from a 
federal (and hence harmonised) approach to numbering which has, for example, allowed 
the extensive  development of  nation-wide freephone  services.  Also,  problems such as 
divergent allocations of radio spectrum, which can lead to interference, have been avoided. 
One area where problems have arisen in the past in the United States has been the terms 
and  conditions  of  interconnection.  However,  this  may  change  as  a  result  of  the 
Telecommunications Act 1996, which gives the State regulators responsibility for approving 
rates  as  long  as  these  comply  with  FCC  principles59•  Such  an approach  bears  some 
similarity to  the  proposed Interconnection Directive and indicates how the appropriate 
division of state and federal regulation is likely to differ from issue to issue. 
There are of course a  number of important differences between Europe and the United 
States.  For example, there is no legal equivalent to federal pre-emption in Europe; instead 
the Community has proceeded by way of establishing political positions, later written in 
harmonisation Directives, in order to approximate national regulatory frameworks and by 
adopting measures under Article 90, in each case leaving it to NRAs to implement the new 
framework.  Various other differences also need to be considered: 
• 
• 
59 
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the FCC employs 2,271  people.  While a significant proportion of these people are 
engaged in broadcasting regulation and spectrum management, and the numbers 
are boosted by a large number of lawyers arising from the adversarial nature of the 
United States regulatory process, a body of this size is unlikely to be feasible,  or 
indeed desirable, in the European context;6o 
although  there  are  substantial  differences  in  telecommunication  networks  in 
different states in the  United States,  these  are  relatively  small compared to  the 
differences between European countries.  The extent of European differences, and of 
course language requirements, may reduce some, although by no means all, of the 
benefits which could be achieved through a European Regulatory Authority.  For 
example, the potential scale  economies which could be gained from a  European 
Regulatory Authority may be less in a European context since, at least in some cases, 
it would be necessary to take these differences into account in carrying out policy 
making and regulation61. 
A similar approach is taken with regard to RBOC entry into the long distance in their own market area where the 
Act establishes a checklist of conditions which need to be met.  Responsibility for monitoring these conditions 
rests with the states. 
A further breakdown of staffing and responsibilities is contained in Appendix 8. 
For example, in countries with developed competitive markets, there may be a considerable degree of scope for 
regulating operators using competition law.  On the other hand, in countries where competitive forces are less 
developed there is likely to be a need for detailed regulation. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that United States experience shows that there is a case to be made for 
both federal and state regulation, and that the regulatory balance will depend on the issue 
under consideration, is  of itself significant.  Moreover, the potentially important role of 
regional  diversity  in  showing what  policies  should  or  should  not be  adopted  at  the 
European level is also worth taking into account. 
5.2.2  Canada 
a.  Current position 
There are now nine regional telephone companies in Canada, which together form Stentor. 
By far the largest of these companies is Bell Canada which provides local service in Ontario 
and Quebec  (which  account for  approximately  70%  of  Canada's population)  and long 
distance services.  There is some competition in the long distance market (e.g. from Unitel), 
and in the international market from resellers, but not as yet in the local market, although 
this is likely in the near future. 
Following  recent  judicial  and  legislative  decisions,  all  dominant  telecommunications 
operators with the exception of Saskatchewan Telephone are regulated by the Canadian 
Radio Television Commission (CRTC) which, as its name suggests, is a federal body that is 
also responsible for regulating radio and TV broadcasting.  CRTC regulation covers most 
areas of these companies' activities including: 
•  the authority to approve all interconnection agreements; 
•  open access for service providers; 
•  competition safeguards, although this responsibility is  shared with the Bureau of 
Competition Policy62. 
Nevertheless, the provinces still have a role in the regulatory process.  For example, tariffs 
remain highly unbalanced in Canada in order to satisfy the goal of providing an affordable 
basic  universal  service.  This  goal  is  supported  by  both  the  federal  and  provincial 
governments and is explicitly stated in the 1993 Telecommunications Act, which in many 
other respects is orientated towards increasing competition and ensuring that regulation is 
only used where it is efficient and effective.  Since local telephony charges are set a long 
way below costs,  long distance operators make a  payment to  local  operators, which is 
effectively  a  combined  access  deficit  and  universal  service  contribution.  While  this 
payment is  determined by the CRTC  it is  apparent that the provinces are able to  exert 
pressure to ensure that rates in isolated areas remain affordable. 
It can be noted that while there is a shift towards increasing the role of competition law in the regulatory process 
its role is currently unclear in certain respects. 
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b.  Broadcasting 
As noted, the CRTC is also responsible for broadcasting regulation, although it is assisted in 
this  activity  by  the  Department  of  Industry  and  Heritage  Canada  (which  is  mainly 
responsible for content regulation).  A major concern in the field of broadcasting has been 
the level of Canadian content and this has been principally influenced through controls on 
the  cable  companies  (approximately  75%  of  Canadian  households  subscribe  to  cable 
television).  It can be noted that, with the partial exception of Quebec, there has been little 
concern expressed by the provinces over federal control of broadcasting. 
c.  Rationale for the current division of  responsibilities 
Until  recently,  Bell  Canada and British  Columbia  Telephone  Company  (BC  Tel)  were 
regulated by the CRTC, while operators in other provinces were regulated by provincial 
bodies.  In the 1970s  and 1980s  there was an extensive debate in Canada over national 
telecommunications policy issues, such as the introduction of competition and the division 
of regulatory responsibilities.  As a result of technological developments and the experience 
of other countries, the federal government became increasingly convinced of the benefits of 
introducing competition, whereas some provincial governments had been more concerned 
with other goals such as ensuring the continued provision of basic universal service.  No 
changes  took  place  until  the  Supreme  Court  decision  on  Alberta  Government 
Telecommunications (AGT) was made in 1989. 
The  AGT  case  concerned  the  unsuccessful  efforts  of  a  provider of corporate  network 
services to interconnect with AGT in the early 1980s.  Eventually, in 1989,  the Supreme 
Court ruled in favour of AGT, because of its sovereign immunity, but at the same time 
provided the federal  government with the right to  remove that immunity and thereby 
ensure that provincial operators were subject to federal regulation.  After the AGT case, 
there was a significant increase in the role of the federal regulation and a corresponding 
decline  in  the  role  of  the  provincial  governments.  Indeed,  following  the  1993 
Telecommunications Act, the role of the provinces is now largely a consultative one. 
The rationale for the increasing role of the CRTC in regulation provides some parallels with 
the United States experience, since in both cases the federal bodies have attempted to take 
powers in order to assist the development of competition.  Thus, it can be noted that AGT' s 
action on interconnection was clearly uncompetitive and, more generally, that the federal 
government has been interested in encouraging competition while the attitude of provincial 
governments has been more equivocal.  Moreover, it is evident from the progress that has 
been made in recent years that, in the absence of the shift towards federal regulation, the 
development  of  competition  would  have  been  held  back.  Cowling,  Strathy  and 
Henderson63  also argue that federal authority is  perceived by industry representatives to 
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have resulted in greater efficiency and certainty and that it is appropriate in developing the 
information highway. 
d.  Implications for a European Regulatory Authority 
With the EU now set on the course of liberalising basic voice telephony services and the 
provision of infrastructure, there may appear to be some broad similarity with the situation 
in  Canada,  particularly  given  the  parallel  emphasis  on  ensuring  the  maintenance  of 
universal service.  However, there are a number of differences between Canada and the 
European Community which should be noted: 
•  the  relationship  between  the  federal  and  provincial  governments  in Canada  is 
fundamentally different from that between the European Community and Member 
States.  In particular, the latter operate within a framework which emphasises the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
•  the extent of differences between European telecommunications markets means that 
there is  a  greater need for  strong state level regulation in Europe than there is 
Canada; 
•  as in the United States, the move towards federal level regulation in Canada has 
been  spurred by  the  desire,  of  the  federal  body,  to  encourage  competition  in 
telecommunications.  On the assumption that European NRAs become independent 
and efficient, this reason for an extension of federal regulation is less relevant in the 
EU context; 
•  the Canadian approach may reduce the role of the discovery process which is still an 
important factor  in the United States.  On the other hand, given the number of 
countries which have opened the telecommunications market up to competition, it 
could be  argued  that a  European Regulatory  Authority  would be able  to  gain 
information  on  best  practice  by  examining  performance  in  countries  with 
competitive markets both within and outside the EU. 
Together  these  points  indicate  that,  if  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  were  to  be 
introduced,  it would not be likely  to  involve  the  same  degree  of  diminution of  state 
regulation as has occurred in Canada. 
5.2.3  Australia 
a.  Current position 
There are two fixed public telecommunication network operators in Australia, as well as 
three public mobile operators and a variety of service providers.  The largest fixed public 
network operator is Telstra which is a government owned but corporatised company.  The 
other operator, Optus, commenced operations following the 1991 Telecommunications Act. 
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Further liberalisation will take place from July 1997 when the current network duopoly will 
come to an end. 
Telecommunications regulation is essentially a  federal responsibility although the states 
have powers in certain areas such as land management and environmental planning.  The 
principal regulatory body is Austel which is also responsible for competition regulation in 
telecommunications64.  Other relevant bodies are the Australian Broadcasting Authority and 
the Spectrum Management Agency. 
In contrast with some other countries, telecommunication carriers can also be suppliers of 
cable TV,  and both Telstra and Optus have entered consortia for this purpose.  Optus is 
using this as a means of establishing its presence in the local loop. 
There has been some criticism of the way in which the telecommunications industry has 
been reformed.  For example, it has been argued that the transition to full competition has 
been delayed too long and that, as a result, efficiency improvements and price reductions 
have  occurred  more  slowly  than  might have been the  case.  On the  other hand,  the 
assignment of most regulatory responsibilities appears to have been quite successful, for 
example, in the area of resolving access disputes. 
A further aspect of the Australian environment is that there is now a move towards using 
competition law rather than detailed regulation.  Thus, the Competition Policy Reform Act, 
1995, gives the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission the power to declare 
certain bottleneck facilities to be "essential facilities".  However, it is recognised that, for 
competition law  to  be  successful,  the  body implementing that law needs  to  have  the 
appropriate information.  Hence, Austel is required to develop a cost allocation manual and 
the carriers are required to provide separate accounts for network and other businesses to 
ensure that transactions are at arms length. 
b.  Implications for a European Regulatory Authority 
Given  the  major  role  assigned  to  Austel,  it is  debatable  how  relevant  the  Australian 
experience is in illustrating the advantages and difficulties associated with a dual system of 
regulation.  In addition, while it might be argued that the move towards competition law 
may have some relevance to  the EU, it should be remembered that competition has now 
been established in Australia for  a number of years and that it may be easier to rely on 
competition  law  in  such  an  environment  than  in  one  in  which  rules  regarding 
interconnection charges and other matters are still being developed. 
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5.3  Lessons from Pan-European and Community Bodies in Other Sectors 
Pan-European and Community bodies in other sectors include: 
•  the  European  Air  Traffic  Control  Harmonisation  and  Integration  Programme 
(EATCHIP) which was launched in 1990; 
•  the European Environment Agency which came into force in 1993; 
•  the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA ) was established in 1995; 
•  the Office of Harmonisation (trademarks office); 
•  the European Patent Office; 
•  the European Monetary Institute (EMI). 
These bodies, which constitute possible models for the form and functions of a European 
Regulatory Authority, and the way in which it might be formed, are discussed in Appendix 
6.  In that appendix it is suggested that the analogies which can be drawn between such 
bodies and a  European Regulatory Authority are somewhat limited given the generally 
restricted nature of their operations, and the fact that these may also be quite different to 
those of a European Regulatory Authority.  Consequently, a range of legal and operational 
issues  will  need  to  be  addressed  in  setting  up  and  running  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority which have not been encountered in running these other bodies. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the various bodies is useful in highlighting some of the 
driving  forces  towards  greater  federalism  and  in  indicating  some  of  the  operational 
problems which would need to be dealt with by a European Regulatory Authority. 
Possibly the most relevant model is the Office of Harmonisation (trademarks office) which 
was formed under Article 235.  This has the power to make decisions and has a  quasi-
judicial function. 
Another interesting parallel, though yet to be concluded, is the future European air traffic 
control programme, developed as part of EATCHIP.  The reasons for establishing such a 
body is that there are significant externalities to be gained from European co-operation. 
In practice a number of operational problems have been encountered in establishing and 
running these various bodies.  These  problems are  discussed in Appendix 6  and their 
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relevance to a European Regulatory Authority is considered in Chapter 6.  A summary is 
provided below: 
•  the choice of official languages.  The  use of  different languages proved to  be a 
problem in the establishment of the Office for Harmonisation.  The need to carry out 
its functions in different Community languages would clearly impose additional 
costs on a European Regulatory Authority; 
•  the choice of location.  There were problems encountered in the setting up the Office 
of Harmonisation and this is likely to be relevant in the setting up of a European 
Regulatory Authority; 
•  limited impact.  Where systems are not mandatory, a  European body might only 
have a limited impact on European integration.  This is a potential problem with the 
idea of a European Telecommunications Institute which was suggested by Forrester, 
NoraH & Sutton in a recent report for DG IV;6s 
•  business  complexity.  It  has  been  noted  that  the  problem  of  co-ordinating  a 
collection of businesses operating in quite different environments is likely to be a 
significant  problem  in  aviation  (see  Appendix  6).  While  the  analogy  with 
telecommunications  regulation  is  not  a  precise  one,  it can  be  argued  that  the 
differences in telecommunication markets between Member States are sufficiently 
pronounced as to set limits on the desirable degree of harmonisation of legislation 
and regulation; 
•  overlapping roles.  Where the jurisdiction of a pan-European body is not mandatory, 
as in trade marks and patents, potential users have a  choice between going to a 
national body or the European body.  The choice will be affected by issues such as 
charges and the speed of decision making.  In addition, in certain areas, the national 
and pan-European bodies may differ in their responsiveness to  the needs of the 
customer.  These factors could result in one or other of the bodies being by-passed. 
5.4  Convergence 
As  is widely recognised, we are at the early stages of "the information society".  Rapid 
progress in digital technology, fibre optics, satellite systems, compression technology and 
encryption  has  transformed  the  way  in  which  voice,  data,  images  and  video  can  be 
transmitted and stored.  When converted into digital form, the distinction between types of 
information effectively becomes blurred as  each becomes simply a  stream of bits  to  be 
delivered to the office or the home by a variety of communications infrastructures: fixed 
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and  mobile  telephony  systems,  cable  television  networks,  and  terrestrial  and  satellite 
broadcasting systems. 
Due to the use of separate technologies and means of delivery, the existing communications 
methods  have  developed  separately,  a  process  which  has  both  encouraged  and  been 
reinforced by distinct regulatory institutions and frameworks.  In the digital era, however, 
this one-to-one correspondence between the delivery system and its content breaks down. 
New  regulatory  frameworks  may  be  required  if  this  convergence  process  is  to  be 
completed.  For example, OFTEL, the United Kingdom Telecommunications regulator, is to 
take  a  role  in the  regulation  of  conditional  access  service  for  digital  television  under 
regulations proposed by the United Kingdom Government in order to transpose the EU 
Advanced Television Standards Directive (95/  47). 
The Community has already begun to respond to convergence, for example by requiring 
Member States to liberalise the use of cable networks and allow the carriage over such 
networks of allliberalised telecommunications services.  Restrictions on the carriage of basic 
voice services will also be removed in most of the Community as from 1 January 1988. 
By contrast, no action has yet been taken at Community level to remove restrictions (if any) 
imposed by Member States on the carriage of video, or entertainment services, over public 
telephone networks.  However, the Full Competition Directive requires the Commission to 
carry  out,  by 1  January  1998,  an assessment of  the  situation regarding the  remaining 
restrictions on the use of public telecommunications networks for  the provision of cable 
television and related services. 
Under the ONP rules, and under the Services Directive itself, a prime objective has been to 
ensure open access to public telephone networks.  The same issues are likely to arise in due 
course  in relation  to  other  delivery  mechanisms.  For  example,  in the  area  of  digital 
television, while a prime motivation for regulation in the analogue era (that spectrum was 
in highly limited supply) has become less important as a result of the greater spectrum 
efficiency enabled by digital compression, other possible reasons for regulation have come 
into sharper focus.  For example: 
•  universal  service,  or  the  provision  of  service  throughout the  Community  at  a 
reasonable price; 
•  non-discriminatory  conditional  access,  navigational  and  subscriber  management 
systems and listings; 
•  proper control over personal data gained by developments in interactive systems. 
In  the  light of  greater substitution between different  systems  of  delivery,  the  logic  of 
separate, and often diverse, rules of content carried over different networks will also need 
to  be reviewed, and indeed this issue has already been much discussed in the European 
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Parliament during debates on the proposal for a new Television without Frontiers Directive 
and in relation to concerns over the distribution of pornography on the Internet. 
The Commission is studying the regulatory implications of convergence in order to prepare 
a  response66.  The  KPMG  report to  the Commission67,  addressing public  policy  issues 
arising  from  telecommunications  and  audio  visual  convergence,  considers  that  the 
European Union will need to  define a  regulatory vision for  the future  which supports 
market-led developments in the convergence industries and to develop practical transition 
arrangements which progressively migrate current regulatory regimes to the new vision. 
a.  General issues raised by convergence 
The  fundamental  principle  of  freedom  of  circulation  and  the  right  of  establishment, 
especially free movement of transfrontier services, is impeded by the existence of disparities 
between Member States  in relation  to  ownership  rules.  Restrictions  placed on public 
telecommunications operators are an issue in the convergence debate and this will become 
more important as public telecommunications operators seek to provide services containing 
an audiovisual content. 
At  present,  services  are  commonly  treated  as  either  telecommunications  service  or 
broadcasting services.  Convergence has led  to  a  blurring of definitions.  For example, 
whether video on demand is  treated as  "broadcasting"  or "telecommunications"  differs 
between Member States.  Regulation tends to be based on the technology of delivery with 
some subjective assessment of content, and often leads to an unlevel playing field. 
A number of issues related to content regulation are also raised by convergence.  These 
include the broad framework of (positive and negative) content regulation, the challenge 
that the Internet poses to national definitions of, for example, taste and decency, as well as 
socio-political concerns such as the extent of universal service obligations and the role of 
public service broadcasting. 
It can be noted that different approaches have been adopted in the various Member States 
with regard to convergence issues.  For example: 
• 
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•  in Germany,  approximately  95%  of  the  cable  TV  network  is  controlled  by  the 
incumbent telecommunications operator; 
•  in most Member States,  the  provision of  public  voice  telephony  over cable  TV 
networks is prohibited. 
The fact that regulation differs between Member States may act as a  deterrent to those 
companies wishing to develop pan-European strategies. 
A further issue raised by convergence is the problem of overlapping jurisdictions.  This 
problem is apparent in the United Kingdom, for example, where there are over 20 bodies 
which are responsible for regulating the various information industries.  An implication of 
overlapping jurisdictions is that companies may need to deal with a number of bodies in 
relation to a specific issue and thus incur additional transaction costs and may be subject to 
delays.  The existence of many regulators, combined with the difficulty of determining who 
is responsible for particular aspects of regulation, raises the costs of companies wishing to 
develop converged services. 
It is  possible  that this problem may intensify in the future.  Thus, OFTEL,  the  United 
Kingdom telecommunications regulator, recently released a Consultative Document on the 
Broadband Switched Mass Market which specified its preliminary views on regulation in 
this  area.  This  paper  suggests  that  OFTEL' s  regulatory  role  should  stretch  into 
broadcasting, the technologies used by service providers, and the technologies employed by 
suppliers of set top boxes, a development which would lead to encroachment into the role 
of other regulatory bodies. 
These issues highlight the fact that convergence provides various challenges to regulation at 
the national and international level. 
b.  Need for regulation at the European level 
While  competition  will  probably  turn  out  to  be  the  single  most  important  tool  for 
influencing  the  impact  of  convergence,  ex-ante  guidance  and  regulation  and  ex-post 
monitoring are also likely to be needed in this area.  This may require more involvement at 
a European level, including: 
•  providing a partial solution to the problem of overlapping jurisdictions by giving 
the NRAs for  telecommunications control over infrastructure issues while giving 
other  bodies  control  over  content.  (As  noted  already,  the  federal 
telecommunications  regulators  in  the  United  States  and  Canada  also  have 
responsibility for many aspects of broadcasting regulation).  However, a potential 
problem here is  that control of content could be  used as  a  means of  restricting 
competition  since  stringent content  regulation  would  reduce  the  willingness  of 
companies to invest in infrastructure.  To  overcome this problem, the Community 
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may need to vigilant over the way that content regulations are applied in Member 
States. 
•  with convergence,  the number of sector-specific  regulators,  and their  respective 
roles, will need to be re-examined. 
•  economic allocation of spectrum.  Digital compression techniques have led to an 
increase in the capacity of delivery systems, which reduces the need for spectrum 
management.  However, this trend is  partly offset by the development of more 
sophisticated, bandwidth-hungry applications.  Convergence will increase the need 
for a more co-ordinated approach to frequency allocation at the European level to 
ensure the provision of pan-European telecommunications and audiovisual services. 
•  having a unified licence for companies that are developing converged services at a 
national (and European level for pan-European services). 
While  much work remains  to  be carried out on all  these  issues,  one fact  is  sure:  if  a 
European Regulatory Authority is created, it has a possible and indeed probable role in the 
development  of  policy  for,  and  regulation  of,  forms  of  delivery  systems  within  the 
Community over and above conventional telephone networks.  There will also be a need to 
ensure that content regulation does not needlessly restrict competition. 
Some of these convergence-related activities are analogous to areas identified by survey 
respondents  as  requiring  the  involvement  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority.  The 
responsibilities of a European Regulatory Authority could, therefore, extend into the areas 
listed above, working within a policy framework laid down by the Commission. 
5.5  Conclusions 
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we looked at the telecommunications industry in other countries and 
existing initiatives in other industries in Europe.  On the basis of these case studies, we 
identified a number of reasons why there has been a move towards an increasing role for 
federal bodies, particularly in the United States and Canada.  For example: 
•  in the  area  of telecommunications,  there  is  a  growing awareness  that there  are 
significant benefits associated with the creation of a  competitive marketplace.  In 
both  the  United  States  and  Canada,  federal  authorities  have  been  particularly 
interested in introducing and increasing the extent of competition whereas the state 
and provincial authorities have, with some exceptions, shown less interest; 
•  it has been recognised that some functions are better undertaken at a federal level 
because of externalities.  The clearest example of such an activity is radio spectrum 
management, although numbering would also appear to fall within this category; 
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•  in other  areas,  for  example  licensing,  the  creation  of  a  federal  body can bring 
important benefits in terms of reducing transaction costs and delays; 
•  in the United States, where there is a dual system of regulation, the FCC has been 
assigned  the  responsibility  of  setting the  policy  framework  in some  areas  (e.g. 
competition  policy,  interconnection  charges)  while  the  state  regulators  are 
responsible for monitoring whether these conditions are met.  Assigning the FCC a 
role in these areas may help to ensure that a consistent approach is adopted in each 
state which in turn may generate a number of benefits. 
These  factors  suggest that there  may be  an important role  for  a  European Regulatory 
Authority  in  Europe.  However,  there  are  already  a  number  of  European  bodies  in 
telecommunications and it needs to be considered how far these bodies fulfil the various 
roles which a European Regulatory Authority might undertake. 
The  nature and role  of  existing  European bodies  involved  in telecommunications  was 
considered in Chapter 2 of  this Report.  We  note  that there are existing bodies which 
already carry out a number of the functions which a European Regulatory Authority might 
undertake,  e.g.  in  the  areas  of  number  harmonisation  and  spectrum  allocation. 
Nevertheless, the Survey we carried out as part of this Study identified a number of gaps in 
the  current  regulatory  framework  for  telecommunications  in  Europe,  as  described  in 
Chapter 2.  While the existing bodies have played some role in reducing transaction costs 
and delays in certain areas (e.g. ETO's one stop licensing procedure), the Survey indicates 
that  there  are  areas  in  which  the  current  activities  of  European  bodies  involved  in 
regulation  may  prove insufficient  to  meet market needs  in relation  to  certain  aspects 
(particularly  pan-European  aspects)  of  areas  such  as  interconnection,  numbering  or 
licensing. 
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6.  LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
6.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss legal issues concerning the creation of a European Regulatory 
Authority, including those issues raised by any decisions on the geographic reach of a 
European  Regulatory  Authority  and also  issues  relating  to  the  specific  functions  of  a 
European Regulatory Authority suggested by Survey respondents.  We then discuss some 
of the general operational issues that would need to be considered in creating a European 
Regulatory Authority. 
6.2  Legal Issues Concerning the Geographic Reach of a European 
Regulatory Authority 
As  mentioned  briefly  before,  the  breadth  of  membership  of  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority would need to be considered.  Membership of a European Regulatory Authority 
could be limited to  EU  Member States  (and the EEA),  but that might be seen to  be a 
retrograde step as other existing bodies, such as CEPT, already enjoy wider membership. 
This issue is addressed in a previous report68 which suggests that a European Regulatory 
Authority would have to fit into one of the following institutional models: 
•  uAn  EU Authority under  the  supervision  of the  Commission,  whose  structure  would  be 
similar  to  that of other existing or  trans-European  institutions, established under Article 
235 legislation"; 
•  an  EU  Authority  that  would  be  totally  independent,  and  outside  any  control  by  the 
Commission or other EU institutions"; 
•  "an independent Authority whose membership would not be limited to EU Member States". 
That report also differentiates a European Regulatory Authority from other existing bodies 
by stating that a European Regulatory Authority: 
• 
• 
68 
11Would probably have to include non-EU members"; 
"might  need  to  take  permanent  charge  of some  areas  currently  handled  (or  at  least 
supervised) by the Community" 
See Stanbrook &  Hooper, "Legal and Institutional Issues Raised in Preparing for the Full Liberalisation of the 
Telecommunications Sector". Report to the European Commission, 1994. 
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•  "for political reasons  (at least) would have to  be independent of  the  Commission  [especially 
if  it includes non-EU Members]".69 
a.  Can the European Regulatory Authority admit non-EU Members? 
Under Article 210 of the EC Treaty, which states "The Community shall have legal personalihf', 
the  Community  enjoys  the  right  to  establish  contractual  links  with  third  countries  if 
necessary to achieve Treaty objectives. The authority to enter into such agreements need not 
be explicitly stated in the EC Treaty. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, it may arise implicitly 
provided  the  Community has  the  power  to  attain  a  specific  treaty  objective  and  the 
international agreement is to further that Community goal7°. 
However, it was not clear until Opinion 1/7671 that the Community had the authority to 
establish an international agency that could enforce the agreed provisions between the 
Community and a third country.  In that case, the ECJ held that the Community not only 
had the power to create an agency but that it could confer the institution with "powers of 
decision" provided they were II appropriate for the objectives pursued." 
The "appropriate powers of  decision" were stated to be in the case itself limited to delegation of 
executive authority, and the ECJ raised, but did not address the issue of conferring policy-
making authority to  international bodies.  It stated, however, that transfers  of authority 
should not constitute "a surrender of  the independence of  action of  the Community in its external 
relations" nor a 
11 change in the internal constitution of  the Community by the alteration of  essential 
elements of  the Community structure." 
Opinions 1/91 and 1/9272 also suggest that the Community may not transfer legislative or 
judicial powers to  an international body if the body makes rules that directly affect the 
allocation of responsibilities and powers defined in the EC Treaty. 
In line with the conclusions of Chapter 4,  any powers to be delegated to an international 
body would probably need to be limited to executive functions which would not alter the 
internal constitution of the Community. In theory, the transfer of executive powers in itself 
69 
70 
71 
72 
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In  a  separate report for  DGIV,  Forrester Norrall &  Sutton have stated that possible options for  a  European 
Regulatory Authority include, "a wholly independent Authority, an Authority answerable to  the Community 
institutions, a consolidation of the Commission's functions based on its competence in the field of Competition 
Law  and  Policy,  and  a  framework  centred  on  the  Commission's  competition  powers".  Because  of  legal 
difficulties,  Forrester  Norrall  &  Sutton  also  contemplate  the  possible  interim  solution  of  a  European 
Telecommunications Institute ("ETI")  which initially would not have regulatory or supervisory functions,  but 
could be "responsible for strengthening of co-operation between the NRAs and co-ordination of the policies, 
monitoring  single  market legislation,  consolidating  the  activities  of various  committees  and  the  holding  of 
consultations".  ETI could also formulate opinions and submit recommendations. 
Cornelius Kramer and Others, Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76. 
Opinion 1/76, given pursuant to  Article 228(1)  of the EEC  Treaty,  involved a  draft agreement to  establish a 
European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels. 
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could upset the balance of the Community structure, but the Community could preempt 
this by preparing European common positions on issues after consulting Member States 
before any vote is cast in meetings by the international body. 
b.  How would a European Regulatory Authority with a wider membership be 
formed? 
Assuming that authority to delegate the necessary powers to an international body exists, 
the focus  shifts  to the mechanism by which authority may be delegated.  A  regulation 
adopted  under  Article  235  could not fully  achieve  the  intended result,  as  regulations 
according to the Treaty are binding in their entirety "in all Member States." It therefore 
applies only to the Community and its Member States. The third country could  not be 
bound  by  the  terms  of  the  regulation  without more.  Thus,  any  regulation  creating  a 
European Regulatory Authority with third country participation would to be accompanied 
by, or at least foresee, a separate act to bind those third countries. 
The ERTA case73,  however, held that sui generis acts by Community institutions enable the 
Community to enter binding agreements with third countries. The Treaty itself contains 
both specific provisions for Community co-operation with third countries in certain areas 
(e.g.  Article 129c(3)  for  the promotion of "projects of mutual interest and to ensure the 
interoperability  of  networks")  and a  general  provision  (Article  228)  providing for  the 
conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or international 
organisations.  This  procedure involves  the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament. Arguably, this Article does not directly apply in this case as the Treaty does not 
explicitly provide for the conclusion of agreements with non-EU states for the regulation of 
telecommunications, but we suggest it is appropriate that these procedures are followed. In 
some cases, the specific provision makes explicit reference to Article 228  (see Article 130m 
[research and development co-operation] or Article 130r(4)  [environmental cooperation]). 
Even in the absence of such a specific reference within the provisions of Article 129c(4) in 
relation to  trans-European telecommunications networks, it seems likely that Article 228 
would still form the basis for such an agreement with third countries. 
c.  Examples of  Participation by non-EU members in existing agencies 
The  Community agencies  discussed  at Section 4.3.lb of  this  report do not provide for 
participation by non-EU  Member countries. On the other hand, as  discussed in Section 
4.3.lb,  Member States  themselves  are  allowed  to  participate in varying  degrees  in the 
decision-making of these bodies. 
EU and non-EU member states do, however, participate in the range of bodies and agencies 
at a European level.  The CEPT and the Community Patents Office are examples of bodies 
73  Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, Case 22/70. 
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whose membership extends and, in the latter case, is permitted to extend according to the 
terms of its Convention beyond Member States of the Community74. 
The European Radiocommunications Office is an example in the telecommunications area 
of a body with specific tasks, whose membership extends to all European countries who 
have agreed to ERO Convention75 as well as operators, manufacturers and service providers 
involved  in  telecommunications  in  those  countries.  Although  ERO  strives  to  achieve 
consensus among its members, it has no executive decision-making power. Article 18 of the 
ERO Convention specifically states that the Convention will not interfere with the sovereign 
right of each member state to regulate its own telecommunications. 
Although the Community Patent Convention has yet to be ratified, the Community Patents 
Office, as envisaged by the Convention, will make and carry out executive decisions on 
patents. Non-EU nations may join by invitation of the EU countries on terms and conditions 
agreed to by the Contracting States and the third state.  The Convention is an agreement 
between the Community Member States rather than one between the Community and a 
third country. 
d.  Conclusions on the geographical reach of  a European Regulatory Authority 
The European Regulatory Authority might be established as an international body having 
executive responsibilities in defined areas of activity. Such delegation should not alter the 
Community's structure and a co-operative mechanism to ensure that due regard is taken of 
Community policies on telecommunications would need to be developed. 
A European Regulatory Authority could also be established as a Community agency, for 
example,  by  Regulation.  That  Regulation  might  also  foresee  invitations  for  non-EU 
countries  to  join  the  agency.  This  could  be  done  by  binding  agreements  with  the 
Community, probably based on Article 228. The involvement of third countries would not 
need to be foreseen, however, in the Regulation as the Community has the implicit power to 
contract with third countries if the agreement furthers  a  Community objective.  In this 
scenario,  European  Regulatory  Authority  powers  also  would  be  limited  to  executive 
decision-making  and  the  Community  would  need  to  develop  a  mechanism  whereby 
common positions after consultation with Member States would be adopted. 
6.3  Legal Issues Relating to Specific Functions of a European Regulatory 
Authority 
In this section, we deal with specific issues raised by the Survey, examining in each case the 
legal viability of recommendations made by Survey Respondents. 
74 
75 
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Within the overall CEPT structure, telecommunications regulatory issues are handled within ECTRA.  Certain 
technical  tasks  in  the fields  of frequencies,  licensing and numbering are conferred upon the European Radio 
Communications Office (ERO) and on the European Telecommunications Office (ETO). 
Convention for the Establishment of the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO), The Hague, 23 June 1993. ll/e/r/a  Legal and Operational Issues 
a.  Interconnection 
Respondents to the Survey call for  some interconnection functions to be transferred to a 
European Regulatory Authority in order to further the single market and to assist in the 
establishment of trans-European networks.  Others argue the case on the grounds that too 
much discretion on interconnection terms is  allowed at national level,  even under the 
proposed  Interconnection  Directive.  By  way  of  example,  respondents  argue  that  the 
Commission, or a European Regulatory Authority, needs to get deeper into the detail of 
cost accounting issues if the single market is to be achieved. 
I  Some  options  for  the  role  of  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  with  respect  to 
interconnection are suggested in Section 3.3.  They are as follows: 
•  a  fully  empowered body,  determining,  at a  more  detailed  level  than  does  the 
proposed Interconnection Directive,  the cost basis for  interconnection and either 
determining,  ex-ante,  a  more  detailed  framework  for  prices  and  other 
interconnection terms or,  alternatively,  acting as  the body to  which negotiating 
parties can appeal if they fail to agree interconnection terms; 
•  a body which would intervene in disputes which the NRAs cannot resolve to the 
satisfaction of the negotiating parties, or to which the NRA itself could pass on 
disputes for resolution; 
•  a body with a stronger harmonisation role than existing pan-European institutions 
(such as ECTRA) and which may also act as a forum for inter-NRA discussions and 
cross-fertilisation of experience, while leaving regulation and enforcement to NRAs. 
The first option in relation to interconnection would, in our view, justify and require the 
establishment of a  European Regulatory  Authority.  Clearly  it raises  issues  under the 
subsidiarity principle, but these could be overcome if political consensus can be achieved. 
Under the delegation doctrine,  the Commission would determine the high-level policy 
objectives, as it has done under the proposed Interconnection Directive, but a  European 
Regulatory  Authority  could  undertake  a  day-to-day  role  in  the  determination  and 
application of interconnection rules. 
The  second  option  presents  a  legal  difficulty  for  reasons  discussed  in  Section  4.3.2. 
Moreover, under the proposed Licensing Directive, Member States must already provide a 
national  procedure  for  making  appeals  regarding  the  decisions  of  an  NRA  to  an 
independent body.  The proposed Interconnection Directive also includes provision for 
"conciliation" at Community level but this falls short of a full appeal process whereby a 
decision of an NRA might be overruled by the Commission or by the ONP Committee. 
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The  third  option  might  be  achievable  under  the  existing  framework  and  without  a 
European Regulatory Authority if: 
•  existing Community agencies, such as the ONP Committee, become more visible 
and pro-active and perhaps if they are further resourced (for example, with a larger 
standing secretariat); and 
•  the  system  of  work  orders  and  mandates  between  the  Commission  and 
organisations like ETO  were used more widely and regularly and worked under 
tighter timetables. 
b.  Licensing 
Respondents to the Survey make mention of the activities of ETO, but point out that the 
work ETO is doing in the field of one-stop shopping for licences is presently focused on 
co-ordinating national applications for licences for a limited number of telecommunications 
services. 
Operators interested in establishing trans-European networks see advantages in being able 
to  apply  for  a  single  licence  authorising  the  establishment and  operation  of  systems 
throughout  the  Community.  They  argue  that,  even  under  the  proposed  Licensing 
Directive,  individual  licences  remain  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  networks  or 
systems in each Member State and that a  number of constraints or barriers remain, for 
example: 
•  procedures  differ  from  country  to  country;  two extreme  cases  are  the  UK  and 
Germany.  The UK works out licences in a very detailed fashion, while for example 
in  Germany,  licences  are  much  shorter;  rights,  restrictions  and  obligations  in 
Germany are instead established by laws and regulations. 
•  there  are  differences in levels  of compliance and enforcement between Member 
States; differences in levels of enforcement are important as, even if formal rules are 
harmonised, the differences may detract from the Single Market. 
•  in a number of countries it is  not always clear what information is  required for 
licence applications, and the application process can be cumbersome.  In others, the 
process is seen as more easy going.  This can be an important practical problem; the 
time taken to prepare a licence application may also vary greatly. 
Some  survey  respondents  argued  that obtaining 15  separate  licences  would  impose  a 
significant additional burden on operators in terms of finance and the time taken to  be 
granted a  licence.  At the same time,  it was argued that there would be differences in 
licence conditions, making the life  of an operator more difficult.  Significant delays and 
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difficulties  in obtaining licences could work against achieving a  Single Market and the 
rapid establishment of the Information Society. 
Further progress could be made in this area by further  resourcing  ETO  to  allow it to 
undertake a larger work programme or, perhaps, by providing a larger standing secretariat 
for ECTRA.  Some respondents, however, consider this to be insufficient. 
Possible approaches include: 
• 
• 
replacing national licensing altogether in favour of Community wide licensing by a 
European Regulatory Authority 
establishing parallel national and Community schemes (rather as with the European 
Trade Mark and European Patent); 
•  distinguishing between situations having a Community dimension and those that 
do not, particularly in the context of trans-European networks, and providing an 
improved  means  for  obtaining  a  single  Community  Licence,  perhaps  from  a 
European Regulatory  Authority in the latter case.  Merger control serves  as  an 
example of  a  divided process,  as  mergers  having a  Community dimension are 
reviewed by the Merger Task Force of DG  IV,  while those that do not remain the 
responsibility of the relevant Member States. 
The second or third of the approaches identified above are likely to be more attractive to 
Member States and more consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The first approach may be difficult to achieve without an amendment to the Treaty (and 
again would require political consensus). 
c.  Numbering and number portability 
Sections 3.6 and 3.10.4 relate to numbering and number portability76.  Some interviewees 
are looking for: 
• 
• 
76 
greater  co-ordination  of  numbering  for  the  long  term  creation  of  a  European 
numbering space and in defining general rules for the management of numbers by 
NRAs; 
the formation of a  European Regulatory Authority to  resolve number validation 
disputes between operators and NRAs; 
For information on the Commission's numbering policy, see Green Paper on a Numbermg Policy for Telecommunications Services m 
Europe, COM (96) 590. 
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•  true pan-European numbers for services such as freephone. 
Some interviewees also stressed the need for harmonisation of the methodologies used to 
allocate  the  cost  of  introducing number portability  in each  Member State  in order to 
promote the Single Market. 
In our opinion, there are no legal constraints, other than the general issue of subsidiarity 
(which seems relatively minor here), to these activities being undertaken by a  European 
Regulatory  Authority.  Alternatively,  however,  it may be  possible  to  adopt a  middle 
solution by promoting the role of the Commission through the work orders in the field of 
numbering  given  to  ETO,  as  well  as  for  its  work with  the  ECTRA  Project  Team on 
Numbering and initiatives such as the European Numbering Forum. 
d.  Allocation and management of  radio frequencies 
Section 3.5 shows that some respondents to the Survey want more effective co-ordination of 
radio frequencies  at Community level,  particularly in the area of satellites.  Others are 
content to rely on existing arrangements, a line apparently endorsed by the Council in the 
context of S-PCS. 
At  one  extreme,  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  take  over  responsibility  for 
allocation of the radio frequency spectrum from Member States, but that is  likely to be 
resisted on a number of grounds including subsidiarity and could possibly require a Treaty 
amendment. 
Alternatively,  a  European Regulatory  Authority could take a  pro-active role in the co-
ordination of the radio spectrum and the identification of new areas of the spectrum for 
new services or, as a lesser step still, the Commission could continue its process of funding 
mandates  for  work  in  this  area  by  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  and  to  deliver 
recommendations on spectrum issues.  These last two activities would not appear to raise 
major issues under the head of subsidiarity, though the former could lead to a charge of 
duplication of work. 
e.  Funding and enforcing universal service obligations 
Section  3.10.3  shows that one half of those  responding took  the  line  that a  European 
Regulatory Authority should have a role with respect to universal service obligations, often 
for  fear  that differing  approaches  to  calculating  the  cost  of  USOs,  as  well  as  related 
contributions,  in different  Member  States  could  tilt  the  playing field  in favour  of  the 
incumbent or work against the concept of the Single Market.  It should be noted that the 
Survey took place before the publication by the Commission of the criteria to be used in 
assessing national universal service schemes and providing guidelines for the operation of 
such schemes, including detailed guidance with regard to  the costing and financing  of 
universal service. 
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The organisation of USOs on a true Community-wide basis, so that for example subsidies 
might be paid by a German operator to meet the cost of universal service in Greece, is not 
currently contemplated.  The only  role  of  a  European Regulatory  Authority,  therefore, 
might be in the area of developing a harmonised framework for  the calculation of USO 
costs and harmonised rules for universal service funds within Member States, although this 
is already occurring via the proposed Interconnection Directive.  There would not be any 
legal impediment to a European Regulatory Authority taking on that role provided that it 
did not extend to the making of actual policy decisions; also subsidiarity does not appear to 
be a major barrier. 
6.4  General Operational Issues 
6.4.1  Roles and Potential Operational Problems of a European Regulatory Authority 
In this section we examine some of the operational problems which might be encountered 
by a European Regulatory Authority.  We initially look at the possible roles of a European 
Regulatory Authority and the operational issues and problems which would need to be 
addressed  in  performing  these  roles,  including  the  relationship  between  a  European 
Regulatory Authority and existing European telecommunications bodies (a  discussion of 
these bodies and their roles is provided in Appendix 5). 
A European Regulatory Authority could perform one or more of a number of alternative 
roles: 
•  Under  an ex-ante  role,  high  level  policy  would continue  to  be  determined  by 
existing Community policy making institutions although a  European Regulatory 
Authority  could be  involved  in specifying  the  detailed  rules  to  implement the 
agreed policy framework and ensuring consistency across different regulatory areas; 
•  Under an ex-post role,  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  have  a  role  in 
dispute resolution on a case-by-case basis; 
•  As a European resource centre, a European Regulatory Authority could assist in the 
administration and allocation of Community telecommunications resources  (such as 
numbers, licences and frequencies); 
•  Drawing  on  best  practice  throughout  Member  States,  a  European  Regulatory 
Authority  could  assist  the  NRAs  in  an  advisory  role  by  providing  technical 
expertise. 
Below, we first consider each of these roles in turn, and then move on to highlight some 
general issues  that would need to  be considered,  regardless  of the roles  assigned  to  a 
European Regulatory Authority. 
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a.  Ex ante role 
An ex  ante role for  a  European Regulatory Authority could involve formalising existing 
policies and developing new policies.  However, this role raises a number of important 
issues as: 
•  granting a high level policy role to a European Regulatory Authority would require 
an amendment to the EC Treaty (see Section 4.3); and 
•  the  Community  has  already  taken  measures,  principally  through  the  use  of 
Directives, to liberalise and harmonise telecommunications, whilst the Commission 
is increasingly developing guidelines to stimulate best practice amongst NRAs. 
These points raise doubts over the need or legal appropriateness, at the current time, of 
creating a European Regulatory Authority with such a policy role. 
As  an  alternative  to  being  a  policy  formulating  and  development body,  a  European 
Regulatory Authority could be assigned the more limited role of specifying existing policies 
in more detail.  Thus, in the area of interconnection charges, the body could be involved in 
the detailed specification of the costing methodology and of the costing allocations to be 
used for individual asset categories, while in the area of accounting separation the body 
could have responsibility for defining, at a disaggregated level, what are retail and what are 
network costs within an overall policy framework provided by Community law. 
Resource requirements are an important concern in the creation of a European Regulatory 
Authority, and issues to be resolved include both the numbers of staff needed and the 
specific technical expertise required.  Some of the issues that might be relevant to this body, 
such as the detailed specification of the framework to calculate interconnection charges and 
to  produce  separate  accounts,  would  require  a  considerable  number of highly  skilled 
people.  It can be noted, for example, that OFTEL, in the UK, employs seventeen people in 
its  economics  accounting team and,  given  the  need to  develop  a  framework  which is 
appropriate for countries with very different telecommunications markets and information 
systems, the resource requirements could be significantly higher.  Staff numbers for bodies 
involved in telecommunications are provided in Table 2.2 as an illustration. 
While many respondents argued the case for  a  greater degree of harmonisation, others 
pointed out that there was a danger in too much harmonisation in some areas.  A particular 
concern was that, in countries in which competition is established, a European Regulatory 
Authority  could  result  in  regulation  replacing  a  market  driven  approach,  e.g.  in  the 
determination of cost floors  for  retail services and the determination of interconnection 
charges for competitive services. 
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A further concern is the potential overlap of a European Regulatory Authority with existing 
European bodies such as ETO, ERO and ETSI.  A number of possible solutions might be 
adopted, including: 
•  incorporation of these bodies into a European Regulatory Authority.  However, this 
raises a number of issues such as the fact that these bodies have a  membership 
which stretches beyond the EU; 
•  establishment of formal links between the existing European bodies and a European 
Regulatory Authority which would enable them to provide advice in their specialist 
areas to a European Regulatory Authority.  It can be noted that the Commission has 
entered into Memoranda of Understanding with both ETO and ERO to allow the 
funding of work orders for the Commission; 
•  establishment of a European Regulatory Authority whose function it would be to 
provide specialist advice to the Commission; 
•  limitation of the issues covered by a European Regulatory Authority to those which 
are not examined by ERO, ETO and ETSI  (e.g. interconnection).  In this context, it 
can be noted that few  survey respondents believed that a  European Regulatory 
Authority should be involved in standards; 
•  a mixed option whereby a European Regulatory Authority might take over certain 
executive tasks  (such as  the administration of the licensing one-stop-shop)  from 
these bodies but the latter would retain their role in examining technical issues. 
b.  Ex post role 
As an alternative, or possibly in combination with an ex ante role, a European Regulatory 
Authority might be assigned a  role in dispute resolution but, for  the reasons discussed 
above, that would have to be an informal role,  to which parties voluntarily submitted, 
rather than as part of a conventional legal process.  Such a role nonetheless raises a number 
of issues. 
An important issue concerns national approaches to the detail of regulations, which are 
likely to differ to a very significant degree.  For example, in the case of interconnection 
charges, which under the proposed Interconnection Directive are required to be cost based, 
estimated costs may vary according to the cost standard used, pending the development of 
guidelines and best practice within the Community by the Commission, and the derivation 
of individual cost allocations and apportionments.  It would require considerable time and 
effort for a European Regulatory Authority to get to grips with any individual cost system 
let alone the cost systems of each Member State.  One way of reducing this problem would 
be for the framework for cost systems to be specified at a European level or at least that a 
requirement exist for information to be produced in a certain format which would allow 
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comparison between Member States.  However, this would impose substantial costs on 
network operators. 
c.  European Resource Centre 
As  a  European  resource  centre,  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  assist  in the 
administration  and  allocation  of  Community  telecommunications  resources  (such  as 
numbers,  licences  and frequencies).  This  role  might also  build on the  administrative 
support functions already carried out by existing institutions (e.g. the licence one-stop-shop 
provided by ETO). 
Issues which need to be considered in looking at the creation of a  European Regulatory 
Authority acting as a European resource centre include: 
•  whether  Member  States  would  be  required  to  participate  in  the  centralised 
allocation of European resources or would do so on a voluntary basis; 
•  how the roles of such a body and those of ETO and ERO could be combined; 
•  the  nature  and  extent  of  demand  for  pan-European  resources  (such  as  pan-
European freephone numbers, operator licences and frequency allocation). 
d.  Advisory role 
The introduction of competition into monopolistic telecommunications markets will mean 
that NRAs in these countries will need to deal with a range of important issues.  A potential 
role  for  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  would  be  to  provide  advice  on 
telecommunications  issues;  thus,  in  effect,  it  would  act  as  a  consultancy  service. 
Alternatively  a  European  Regulatory  Authority  could  collect  information  on  different 
aspects  of  countries'  performances  (e.g.  retail  and network charges,  operators'  market 
shares) which could be made available to operators. 
Issues which would need to be addressed in establishing a European Regulatory Authority 
with these roles include the following: 
•  the need to determine whether there is any demand for a body, the role of which is 
merely to collect information and produce statistics; 
•  given that there is a demand, the difficulty in forecasting level of activity and the 
skilled resources to satisfy this demand. 
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e.  Other issues 
It is  also  worth  briefly  highlighting  some  other  issues  which  need  to  be  considered 
whatever roles are assigned to a European Regulatory Authority: 
• 
• 
• 
6.4.2 
the  experience  of  existing  pan-European  bodies  has  highlighted  the  problems 
arising from the use of different languages.  However, while this would clearly 
impose  additional  costs  on  such  a  body,  it  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an 
insurmountable hurdle; 
the need to determine an appropriate location might delay the establishment of a 
European Regulatory Authority.  However, since it would be likely to take some 
time to establish a body with significant ex ante or ex post functions, this would be 
unlikely to  be a  significant problem in practice.  On the other hand, if it were 
decided to integrate ETO and ERO in a European Regulatory Authority this could 
mean changing the location of these bodies; 
regulation is likely to provide inferior outcomes to competition.  Thus, a European 
Regulatory  Authority  may  only  be  required  for  a  transitional  period  until 
competition is fully effective.  This being the case it might be advisable to set up a 
European  Regulatory  Authority  with  a  clearly  defined  lifetime.  However,  if 
transitional in nature, some may argue that its creation will represent unnecessary 
bureaucracy and disproportionate expenditure. 
Ways of Dealing with Potential Operational Problems 
Section 6.4.1  considered the potential roles that a  European Regulatory Authority could 
perform and the implications for the functions that it might undertake.  In each case we 
have highlighted potential operational problems.  The selection of the most appropriate role 
and functions of such a body is outside the remit of the current study. 
In this section we suggest some ways of dealing with the following operational problems 
identified in the previous section: 
•  staffing levels and skills; 
•  determination of the division between a European Regulatory Authority and NRAs; 
•  relationship with the NRAs; and 
•  the relationship with ERO, ETO, ETSI. 
a.  Staffing levels and skills 
An issue of particular significance is the resource requirements of the regulatory body.  In 
Table 2.2 we showed the functions of various regulatory bodies in different countries and at 
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a pan-European level and the number of people employed by these bodies.  It can be seen 
that the resource requirements of a European Regulatory Authority would be significant if 
it were to carry out most or all of the functions of these various bodies. 
In practice, a European Regulatory Authority might not need to perform a number of the 
more labour intensive functions, as these could be dealt with primarily at a national level. 
Functions of this type include detailed spectrum allocations and monitoring of frequency 
usage and consumer affairs.  Nevertheless, if  a  European Regulatory Authority were to 
become involved in the detailed specification of methodologies, in areas such as setting 
interconnection charges, and in ensuring that these methodologies are implemented in a 
consistent way,  the resource  requirements could still be considerable.  Furthermore,  a 
European Regulatory Authority's role could be more complex than those of NRAs in that it 
has to  deal with individual Member States,  each of which has at present a  dominant 
operator, rather than a single country. 
A further problem is  that many of the issues a  European Regulatory Authority could in 
principle address require people with highly developed skills.  While it might be possible to 
second staff from NRAs, this may not be feasible in practice since the NRAs themselves 
may be short of staff with the appropriate skills. 
As the number of people needed to staff a European Regulatory Authority would depend 
on the roles assigned to that body, it is important to have a clear specification of the duties 
of a European Regulatory Authority and to consider in detail the numbers of staff required 
to perform particular duties.  Discussions with NRAs in Europe and other countries would 
provide valuable information on likely resource requirements. 
Resource requirements would be likely to be a particular problem if a European Regulatory 
Authority became involved in monitoring the approach adopted to regulatory issues in the 
various Member States.  While some degree of monitoring is required to ensure consistency 
of approach it would seem advisable to limit the role of a European Regulatory Authority 
in this area and where necessary consider the use of outside assistance (e.g. consultants).  It 
can be noted that with the creation of independent NRAs the requirement for a European 
Regulatory Authority to examine the implementation of regulation in particular Member 
States may be reduced. 
b.  Detennination of  division between a European Regulatory Authority and 
NRAs 
Where possible the division between the role of a European Regulatory Authority and that 
of the NRAs should be based on economic considerations.  For example, where externalities 
are significant, as is the case with numbering, or transaction costs are important, as in the 
case  of  licensing,  there  may  be  grounds  for  transferring  some  responsibility  to  the 
Community level.  Where these considerations are less important, or where there are good 
reasons for issues to be dealt with at the national level, as is the case for consumer affairs, it 
is less than clear why a European Regulatory Authority would need to be involved. 
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c.  Relationship with NRAs 
There  would be  likely  to  be  some  degree  of conflict between a  European  Regulatory 
Authority and the NRAs.  Measures which could be taken to reduce the degree of conflict 
include the following: 
•  clearly defining the respective roles of a  European Regulatory Authority and the 
NRAs and their interfaces; 
•  developing a set of benchmarks to test the extent to which measures are in place to 
encourage competition; countries which meet these benchmarks could be allowed 
more flexibility in meeting the precise specification of EC regulations (e.g.  costing 
rules); 
•  putting in place a clearly stipulated set of procedures to ensure that operators do not 
try to use a European Regulatory Authority to bypass NRAs. 
d.  Relationship with ETSI, ETO and ERO 
The Survey responses suggest that there would be little need for a European Regulatory 
Authority to become involved in -setting standards.  In the case of spectrum management, 
numbering and licensing issues there was more support for having a European Regulatory 
Authority involvement.  This being the case it is clearly important to examine how such a 
body would relate to both ERO and ETO.  One possible approach would be to use ERO and 
ETO  as  research organisations providing analyses which could be used by a  European 
Regulatory Authority to develop inputs to policy-making by the Commission. 
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This  Study  has  been  executed  within  the  context  of  Community  liberalisation  of  the 
telecommunications sector set for 1 January 1998.  We note that Europe already has a well-
developed regulatory framework, so the purpose of the Study is  to look beyond 1998  to 
examine whether the current responsibilities of different telecommunications bodies and the 
balance between them will be sufficient to meet market needs or whether gaps exist in the 
current regulatory framework, which call for  resolution at a European level or by a new 
European Regulatory Authority. 
Below, we summarise the main conclusions to the study. 
1.  From our Survey, it is  clear that there is a  degree of support for a  European 
regulator.  Support for enhanced European regulation is strongest in the areas of 
interconnection,  numbering  and  number  portability,  licensing,  frequencies  and 
universal service.  There was also strong support for the direct involvement of a 
European Regulatory Authority in the implementation and enforcement of existing 
telecommunications Directives, although such a  transfer of responsibilities would 
not be possible without a  Treaty change.  Nevertheless, action could be taken to 
address  the  need  to  improve  implementation  and  enforcement  of  Community 
regulations. 
2.  Support for a European Regulatory Authority may grow after 1998 when practical 
problems show the limits of the current framework.  This  is  indicated by the 
Survey  results,  which  demonstrate  that  the  technical  debate  surrounding  the 
creation of a European Regulatory Authority is still very much in its infancy and that 
consciousness of its possible relevance varies widely. 
3.  Any  attempt  to  create  a  new  regulatory  body with  a  policy  function  or  an 
appellate  role  would require  a  Treaty amendment.  Treaty  amendments  were 
adopted  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  European  Investment  Bank  and  the 
European Central Bank, although these bodies arguably have more developed policy 
functions than the tasks which might fall onto a European Regulatory Authority.  On 
the other hand, the ECJ has already held that executive powers may be delegated by 
the Community provided they are subject to strict review. 
4.  Legally, it would be possible under the Treaty to create a body (which may or may 
not involve participation by non-Member States) with an essentially "managerial" 
or "operational" role.  Without an amendment of the Treaty, delegation of clearly 
defined powers to a Community Agency is permissible so long as the body remains 
subject to review and so long as the delegating body only delegates powers which it 
has received under the EC Treaty.  As an example, while we do not consider that it 
would be possible,  without Treaty amendment, to  create a  European Regulatory 
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Authority with the power to decide whether operators should be required to allow 
interconnection, we do consider it possible for a European Regulatory Authority to 
be  given the task of  determining interconnection terms where operators seeking 
cross-border interconnection cannot reach agreement. 
5.  The legal basis for creating a European Regulatory Authority would depend on its 
tasks, but the most probable legal basis would be Article 235  of the EC  Treaty. 
Article 235 provides a mechanism for the Council to take "appropriate measures" to 
attain a  Community objective  where the Treaty has not expressly  provided the 
necessary powers.  Possible objectives include, under Article 3, attaining an internal 
market,  ensuring  that  competition  in  the  internal  market  is  not  distorted  and 
encouragement of trans-European networks.  A European Regulatory Authority, as 
has been the case with other Community agencies, would be likely to be created by a 
Council  Regulation.  If a  European  Regulatory  Authority  was  created  as  an 
international agency, an agreement with third countries would be required. 
6.  Experience in telecommunications in other jurisdictions and experience in other 
economic sectors within the EC establish economic grounds for the creation of an 
European Regulatory Authority.  There has been a trend towards federal regulation 
in both Canada and the United States, while, in Australia, telecommunications has 
always been regulated at the federal level.  In both Canada and the United States, the 
move  towards  federal  regulation  has  been  largely  motivated  by  the  need  to 
supervise the introduction and extension  of  competition in a  consistent manner 
throughout the federal  territory.  In addition,  there has been a  recognition that 
certain roles can best be fulfilled at a federal level, for example where externalities 
are present (e.g.  spectrum allocation and numbering).  A  parallel move towards 
resolution at a Community level has occurred in a number of sectors.  Indeed, we 
note that the advantages of undertaking certain functions at a Community level has 
already been recognised in telecommunications and a range of bodies have been set 
up including the ONP Committee, the European Telecommunications Office and the 
European  Radiocommunications  Office.  However,  this  patchwork  of 
telecommunications bodies may not provide a sufficiently coherent framework for 
the regulation of the single market. 
7.  There are a range of practical issues that would need to be resolved in creating a 
European Regulatory Authority.  These include: 
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•  resourcing and staffing levels; 
•  attracting people with the necessary high levels of skills; 
•  the potential problems of imposing a regulated solution in markets in which 
competition is already well developed; 
•  choice of language; 
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•  location; and 
•  the fact that the body may only be needed during a transitional period. 
The creation of a European Regulatory Authority would require some rationalisation 
to prevent overlap and/  or omissions in telecommunications regulation.  This might 
affect the functions of Community level committees working in telecommunications, 
such as the ONP Committee, and may also lead to some limited modification of the 
functions of the Commission, pan-European bodies and the NRAs. 
8.  Convergence  may create  new pressures  for  a  European  Regulatory  Authority 
and/or  new  approaches  to  its  role.  The  European  Union  needs  to  define  a 
regulatory vision for  the future, which supports market-led developments in the 
convergence  industries,  and to  develop  practical  transition  arrangements  which 
progressively  migrate  current  regulatory  regimes  to  the  new  vision.  While 
competition policy may turn out to be the single most important tool for regulating 
the impact of convergence, ex-ante guidance and regulation, and ex-post monitoring, 
are also likely to be needed in specific areas, including interconnection of, and access 
to,  broadband wired or wireless networks,  use of  conditional access  systems  or 
subscriber management systems and also, perhaps, in the area of content.  These 
issues need be considered in defining the tasks of a European Regulatory Authority. 
9.  Europe  may  not require  a  single  unique  regulatory  structure.  A  number  of 
options exist for improving regulation in Europe post-1998.  Each of these options 
would build on the  current set of  Community  proposals  and Directives  which 
establish  the  framework  for  regulating  European  telecommunications  after 
liberalisa  tion: 
• 
• 
• 
a  co-ordinating  role  for  the  Commission  to  guide  national  regulatory 
authorities and encourage best practice among them; 
a  rationalisation of the  work of the  various  existing telecommunications 
committees and bodies that operate at a Community or wider pan-European 
level; 
creation of a body which: 
receives and carries out specific mandates from the Commission on a 
broad or narrow sphere and advises it and the national regulatory 
authorities on current or future regulatory issues; and 
takes over, in a more rationalised and comprehensible form, some of 
the  technical  functions  of  other  existing  European 
telecommunications  bodies  and  committees  (both  inside  and/  or 
outside  the  Community)  but with  greater  resources  and  a  larger 
secretariat enabling  it to  take  on a  more  effective  ex-ante  role  in 
developing policy recommendations and/  or monitoring the market; 
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•  a  regulatory  body  having  day-to-day  management  powers  which 
complement  some  of  the  duties  of  national  regulatory  authorities, 
particularly  in relation  to  networks  or  services,  but which  work  within 
objectives and policies set from time to time by the Community; 
•  an independent regulatory body. 
The  last  of  these  options  for  developing  European-level  telecommunications 
regulation would require Treaty amendments. 
10.  The creation  of a  regulatory body for  telecommunications at the level  of the 
European  Union  would  be  likely  to  be  an  organic  process,  with  regulatory 
functions added or removed as the need to do so became clear.  Regulatory changes 
instituted now will not preclude further developments at a later stage.  In pursuing 
any of the options for further development of European Union telecommunications 
regulation, it is important to do so in a way that will allow easy transition to the next 
option should the need arise. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AGT 
CEN 
CENELEC 
CEPT 
CERP 
CMRS 
CPE 
CRTC 
DECT 
DOJ 
DSI 
EATCHIP 
EC 
ECJ 
EEA 
EMCDDA 
EMEA 
EMI 
EU 
ECTRA 
ENO 
ETO 
ERC 
ERO 
ETS 
ETSI 
FCC 
GATS 
GATT 
GSM 
ICJ 
IRCC 
ISDN 
ITU 
LATA 
LEC 
MFJ 
MOU 
NARUC 
NRA 
NTIA 
Alberta Government Telecommunications 
European Standards Committee 
European Electrotechnical Standards Committee 
Conference of European Post and Telecommunications Administrations 
European Committee for Postal Regulations 
Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
customer-premises equipment 
Canadian Radio Television Commission 
Digital European Cordless Telephone 
Department of Justice 
Detailed Spectrum Investigation 
European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme 
European Community 
European Court of Justice 
European Economic Area 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency 
European Monetary Institute 
European Union 
European Committee of Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs 
European Numbering Office 
European Telecommunications Office 
European Radiocommunications Committee 
European Radiocommunications Office 
European Telecommunications Standards 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
Federal Communications Committee 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Global System for Mobile 
International Court of Justice 
International Radiocommunications Consultative Committee 
Integrated Services Digital Network 
International Telecommunications Union 
Local Access Transport Area 
Local Exchange Carrier 
Modification of Final Judgement 
Memorandum of Understanding 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
National Regulatory Authority 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
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OFTEL 
ONA 
ONP 
PUC 
RBOC 
S-PCS 
TEN 
TO 
uso 
WRC 
WTO 
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Office of Telecommunications 
Open Network Architecture 
Open Network Provision 
Public Utility Commission 
Regional Bell Operating Companies 
Satellite-Personal Communications Systems 
Trans-European Networks 
Telecommunications Operator 
Universal Service Obligation 
World Radiocommunications Conference 
World Trade Organisation 
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